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ABSTRACT
VERTICAL CONTRACTING IN THE US HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Stuart V. Craig
Matthew Grennan
This dissertation studies the economic forces that determine prices in business-to-business
health care markets. Health care is a large fraction of the US economy. In US health care
markets, consumers are often insured and interact with the health care system through
intermediary decision makers (health care providers, insurers, and employers). Prices for
the associated goods and services in these markets are typically negotiated in businessto-business transactions, which may have complicated implications for consumers. In this
dissertation, I analyze pricing agreements across three vertical channels. First, I document
large variation across insurers in the prices paid for the same medical services at the same
hospital. This price variation, although difficult for consumers to observe, is driven at least
in part by insurers’ negotiating effort, and materially impacts the value of the insurance
plan. Second, in a retrospective analysis of hospital mergers, I document relatively small
cost savings, or “efficiency” gains post-merger. Where they do exist, cost reductions tend to
be concentrated among high-tech implantable devices, and among hospitals for which market
concentration in the output market is of the greatest concern. Finally, I study competition in
the employer sponsored health insurance market. I estimate a model of supply and demand,
which allows me to simulate the introduction of a potential publicly offered insurance plan,
or public option, to the employer-sponsored market. I find that a public option has limited
competitive impact on competition in the employer sponsored market under most policy
scenarios, due to existing price discrimination and wide variation in the cost of providing
insurance to different employer groups.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

CHAPTER 1 :

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CHAPTER 2 :

How Important Is Price Variation Between Health Insurers? . . . . .

3

2.1

Setting and Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

2.2

Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.3

Results

2.4

Implications

2.5

Conclusion

CHAPTER 3 :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Mergers and Marginal Costs: New Evidence on Hospital Buyer Power 31

3.1

Data and Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

3.2

Mechanisms of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3.3

Empirical Specification and Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3.4

Estimates of Merger Treatment Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.5

Conclusion

CHAPTER 4 :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Competition in Employer Sponsored Health Insurance

. . . . . . . . 73

4.1

Setting and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

4.2

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

4.3

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

v

4.4

Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.5

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4.6

Conclusion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

vi

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 :

Quantifying Price Variation Within and Between Groups . . . . . . . 14

TABLE 2 :

Between Insurer Price Variation for Composite Price Measures . . . . 16

TABLE 3 :

Variation in Prices by Plan Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

TABLE 4 :

Merger Sample Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

TABLE 5 :

Summary of Product Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

TABLE 6 :

Comparison of Merging and Non-Merging Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . 52

TABLE 7 :

Merger Treatment Effects – Pooled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

TABLE 8 :

Merger Treatment Effects – Heterogeneity, Within Brand . . . . . . . 67

TABLE 9 :

Characteristics of Employer Panel, 2001-2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

TABLE 10 : Market Shares and Premiums Under a Public Option . . . . . . . . . 112
TABLE 11 : Market Shares and Premiums Under a Public Option, No Switching
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
TABLE 12 : Quantifying Price Variation Within and Between Groups with Weighting
By Patient Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
TABLE 13 : Quantifying Price Variation Within and Between Groups with Balanced
Panels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
TABLE 14 : Patient Characteristics and Hospital Choice Across Payers in Boston
HRR, All Inpatient, 2009-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
TABLE 15 : All Inpatient Prices, All Payers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
TABLE 16 : Patient Characteristics and Hospital Choice Across Funding Type in
Boston HRR, All Inpatient, 2009-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
TABLE 17 : ASO and HMO Effects Under Assumed DGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
TABLE 18 : Comparison of Matching Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
TABLE 19 : Merger Treatment Effects on Price – Alternative Matching . . . . . . 132
vii

TABLE 20 : Merger Treatment Effects – Re-weighting for Generalizability . . . . 134
TABLE 21 : τ + 1 Market Share of Products Purchased in τ − 1 . . . . . . . . . . 137
TABLE 22 : Merger Treatment Effects on Purchase Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
TABLE 23 : Evidence on Differential Attrition of Merging Hospitals . . . . . . . . 140
TABLE 24 : Main Price Regressions Excluding 2014 Mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
TABLE 25 : Estimated Savings Using Within-Brand Merger Effects . . . . . . . . 143
TABLE 26 : Estimated Savings Using Pooled Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
TABLE 27 : Merger Treatment Effects – Alternative Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
TABLE 28 : Merger Treatment Effects on Price – Alternative Timing . . . . . . . 149
TABLE 29 : Merger Treatment Effects on Price – Alternate Standard Errors . . . 150
TABLE 30 : Cost Regressions Using the HCRIS Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
TABLE 31 : Between Employer Premium Variation by Employer Size . . . . . . . 162
TABLE 32 : Estimation Restrictions and Sample Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
TABLE 33 : Switching Behavior and Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
TABLE 34 : Semi-parametric Tests of State Dependence in the Employer Panel . 169

viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 :

Correlation of Provider-Payer Price Across Procedures . . . . . . . . 13

FIGURE 2 :

Hospital-Specific Price Levels Relative to BCBS . . . . . . . . . . . 19

FIGURE 3 :

Negotiated Prices for Lower Limb MRIs at Winchester Hospital . . 23

FIGURE 4 :

Merger Treatment Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

FIGURE 5 :

Merger Treatment Effects – Event Studies, PPIs . . . . . . . . . . . 59

FIGURE 6 :

Variation in Premiums, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

FIGURE 7 :

Dynamic Premium Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

FIGURE 8 :

Estimated Demand Parameters

FIGURE 9 :

Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

FIGURE 10 : Employer Costs and Public Option Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
FIGURE 11 : Change in Premium Offers Under a Public Option . . . . . . . . . . 114
FIGURE 12 : Consequences of Price Variation for Enrollee Out-of-Pocket Spending
and Plan Actuarial Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
FIGURE 13 : Distribution of Beds by Treatment Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
FIGURE 14 : Merger Treatment Effects on Purchase Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . 138
FIGURE 15 : Merger Treatment Effects – Event Studies, Non-PPIs . . . . . . . . 145
FIGURE 16 : Merger Treatment Effects for Targets – Event Studies using Alternative
Timing Supports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
FIGURE 17 : Merger Treatment Effects For Acquirers – Event Studies using Alternative
Timing Supports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
FIGURE 18 : Relationship Between Vendor HHI and Treatment Effect . . . . . . 152
FIGURE 19 : Plan Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
FIGURE 20 : Claims History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
FIGURE 21 : Enrollment Census

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
ix

FIGURE 22 : Average Premiums Benchmarked to Published Data . . . . . . . . . 159
FIGURE 23 : Premiums and Market Shares in the Self-Insured Market . . . . . . 161
FIGURE 24 : Count of firms in the 5500 data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
FIGURE 25 : Probability of observing a switch and panel length . . . . . . . . . . 165
FIGURE 26 : Simulated ρ = P(A4)/P(A2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
FIGURE 27 : Fit of Estimated Premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
FIGURE 28 : Within-Employer Variation in Premiums and Enrollment . . . . . . 177
FIGURE 29 : Testing for Impact of Fluctuations in Coverage Count . . . . . . . . 179

x

CHAPTER 1: Introduction
This dissertation studies the economic forces that determine prices in business-to-business
health care markets. Health care is a large fraction of the US economy. In US health care
markets, consumers are often insured and interact with the health care system through
intermediary decision markers (health care providers, insurers, and employers). Prices for
the associated goods and services in these markets are typically negotiated in businessto-business transactions, which may have complicated implications for consumers.

In

this dissertation, I analyze pricing agreements between hospital and insurers (Chapter 1),
hospitals and upstream supply and device manufacturers (Chapter 2), and insurers and
employers (Chapter 3).
The first chapter, coauthored with Keith Ericson and Amanda Starc, studies the role of
insurers in negotiating prices with hospitals. Using data from the Massachusetts All Payer
Claims Database, we document extensive price variation across health insurers for the same
services at the same hospital. We have three main findings. First, we show that the variation
in prices across insurers is about as large as the variation in prices across hospitals. Second,
we demonstrate that these prices, although difficult for consumers to observe, substantially
impact the actuarial value of the insurance plan. Third, we find that insurers negotiate lower
prices for the fully insured population, where the insurer bears more risk, than they do for
self insured employers. Our results suggest that insurer effort, while absent from existing
bargaining models, is an important determinant of these negotiated prices.
In the second chapter, coauthored with Matthew Grennan and Ashley Swanson, we study
the nature of hospital buyer power. Hospitals frequently cite cost savings, generated from
more efficient input use or lower prices for inputs, as a justification for horizontal mergers.
We evaluate this claim using a unique data source on hospital purchase orders for medical
supplies. One advantage of this data is that it represents costs that are marginal, and
therefore the most likely setting for cost “efficiencies” to be passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices. Existing literature on mergers and hospital costs is mixed and typically
1

relies on cost reports collected by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which
contain measures of average costs. We combine the data on purchase orders with panel
data on hospital ownership transitions to analyze the impact of realized hospital mergers.
We find only modest evidence of cost savings by hospitals after a horizontal merger. Cost
reductions, when they do occur, seem to be driven entirely by lower prices for the same
inputs, and concentrated among high tech implantable devices. Savings are also concentrated
among hospitals that are acquired in a transaction. Acquiring hospitals experience a slight
increase in prices relative to the non-merging comparison group, suggesting the potential
for managerial disruption around the merger. We also note that cost reductions are largest
among hospitals that merge with a close competitor, where prior literature has found the
highest incidence of downstream price increases for hospital services.
The third chapter studies price setting in the market for employer-sponsored insurance.
Building on prior work demonstrating first-degree price discrimination in this market, I
document additional evidence that insurers respond to employers’ switching costs with
invest-harvest pricing – setting low premiums to attract new employers, and raising them
for employers who are already locked in. I then estimate a structural model of supply and
demand that accounts for switching costs and dynamic premium setting. I use the model to
evaluate the impacts of a counterfactual publicly provided insurance plan, or public option,
under a range of assumptions about the characteristics of the plan. A key insight provided
by the model is that expected health care costs vary considerably across employer groups.
Therefore, in a market where employers already receive individual premium offers from
private insurers, a public option that sets a uniform – or “community rated” – premium will
tend to unravel as it attracts only the most costly employers. A public option that is able
to obtain a large cost advantage by regulating reimbursements to health care providers can
lessen the degree of adverse selection by lowering the unit cost of health care consumption.

2

CHAPTER 2: How Important Is Price Variation Between Health Insurers?
High health care costs are a major public policy concern. Higher quantities and prices both
contribute to the United States’ uniquely high costs relative to other countries (Garber and
Skinner 2008, Cutler and Ly 2011). Furthermore, price variation across settings, providers,
and regions has received substantial media and policy attention.1 Prices for the same service
vary substantially between geographic markets and between providers in a given geographic
market (Cooper et al. 2019). While the recent literature has focused on between-provider
variation, negotiated prices may vary across insurers as well. In this paper, we provide new
descriptive evidence for the role of insurers and payers in setting negotiated prices. We
explore the size of price variation between insurers, how contracting incentives affect these
prices, and consequences for individuals and self-insured employers.
We document variation in prices paid to the same provider for the same service using
data from the Massachusetts All-Payer Claims Database (APCD). We examine negotiated
payments for five well-defined services (knee and hip replacements, vaginal and cesarean
deliveries, and MRIs), in addition to overall price levels for all inpatient care. Betweenpayer price variation is similar in magnitude to between-provider price variation. Across our
five clinical cohorts, the standard deviation in prices across hospitals, controlling for payer,
ranges from 17-31 percent of the mean. In comparison, the standard deviation in prices
across payers, controlling for hospitals, ranges from 16-28 percent of the mean. The most
expensive major payer is about 13% more expensive on average than the cheapest major
payer in our sample. For comparison, the highest-priced hospital system in our data is 27%
more expensive than the average of other hospitals.
Examining variation in prices between payers at the same provider largely eliminates quality
differences as a potential explanation. Differences in bargaining between payers may reflect
underlying differences in enrollees’ demand for providers across payers, the ability of payers
1
Note: this chapter is based on joint work with Keith Marzilli Ericson and Amanda Starc, originally
published in the Journal of Health Economics (Craig et al. 2021a).

3

to steer enrollees to specific hospitals, or bargaining ability.

In our data, differences

in underlying enrollee demand across payers are unlikely to explain price differences, as
demographic characteristics (e.g., income) and distance to nearby hospitals are relatively
balanced across payers. Finally, one might also be concerned that price differentials across
payers could reflect differences in underlying severity and inputs used to treat patients.
Examining MRI prices allows us to isolate a homogeneous procedure where even the
“chargemaster” rate (list price) is largely the same across payers within a provider.
Variation in negotiated provider prices is important for at least two distinct reasons. First,
consumers bear part of those costs in the form of out-of-pocket spending. Second, higher
provider prices translate into higher costs for self-insured employers and, potentially, higher
insurance premiums in the fully-insured market. While price transparency efforts have
focused on helping consumers compare prices between providers before obtaining care, the
earlier choice of which insurer to buy from will also have important effects on the health
care prices consumers face. All else equal, consumers should prefer plans offered by insurers
with lower negotiated rates. This is particularly true as the popularity of high-deductible
insurance plans grows. Moreover, because self-insured employers pay medical costs directly
at the prices their insurer (henceforth “payer”) negotiates, they should prefer lower negotiated
provider prices in administrative services only (ASO) contracts.2
Choosing a low price instead of a high price major payer (about a 15% difference in negotiated
prices) leads to an average out-of-pocket (OOP) savings of $182 in a high-deductible plan;
an individual with more knowledge about the types of service and hospitals they would
experience greater price variation. The cost reduction for self-insured employers is larger:
$750-$1,000 per enrollee.3
2
Self-insured employers do not technically work with insurers, but with an ASO or third-party
administrators who administer the plan. We use the term “payer” to refer to both these entities and to
insurers.
3
The average commercially insured individual in Massachusetts has about $5,000 in health care spending
(Lassman et al. 2017). We observe prices that are 15-20% lower at the lowest price payer relative to the
highest. All else equal, a medium-size enterprise with 200 insurees would save $150,000-$200,000 per year
by choosing the payer with lower provider prices. While ASO contracts could offset higher provider prices
with lower administrative fees, these fees are only about 5% of claims on average making it unlikely that

4

Given the importance of between-payer variation, we explore strategic payer behavior. The
existing literature suggests that payers will receive lower prices if they have larger market
share or greater ability to steer patients to specific providers (Sorensen 2003, Roberts et al.
2017, and Ho and Lee 2017).4 Our theory shows that—in addition to these forces—the
response of insurance demand to negotiated prices is a crucial determinant of negotiated
price levels; to our knowledge, this parameter has not been measured. Contracting incentives
are also important. In a fully-insured product, the payer bears most of the costs of higher
negotiated prices; in an ASO contract, the payer typically receives a fixed fee and the selfinsured employer bears the costs of higher negotiated prices. All else equal, we predict
that payers will negotiate less aggressively when they are not financially responsible for the
claim; in the data, negotiated prices at a given hospital are higher in ASO contracts (by
about 2-4%), holding payer constant. Consistent with previous studies, we also find that
managed care (HMO) plans command prices that are 3-5% lower, holding payer constant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes relevant features of the insurer
market and related literature. Section 2.2 describes our data and estimation strategy.
Section 2.3 discusses the magnitude of variation in negotiated provider prices. Section 2.4
discusses the implications of this variation for the value of an insurance plan, and provides
a framework for understanding payers’ negotiated provider prices. Section 6 concludes.

2.1. Setting and Related Literature
Negotiation between payers and providers determines most health care prices outside of
Medicare fee-for-service. Rather than paying a posted price, payers typically negotiate
“allowed amounts” with providers. We focus our discussion on employer-sponsored insurance,
which is the dominant form of private health insurance in the United States; however, our
insights are also relevant for other insurance markets.5
they fully offset observed price variation CHIA (2016)
4
The incentives of insurers to negotiate lower prices has been identified as way to mitigate provider
pricing power (see Ho and Lee 2017 and Ho and Lee 2017).
5
For example, see Garthwaite and Scott Morton (2017) on prescription drug coverage.

5

Employers in the U.S. healthcare system often purchase insurance on their enrollees’ behalf.
In fully-insured plans, the insurer takes on both administrative responsibilities and financial
risk. These fully-insured plans are typically purchased by small employer groups; Cebul
et al. (2011) show that the fully-insured market is characterized by high search costs and
loads. In the market for these fully-insured plans, the employer serves as a (potentially
imperfect) agent for employees.
Alternatively, employers can self-insure through ASO contracts or third-party administrator
contracts. Under these arrangements, the employer contracts with a payer to administer the
benefit, but the employer remains financially responsible for claims. The contract can take
the form of a fixed per-enrollee fee paid by the employer to the payer. Alternatively, the
employer may pay a percentage of overall claims as a fee, or the fixed fee may depend on
a prior year’s claims (see Jeng 1996). In these contracts, the employer bears the marginal
cost of additional healthcare costs; moreover, fees based on percentage of claims can lead
payers to receive high payments as negotiated prices increase. Both features attenuate the
incentive for payers to negotiate lower prices. Large employer groups typically self-insure,
due in part to federal law.6
Our paper is related to a literature on insurer pricing. Cooper et al. (2019) examine the
role of price variation between providers. Clemens and Gottlieb (2017) show that changes
in relative prices between services tend to follow Medicare. Clemens et al. (2017) show that
private payers tend to deviate most from Medicare when sufficient value is at stake. Other
work examines the effect of managed care on prices. Cutler et al. (2000) find that HMOs
have lower expenditures largely due to lower negotiated prices, and Wu (2009) finds similar
results examining hospital prices in Massachusetts from 1993-2000 using data from a large
employer.7 In both cases, however, between payer price variation could account for some
6

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA preempts self-insured plans from state
insurance regulation (see Dalton and Holland (2019) on tax motivations for self-insurance, Feldman (2012)
for a moral hazard argument, and Jensen et al. (1995) for the role of regulation).
7
Wu’s results show substantial variation in the discounts the HMO plans secure relative to the fee-forservice plan (ranging from 26-52%). However, Wu’s results also show that hospital fixed effects explain a
limited fraction of variation in prices. That is in contrast to both our results and the recent work of Cooper

6

of the observed lower HMO prices. More recently, Roberts et al. (2017) examine variation
in prices for outpatient office visits using data from FAIR Health (a dataset of about 60
insurers). They find that insurers with larger market share in a county negotiate lower
prices in that county.8
Our paper is also related to the structural bargaining literature, which has not historically
modeled the impact of strategic insurer behavior. Most papers (from Town and Vistnes
(2001) to Gowrisankaran et al. 2015) model insurers as maximizing consumer surplus, while
Ho and Lee (2017) model insurers as maximizing the Nash product of their own profits
(premiums net of claims) and consumer surplus. The latter formulation nests everything
from Nash Bertrand pricing to a break-even constraint for insurer, but does not explicitly
consider the negotiation incentives that result from contractual form.

2.2. Empirical Strategy
We explore between-payer provider price variation in the private health insurance market in
the state of Massachusetts. Using the Massachusetts All Payer Claims Database (APCD),
we analyze prices for a representative set of services commonly provided to the privately
insured. These data are ideal for our analysis for three reasons. First, the data report
the actual negotiated prices between hospitals and payers (“allowed amounts”). Second, the
data contain the universe of commercial claims in the state, including both ASO plans and
fully-insured plans. Third, we observe payer identifiers, which allow us to estimate price
differences between payers and hospitals.
et al. (2019), and may be due to the method of measuring prices (per-diem rate for all admissions, as opposed
to well-defined services).
8
Finally, Curto et al. (2019) find that Medicare Advantage plans pay lower rates than traditional
Medicare. However, this may be due to regulation particular to this market.
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2.2.1. Data and Price Measurement
We examine claims for 18-64 year-olds at 68 acute care hospitals in Massachusetts from
2009-2011.9 We analyze facility fees, which do not include payments to individual providers
(which are typically separately negotiated). We focus the discussion of our results on
the three largest payers in Massachusetts: Blue Cross Blue Shield, Tufts Health Plan,
and Harvard Pilgrim. We also present prices for three national payers—UnitedHealth,
Aetna, and Cigna—which are large organizations but make up only a small fraction of
the Massachusetts market.10 Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of
specific payers.
We use two strategies for price measurement and follow Cooper et al. (2019) when possible.
The first measure is focused on precision and the second is focused on generalizability.
To measure prices precisely, we select narrowly-defined services with limited heterogeneity,
so that measured prices are driven by bargaining, rather than by differences in treatment
intensity or patient severity. We use five clinical cohorts: admissions for hip and knee
replacement (ICD 8151 and 8154), vaginal and cesarean delivery (ICD 7359 and ICD 741),
and lower limb MRI (CPT code 73721). We analyze these samples individually, but we also
aggregate data across these clinical cohorts to form a “composite” sample, which we view as
representing average prices across the basket of services we identify.
We select these cohorts to isolate variation in negotiated price, rather than variation in
patient severity. In practice, hospitals are generally paid in one of two ways. Hospitals are
often paid prospectively, and in many cases this payment is negotiated as a fixed markup
over the DRG-based Medicare fee schedule. When this is the case, our clinical cohorts will
do a good job isolating “true” price variation, in the sense that prices will not vary based on
idiosyncratic patient complication. However, in some cases, hospital payments are negotiated
9

Following prior work, we restrict to the set of facilities that can be matched to the AHA and are
identified as "general surgical acute care" hospitals (Cooper et al. 2019, Ericson and Starc 2015a)
10
We observe prices for other payers, and include them in our analyses; due to small sample sizes at many
hospitals we do not report their coefficients.
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as a fraction of the chargemaster (list price), which may vary based on number and intensity
of admission-specific treatments.11 Focusing on MRIs alleviates concerns about unobserved
patient heterogeneity; because we define the MRI cohort based on a single CPT code, the
charge price is largely the same across all patients at a given hospital for a given point in
time.
For all of our samples, we exclude anyone under 18 or over 64 years, out-of-state enrollees,
and those with missing provider information. We exclude episodes whose prices are in the
top or bottom one percent of the price distribution and the top one percent of length-ofstay, as these cases are likely to represent measurement error or idiosyncratically complicated
admissions that may not be representative of a patient’s expected price of care. We also
exclude inpatient cases where the patient had multiple discharge dates or was admitted
to multiple hospitals in order to avoid pricing idiosyncrasies that may be associated with
transfers.
To further ensure that we isolate a homogeneous set of treatments, we perform additional
cohort-specific restrictions. For hip and knee replacements, we include only patients age 4064 and we exclude all admissions where a crushing injury or tumor was recorded in any of
the diagnosis fields. For vaginal deliveries and cesarean sections, we focus on cases where the
patient was between 18 and 40 years old, and exclude any cases that would be disqualified
from inclusion in the hospital’s cesarean section rate.12 To avoid potential bundling of
services, we restrict our lower limb MRI sample to patient days with no other facility claims
and where there was a separate professional claim for the reading of the MRI. As in the other
cohorts, we exclude the payments made on these professional claims as these are typically
bargained for separately between the payer and physician. Finally, in order to ensure that
we have enough data to adequately estimate an average price, we restrict the sample to
hospital-payer combinations with at least 10 cases.
11
Cooper et al. (2019) note that these two methods of payment account for the vast majority of payments
for inpatient hospital services.
12
See Kritchevsky et al. (1999).
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In our exercise focused on generalizability, we construct a sample including all inpatient
admissions. The sample of all inpatient admissions better represents the full basket of
services over which payers and hospitals negotiate, but may contain more measurement error.
These data generally follow the same inclusion rules as the narrow clinical cohorts. However,
we are more agnostic about the relevant clinical processes and patient characteristics in this
sample, applying no restrictions on these dimensions except to control for them in the
regression specifications. Here, we restrict to hospital-payer pairs where we observe at least
50 hospital admissions.
In regressions using the “all inpatient” sample, we use the primary ICD-9 diagnosis codes to
adjust prices. While prior literature has typically used the dianosis-related groups (DRGs)
for this purpose (e.g. Cooper et al. 2019; Gowrisankaran et al. 2015), our data does not
include a reliable record of DRG. DRGs form the basis of payment for a plurality of hospital
admissions (42-49%), though discounts off the chargemaster and per diem rates are also
common (Cooper et al. 2019, Weber et al. 2019). We view the diagnosis codes as providing
similar dimensions of complexity to DRGs. However, they are typically more granular than
a DRG, offering a potential to capture some of the intensity differences that may drive
variation in charges.
A natural concern with using the diagnosis codes to estimate Equation 2.1 on our “all
inpatient” sample is that provider treatment decisions may be an important determinant
of the DRGs (McClellan 1997). However, approximately 27 percent of inpatient cases are
missing a primary ICD-9 procedure code. By contrast, less than 0.01 percent (34 cases)
are missing the ICD-9 diagnosis code, due to stricter reporting requirements. Thus, while
we use procedure codes (ICD-9 and CPT) to define precision-centered clinical cohorts and
composite sample, we choose to use the ICD-9 diagnosis codes in order to maximize the
generalizability of the “all inpatient” sample.
We explore the sensitivity of our analysis to this choice in Section 2.3.
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For most of our analysis, we use the negotiated transaction prices from these samples
directly. However, for some figures, we construct a hospital-payer price index to summarize
the differences across bargaining dyads. To do this, we estimate,

priceihpt = πXi + γhp + δt + εihpt ,
where Xi denotes the charactersitics (age and sex) of individual i, as well a fixed effect for
the clinical cohort (for the “composite” sample) or condition (primary diagnosis code in the
“all inpatient” sample) to which they belong. γhp are fixed effects for the hospital-payer dyad
hp, and δt are fixed effects for each month-year in the sample t. We then generate a price
index of the form
DEX
pIN
= γ̂hp + π̂X + δ̂t t,
hp

where the main estimates of interest are γ̂hp , which are the estimated hospital-payer fixed
effects. The other terms scale the level of these fixed effects relative to the average mix of
patients characteristics and the distribution of patients over time. π̂X is a vector containing
the average contribution of each individual characteristic (π̂) multiplied by the state-wide
average prevalence of that characteristic (X). δ̂t t adds in the average contribution of overtime variation in prices by multiplying time t’s aggregate price shock (δ̂t ) by the state-wide
share of patients in each month-year t (t).
In some cases, we are interested in controlling for average contract-level characteristics within
a hospital-insurer dyad. In order to do this, we must identify pricing agreements that
are common across patients. We follow Cooper et al. (2019) in using bunching in the
price and price-to-charge ratios. Within each clinical cohort-hospital-payer triad, we classify
observations as on the same contract if they have the same price to the $0.01, or if they are
paid at the same fraction of charges to the 0.001. In some cases, a patient may appear to
be a member of more than one contract because there will be observations with the same
charges and prices. In these cases, we select the larger of the two contracts.13
13

For most analysis, we use these primitive contracts, which are not linked to each other across re-
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2.2.2. Regression Specification
Our estimating equation is given by:

priceihpt = βXi + λZi + θh + θp + θt + ihpt ,

(2.1)

where priceihpt is the transaction price for a given patient i at hospital h paid by payer p
in sample month t. We estimate these regressions separately on a sample for each clinical
cohort, as well as on the composite sample and the sample of all inpatient admissions.
Patient age (measured in 5-year age bands) and sex are included in Xi ; for the composite
and all-inpatient admissions samples, Xi also includes fixed-effects for each cohort or primary
diagnosis code. In both the “composite sample” and “all inpatient sample,” we weight cohorts
and diagnoses according to their overall contribution to spending to ensure that clinical
events that occur frequently but do not make up a large portion of spending (e.g., MRIs) do
not dominate the results.14 We also run versions of this regression in which the dependent
variable is ln(price); the results are qualitatively similar.
We control for insurance plan characteristics in Zi , including funding type (ASO, fully
insured, and other) and product (HMO, PPO, POS and other).15 We include hospital fixed
effects θh , sample-month fixed effects θt , and, critically, payer fixed effects θp .
To quantify price variation across payers and hospitals, we analyze the distribution of payer
and hospital fixed effects. Our estimates of the payer fixed effects characterizes the average
price level of a payer, less the contribution of patient characteristics and aggregate time
shocks. By including hospital fixed effects θh , the estimation of Equation (2.1) also removes
negotiation events. However, for some figures, we follow Cooper et al. (2019) in grouping repeated prices
over time using the minimum and maximum dates, persistence of plan characteristics (funding and product
mix), and average monthly volume.
14
All of our results are qualitatively similar when estimated without weights or using inverse propensity
scores to balance the distribution of spending across payers.
15
These plan characteristics are indexed by i to reflect the fact that they vary across consumers who
purchase different plans within a payer.
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the effect of differences in the price levels of the hospitals chosen by a payer’s patients.
Analogously, payer fixed effects remove compositional differences in the payers associated
with hospitals from the hospital fixed effects.
Figure 1: Correlation of Provider-Payer Price Across Procedures

Notes: Each observation represents the regression-adjusted average price for a given hospital-insurer pair. All
prices are adjusted for patient sex and five-year age band as well as a monthly fixed-effect. The method we use
for risk-adjustment is detailed in Section 2.2.1. The composite measure is adjusted using a fixed-effect for clinical
cohort. The inpatient sample is adjusted using a fixed-effect for primary diagnosis.

2.3. Results
2.3.1. Main Results
This section documents large variation in negotiated prices across payers for the same service
in the same hospital. Some payers are systematically more expensive than others on average
13
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1,500

18.3%

3,834
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Notes: This table reports the dispersion measures for the fixed effects estimated in Equation 2.1. Columns (1) and (2) report the number of observations and
unconditional mean price for each sample. Columns (3)-(5) and (6)-(8) report the standard deviation of hospital and payer fixed effects respectively. Standard
deviations are calculated across the unweighted set of hospitals or payers. The standard deviation is reported as a percentage of the mean price below each row.
Patient controls include patient age, sex, insurance product type (HMO, PPO, POS, and other), and funding type (ASO, fully insured, and other). In the all
inpatient and composite samples, each regression also contains fixed effects for the primary diagnosis and are weighted by the overall spending share that each
diagnosis code or cohort represents. Regressions underlying estimates for columns (4), (5), (7), and (8) also include a month-year fixed-effect. Data are limited
to hospital-payer-cohort triads with at least 10 cases.

Patient Controls
θh
θp

74,446

13,142

Vaginal Delivery

Composite

10,810

Cesarean Section

36,525

8,205

Knee Replacement

Lower Limb MRI

5,764

(2)

(1)

Hip Replacement

Mean Price

Observations

Table 1: Quantifying Price Variation Within and Between Groups

across all hospitals, and there is meaningful variation accounted for by a hospital-payer
interaction. We also find price variation within a payer-hospital pair that depends on the
characteristics of the plan type (ASO or fully-insured).
Figure 1 shows, across hospital-payer pairs, the relationship among our price index measures:
prices for narrowly-defined procedures, the composite price index of these procedures, and
the price index measured on all inpatient admissions. There is a positive correlation across
all measures. Consistent with prior work by Cooper et al. (2019), these correlations are
much weaker across service lines (e.g., cesarean sections and hip replacements) than within
service lines (e.g., knee replacements and hip replacements).
Table 1 displays the number of observations and average prices for each clinical cohort.
Columns (3)-(5) report the standard deviation of hospital fixed-effects θh , and Columns
(6)-(8) report the standard deviation of payer fixed-effects θp , each estimated from Equation
(2.1). Each row corresponds to a clinical cohort or composite measure. Below each estimate,
we report the standard deviation of the fixed-effects as a percent of the unconditional average
price reported in Column (2).16 Columns (3) and (6) includes no controls; these estimates
are the standard deviation of unadjusted average price levels. Columns (4) and (7) control
for patient characteristics and aggregate time shocks; Columns (5) and (8) then add payer
and hospital fixed effects, respectively.
Result 1

Variation in price levels between payers (a standard deviation approximately

12% of the mean) is similar in magnitude to variation in prices levels between hospitals (a
standard deviation approximately 16% of the mean).
Result 1 shows that prices vary across payers nearly as much as they do across hospitals.
Depending on which procedure is analyzed, the standard deviation of payer fixed-effects
ranges from 16 to 28 percent of the mean price for the five clinical cohorts in the most
16

As noted by Sacarny (2018), these estimates may exhibit dispersion that is due to measurement error
rather than “true” differences in levels. To limit the potential for dispersion to be driven by such noise,
we limit to hospital-payer-cohort pairs of at least 10 cases. Our results are qualitatively similar for the
unrestricted samples.
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individual-level transaction price. Insurer coefficients are estimated relative to BCBS. Funding type includes ASO, Fully Insured (the omitted category), and
other. Product type includes PPO (the omitted category), HMO, POS, and other. All regressions contain controls for patient patient sex and five-year age
band as well as monthly fixed-effects. We also estimate price-level coefficients for all other payers in the data, which include: Fallon, Health New England,
Boston Medical Center HealthNet, Celticare, ConnectiCare, Health Plans Inc., Neighborhood Health Plan, NetworkHealth, and Wellpoint. However, we omit
these estimates here for the sake of simplicity.
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Table 2: Between Insurer Price Variation for Composite Price Measures

controlled specification. For hospital fixed-effects, this ranges from 17 to 31 percent. These
estimates are fairly similar across the specifications, indicating that variation in payer price
levels is not driven by the composition of hospitals its enrollees visit, though somewhat
smaller when aggregating across a broader sample of admissions.17 Summarizing across all
procedures, the composite sample shows that the standard deviation is about 16% of the
mean for hospital fixed effects and 12% of the mean for payer fixed effects.18
Note that the all inpatient sample has a higher standard deviation for both hospitals (22% of
the mean) and payers (about 13% of the mean). Because prices are measured less accurately
for the all inpatient sample, this higher variation for hospitals could result from more
unobserved heterogeneity in patients and treatment style between hospitals than between
payers. Concerns about unobserved heterogeneity between hospitals motivated the focus on
narrowly defined procedures in the paper and in prior work by Cooper et al. (2019).
While the hospital fixed-effects largely alleviate concerns that observed price variation across
payers is driven by the composition of hospitals, one might be concerned that not all payers
send patients to all hospitals. In Appendix Table 13, we show that our results are robust to
estimating Equation (2.1) on a balanced panel of hospitals and payers.19
To help understand the variation underlying Result 1, Table 2 shows the estimates of
Equation (2.1) with log prices as the dependent variable for two different samples: the
composite sample (capturing all five narrowly-defined services) and the sample of all
inpatient admissions.

We first benchmark the between-provider variation in prices by

running regressions in Columns (1) and (4) that control for an indicator for whether a
17

In unreported results, we estimate alternative variance decompositions (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
1999), which confirm that there is important price variation across both payers and hospitals.
18
These standard deviations are calculated across individual payers, irrespective of patient volume. In
Appendix Table 12, we calculate the standard deviation of hospital and payer fixed-effects at the patient
level, effectively weighting by patient volume, and find similar results.
19
Because many of the smaller payers have sparser data, restricting to the balanced panel of hospitals
across all payers would lead to prohibitively small samples. Therefore, Appendix Table 13 restricts the
data to our three largest payers (BCBS, Harvard Pilgrim, and Tufts). We then limit each clinical cohort to
hospitals where we observe cases from all three payers. In order to be included in the composite sample, a
hospital must see patients from all three payers for all five clinical cohorts.
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hospital is owned by Partners HealthCare (but omit Zi , θh , and θp ). Partners HealthCare
is a “star hospital” (Ericson and Starc 2015b) that has been previously been shown to
command high prices relative to other hospitals in Massachusetts by both the academic
literature (Ho 2009) and policy reports (Coakley 2010). Consistent with those results,
Column (1), shows that Partners HealthCare’s prices are on average 27 percent higher than
those for other hospitals in the data. (We transform our coefficients into percentage changes:
e0.241 − 1 ≈ 0.27.)
Columns (2) and (5) add hospital fixed effects θh and insurance plan characteristics Zi .
Then, Columns (3) and (6) add payer fixed effects. Looking at the average price difference
across payers, Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 show that there is substantial variation: in
Column (3), prices negotiated by Harvard Pilgrim are an average of 6.5 percent lower than
prices negotiated by BCBS (the omitted category); Tufts’ prices are 13.2 percent lower. The
pattern in the data is somewhat surprising given BCBS’s larger market share; one natural
explanation would be that BCBS does less to steer its consumers. While this may be the
case, these gaps in negotiated prices persist even when we control for plan types. Also
note that the three national payers have the lowest prices, despite having relatively small
market share.20 Previous research has identified differentiation based on the geographic
scope of insurers and their networks (Dranove et al. 2003). We note that the three national
payers have the lowest prices, despite having relatively small market share, consistent with
heterogeneous strategies and costs.
What explains these differences between payers? Observable characteristics of enrollees and
their hospital choices are relatively balanced across payers.21 Consumers have preferences
over networks and insurers may have different network strategies, potentially leading to
different negotiated prices; BCBS’s network is relatively broad (Ericson and Starc 2015a),
20

In Table 2 we have aggregated the national payers into a single group. When estimated separately,
coefficients for Aetna, Cigna, and United in Column 3 are -0.060, -0.315, and -0.210, respectively. Cigna and
United’s coefficients are not significantly different from each other.
21
In Appendix Table 14, we calculate differences in patient characteristics and travel distances to hospitals
across payers. We find no statistically (at the 95% confidence level) or economically significant differences
in patient choices across payers.
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which could be a factor in BCBS’s relatively high negotiated prices.22 Moreover, brand
reputation could operate as a shift in demand for a given price, leading to higher negotiated
prices. Finally, search costs may lead to price variation (see Cebul et al. 2011).
Figure 2: Hospital-Specific Price Levels Relative to BCBS
(b) Tufts

(a) HPHC

Notes: Each observation in Panels (a) and (b) represents the regression-adjusted average price for a given hospitalpayer pair in our composite sample. All estimates represent the average residual price contribution by payer from
a regression conditioning on age, sex, and clinical cohort. The method we use for risk-adjustment is detailed in
Section 2.2.1. Hospital-payer pairs with fewer than 10 observations have been omitted.

Result 2

In addition to variation between payers on average, there is important variation

at the payer-procedure level and at the payer-hospital bargaining dyad.
Recall that Figure 1 showed low correlations in prices across procedures. While Table 2
shows price variation by payer for the composite and all inpatient samples, we estimate
analogous specifications separately procedure-by-procedure in Appendix Table 15. These
specifications show that the price index hides some interesting patterns in price variation
across procedures. For instance, while Tufts negotiates rates 13.2 percent lower than BCBS
on average across all five services, Tufts is much “cheaper” for hip and knee replacements
(about 35 percent), and actually more “expensive” for MRIs.
22

BCBS is also unique in this time period for introducing a value-based payment contract (the Alternative
Quality Contract, ACQ), in which providers bear some risk. Higher payments from BCBS could partially
be compensation for bearing risk, note that BCBS did not see a big cost increase when they introduced the
ACQ and the effect of the ACQ on spending is relatively small compared to our results (Song et al. 2011).
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Moreover, the variation across bargaining dyads (hospital-payer pairs) is also important:
BCBS does not negotiate systematically higher or lower prices across all providers or
procedures. Figure 2 shows visually that the price ordering of hospitals in one payer is
quite different than others. The x-axis orders hospitals from low to high by their composite
prices negotiated by BCBS. These prices are shown with light gray dots. The dark blue dots
plot those prices at Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare (Panel A) and at Tufts (Panel B). If all
three payers had the same ordering of hospitals, the dark blue dots would be monotonically
increasing; instead they show substantial variation. We confirm this visual result with a
statistical test: a joint F-test reveals that adding hospital-payer interactions to regressions
of the form estimated in Table 2 always adds statistically significant explanatory power.23
Result 3 Prices are higher for individuals whose employer purchases administrative
services only (ASO), rather than full insurance, from the payer. Conditional on payer, prices
are 2% higher on average members who are ASO than who are fully insured. However, this
understates the effect of contracting incentives on prices, since some contracts have both ASO
and self-insured plans. Accounting for these incentives, our analysis predicts that moving a
contract to 100% ASO members from 0% would raise prices by about 8%.
Returning to Table 2, we examine how prices vary with plan characteristics, including HMO
status and fully-insured versus self-insured (ASO). Columns (2) and (5) describe the average
differences in prices between individuals in these contracts, while Columns (3) and (6) add
payer fixed effects and show how price vary even conditional on payer. Consistent with
previous literature exploring the impact of managed care on negotiated prices, we find that
HMOs, which typically steer consumers to specific providers, pay prices that are lower
relative to PPO plans. In Column (3), we estimate that HMO plans pay prices that are
nearly 5.4 percent lower than PPOs, even when controlling for payer and hospital. This is
smaller than the estimates from Cutler et al. (2000) and Wu (2009); those estimates do not
hold fixed payer, while ours isolates the effect of HMO contract form within payer.
23

For hip replacements, we estimate a joint F-test of F (45, 118) = 63, 852, p < 0.001. This same test is
significant at p < 0.001 for all of our clinical cohorts.
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Notes: ∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗ (p<0.01), ∗∗∗ (p<0.001). Standard errors clustered at the hospital-insurer pair in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of individual-level
transaction price. Insurer coefficients are estimated relative to BCBS. Funding type includes ASO, Fully Insured (the omitted category), and other. Product type includes
PPO (the omitted category), HMO, POS, and other. All regressions contain controls for patient patient sex and five-year age band as well as monthly fixed-effects. All
regressions also contain hospital-by-payer payer fixed effects.

Composite

0.945
74,446

R-Squared
Observations

Clinical Cohort

0.074∗∗∗
(0.018)

ASO

Panel B: Contract-level Characteristics
-0.048∗∗
HM O
(0.015)

0.945
74,446

R-Squared
Observations

0.569
5,764

0.027∗∗
(0.009)

0.021∗∗∗
(0.006)

ASO

(2)

-0.058∗∗∗
(0.017)

(1)

Panel A: Raw Characteristics
HMO
-0.048∗∗∗
(0.009)

Dependent Variable:

Table 3: Variation in Prices by Plan Characteristics

We present novel results on differences in price levels between self-insured ASO contracts
and fully-insured products. Columns (3) and (6) show that ASO individuals have prices
that are 2.3 to 4.0 percent higher (depending on whether examining composite prices or all
inpatient prices) than those in fully-insured plans. Moreover, we confirm this result in in
Panel A of Table 3, which presents specifications that include hospital-by-payer fixed effects.
On aggregate, we find that individuals in ASO plans pay prices that are 2.1 to 4.3 percent
higher than their fully insured counterparts (Columns 1 and 7), even conditional on the
same hospital-payer pair. Comparing across all the columns in Table 3, we see that ASO
effect is broadly consistent across procedures. The magnitude of this effect is substantial:
approximately half as large estimated coefficient on HMO.
Note that we can see within payer variation in prices at the same hospital-payer. We show
an example of this in Figure 3, which shows negotiated prices for lower-limb MRIs at a
particular hospital. Using the procedure described in Section 2.2.1, we identify individual
contracts. Note that a given payer can have multiple, stable prices even at a single hospital.
Our results in Table 2 and Panel A of Table 3 understate the impact of funding type on
negotiation incentives, because prices are often negotiated at the product level, rather than
explicitly by funding type. As shown in Figure 3, while some contracts include only ASO
enrollees or fully-insured enrollees (e.g. Harvard Pilgrim HealthCare’s two contracts here),
many contracts cover a mix of the two. For example, the higher priced BCBS contract in
Figure 3 is 100% PPO and roughly 70% ASO. The lower priced BCBS contract is roughly
88% HMO (12% other non-PPO) and only 35% ASO. Pricing may depend on the mix of
characteristics held by the individuals on each contract.24 In Panel B of Table 3, we regress
log price on the share of the contract that is HMO (and POS, and other) and ASO (or
other). Contracts with more HMO patients are more likely to benefit from the ability of
the payer to steer patients and are therefore likely to have lower prices. Likewise, contracts
with more ASO patients may influence negotiation in a particular contract.25
24
25

Appendix A.1 contains more detail on the precise structure of the measurement error we have in mind.
We do not observe provider network breadth. Part of how HMOs negotiate lower prices is by being
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Figure 3: Negotiated Prices for Lower Limb MRIs at Winchester Hospital

Contract

Mean
Price

Volume Per
Month

Age

PPO

HMO

POS

ASO

Fully
Insured

BCBS

1
2
3

648
723
607

31.9
9.3
40.5

43.2
42.5
42.9

0.000
1.000
0.281

0.876
0.000
0.624

0.124
0.000
0.094

0.360
0.719
0.579

0.640
0.281
0.421

HPHC

1
2

662
716

8.3
5.2

40.6
44.2

0.812††
0.214

0.033†
0.722

0.033†
0.064

0.967††
1.000

0.000

Tufts

1
2

598
639

7.7
5.0

43.4
42.9

0.000
0.832

0.947
0.000

0.053
0.168

0.050
0.866

0.950
0.134

Payer

Notes: † denotes an upper bound on percentages, which we have bottom coded to avoid presenting means based
on fewer than 10 observations. †† denotes an analogous lower bound to prevent the derivation of suppressed
values. The scatterplot shows the persistence of prices for lower limb MRIs among our three largest insurers
at Winchester hospital. The length of each series indicates the first and last day the price was observed for
each hospital-payer pair. The table displays the characteristics of patients on each contract. In general hollow
markers in the figure correspond to contract 1 in the table above, while solid markers correspond to contract 2.
Beginning in September 2010, BCBS appears to begin negotiating for all plans together, which we denote with
a solid marker as contract 3.

willing to have smaller provider networks. The next section shows that theory predicts that contracting
incentives will lead ASO prices to be higher than fully insured prices. The estimated ASO effect here,
though, could result from both contracting incentives and unobserved variation in network breadth. However,
network breadth will only contribute to the estimated effect if it varies by ASO status even conditional on
HMO/PPO status.
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When we use variation at the contract level to identify contracting incentives (Panel B of
Table 3), the coefficient on HMO share stays similar in magnitude to that in Panel A, but the
coefficient on ASO share increases in magnitude. Column (1) shows that moving a contract
from 0% to 100% ASO would lead to a predicted price increase of about 8 percent for the
composite price. As a result, Panel B shows that the effect of ASO contracting incentives
on prices is now substantially larger than that of HMOs.
2.3.2. Sensitivity to Sample Construction and Price Measurement
In addition to the robustness checks above, we investigate the sensitivity of our estimates
to alternative sample restrictions and measurement choices in three additional ways.
First, we examine whether measurement error due to low data quality artificially overstates
price dispersion across hospitals and payers. One concern is that data quality may have
been poorer in the first year of the APCD’s operation. We therefore reproduce Tables 1-3,
excluding the data from 2009, in unreported results. We find that the results are virtually
unchanged. Moreover, our measures of contracting, illustrated by Figure 3, show that price
arrangements are well-defined across all years of the data.
Second, we test whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of professional fees in
the price. In general, hospitals and physicians are independently operated and negotiate
separately over prices. However, from the perspective of an insurer, high hospital prices may
be offset by lower physician prices. This might result if insurers differentiate on substitution
between physician and hospital network breadth, which could lead to counter-veiling price
differences across insurers. Moreover, in cases where physicians are vertically integrated,
there may be additional concern that the prices are determined jointly, in which case it
may bias our estimates to focus on the facility payments alone. In unreported results we
replicate all of our analyses with the inclusion of professional claims. This change leads to
some minor shifts in point estimates, however the qualitative findings are unchanged. There
continue to exist substantial differences in negotiated prices across payers, which are similar

24

in magnitude to our main estimates. Our finding that ASO plans pay higher prices is also
robust to this exercise.
Third, recall that our approach to adjusting “all inpatient” prices in Equation (2.1) relies on
ICD-9 diagnosis codes. While the goal is to isolate prices, this measure may incorporate some
aspects of differential quantity. We use ICD-9 diagnosis codes rather than the corresponding
ICD-9 procedure codes due to concerns about data quality. However, we test the sensitivity
of our results to this choice in unreported results and find that using the primary ICD9 procedure code in place of the diagnosis code does not meaningfully change any of our
estimates. This provides evidence that, when available, these measures capture similar
dimensions of complexity.

2.4. Implications
2.4.1. Price Variation and Consumer Value of Insurance
The financial value of a health insurance plan to an individual is often modeled as comprising
two parameters: premiums p and a cost-sharing function that translates medical expenses
into OOP costs for the consumer.26 However, the prices a plan has negotiated with providers
also affect its value, as the prices determine the amount of medical expenses incurred for
using a particular service—and, therefore, the cost-sharing that the individual faces. Let
z be the plan’s negotiated provider price level that scales up or down a claim L.27 For
normalization, let z = 1 be the average negotiated price level, so that an insurer with
z = 1.5 has negotiated provider prices that are 50% higher than average.
For simplicity, we model cost-sharing as a constant coinsurance rate α ∈ [0, 1]: if an
individual has claims L, the insurer will pay αL. Because α characterizes the fraction of
26
Insurance plans vary on other dimensions besides financial value, including provider networks and brand
reputations. Recent work has attempted to estimate how sensitive consumers are to premiums when plans
are differentiated on these dimensions, holding constant the cost-sharing function (Ericson and Starc 2015b,
Starc 2014).
27
A single price level is a simplification, as a payer could be cheaper than average at one hospital and
more expensive than average at another. Our empirical results show that payers differ between each other
on average, but also that there is substantial idiosyncratic hospital-payer variation.
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claims the plan covers, we refer to α as the plan’s actuarial value.28
We can then write an insurance contract as X = (p, α, z). Consider an individual with a
risk-averse utility function who faces probability π of needing a procedure that would cost
L at average prices. Their expected utility is given by

EU (X) = πU (w − p − (1 − α)zL) + (1 − π)U (w − p)
for some level of wealth w.29 First, note that the value of an insurance plan to an individual
is weakly decreasing in its negotiated provider price level z:

∂EU
∂z

≤ 0. Moreover, the effect of

z on individual utility depends on the degree of cost-sharing in the plan. Under full insurance
(α = 1), the individual is not affected by z; as actuarial value drops, the individual begins
to be more affected by the provider price level.
To quantify the impact of provider price variation on the effective financial generosity of an
insurance plan, we select a sample of health care claims for a sample of working-age adults
from Truven MarketScan (details in Appendix). We apply a high-deductible insurance plan
to these claims (deductible=$5,000, coinsurance=30%, maximum OOP=$6,350). We then
simulate the OOP spending amounts under a range of price multipliers that enable us to
examine how OOP spending changes with negotiated prices. The average OOP spending in
the data at observed prices is $1,900. Across all our sampled services and providers, highercost payers were about 15% more expensive than lower-cost payers. A 15% discount relative
to observed prices is an average OOP savings of $182, or 9.8%. Price increases translate
into OOP spending increases at a high rate in HDHP’s, which have low actuarial value at
baseline.
28

In non-linear contracts (e.g., deductible and max OOP), effective actuarial value will vary with
negotiated prices. Here, we think of actuarial value α as being defined for some fixed reference level of
negotiated prices, so that a change in z will not affect α.
29
More generally, an individual will face a distribution F of loss sizes L ≥ 0. We assume that provider
price level does not affect underlying medical care usage (no moral hazard).
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2.4.2. Insurer Incentives: Fully Insured and ASO Markets
Contractual form will affect the incentives that payers have to negotiate prices, and so a
payer’s optimal price will typically differ between the fully-insured market and the ASO
market. We lay out a brief model that identifies these incentives. We allow payers to
negotiate separate provider prices zIN S and zASO for the two markets they operate in: the
fully-insured market (INS) (e.g., health insurance exchanges, the individual market, the
small group market) and the ASO market. However, in practice, there may be reputation,
legal, and contractual barriers linking the prices in the two markets; in this case, the observed
price in product for a given payer may reflect a combination of these two prices.
Consumer demand in the fully-insured market is given by the function DIN S (p, zIN S , α, X),
where X is the vector of other products in the market, where demand is weakly decreasing
in p and zIN S , and is weakly increasing in α. While the model in Section 2.4.1 shows that the
level of zIN S affects consumer welfare, the way in which zIN S affects demand is a complex
interaction between this model and a model of consumer search.
Negotiated provider price levels also affect the value of ASO contracts. ASO contracts
typically consist of a fee paid to the payer in exchange for claims processing and access to
the payer’s negotiated provider rates. We represent an ASO contract as Y = (τ, z), where z
is the payer’s negotiated provider rates, and the fixed fee is τ . Thus, if spending per enrollee
at average prices (z = 1) is $M , then total cost per enrollee to the self-insured employer is
zM + τ . Other contractual forms—including those in which the employer pays a percentage
of overall claims as a fee —will exacerbate the issues we highlight in this section. When
the employer chooses an ASO provider, both τ and z are both important determinants of
costs. In theory, employers could trade off τ against z to make decisions only on total cost;
however, employers are unlikely to observe z as well as they observe τ , and may not value
reductions in z fully.30 Let ASO demand is given by DASO (τ, zASO , α, X), with demand
30

It is likely that z is harder to observe because there are many different prices in the market at the
payer-provider level and no publicly available source of information on them.
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weakly decreasing in τ and zASO .
Payers can exert costly effort eIN S and eASO to reduce negotiated prices (see e.g. Grennan
2014). The cost of effort for each price is given separately by a convex function c, with
c(0) = 0, c0 > 0, c00 > 0. We assume

dzi
dei

= −1 for each contract type i, which is without loss

of generality because the cost of effort function c can be re-scaled.31 We let the expected
amount of medical care per enrollee be M at z = 1 prices,32 and assume that there are no per
beneficiary costs other than medical care consumed. We assume payers choose negotiation
effort, premiums p, and administrative fees τ to maximize total profits,33 which can then be
written as:

ΠIN S = (p − αzIN S M ) DIN S (p, zIN S , α, X) − c (eIN S )
ΠASO = τ DASO (τ, zASO , α, X) − c (eASO ) .

Note that the response of insurance demand

∂DIN S
∂zIN S

and

important determinants of payer negotiation effort.
investigate

∂D
∂p

to negotiated prices is

∂DASO
∂zASO

While a large number of papers

(the response of demand to premiums),34 we are unaware of any papers that

attempt to measure

∂D
∂z ,

let alone the differences between

∂DIN S
∂zIN S

and

∂DASO
∂zASO

. Research (e.g.

Abaluck and Gruber 2011) has estimated the responsiveness of plan choice to individuals’
expected out-of-pocket costs, which can be informative about

∂D
∂z .

However, an individual’s

expected out-of-pocket costs are a function of cost-sharing design and expected utilitization,
in addition to plans’ negotiated prices.35
31

It is possible that there is a different cost of effort function for zIN S and zASO . For our Result 4 below,
we need only assume that if eIN S = eASO = 0, then zIN S = zASO .
32
For simplicity, we abstract away from asymmetric information.
33
We do not treat actuarial value as a choice variable; for instance, it is determined by regulation on the
ACA’s health insurance exchanges.
34
See Auerbach and Ohri (2006), Chan and Gruber (2010), Cutler and Reber (1998), Ericson and Starc
(2015b), Gruber and Poterba (1994), Ho (2006), Ho and Lee (2017), Marquis and Long (1995), and Royalty
and Solomon (1999).
35
For instance, Abaluck and Gruber (2011) conclude that individuals are less responsive to expected
out-of-pocket costs than to premiums. This suggests that ∂D
is small but not zero. However, their results
∂z
do not isolate how a change in z—as opposed to a change in contract design and/or formulary—would affect
demand, which is crucial for negotiation incentives.
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Our next result shows that if the demand response to negotiated prices is small enough, the
payer will optimally set ASO prices higher:
Result 4 For small enough response of insurance demand to negotiated prices (e.g.
∂DIN S
∂zIN S

=

∂DASO
∂zASO

= 0), zASO > zIN S .36

In the fully-insured market, the payer benefits from negotiating a lower price level because it
pays the insured claims; at α = 1, the payer is the residual claimant on negotiation effort. In
the ASO market, lower negotiated prices only benefit the payer through increased demand;
if that channel is shut down because

∂DASO
∂zASO

= 0, then ASO prices will be higher. However,

we do not know whether and how the individual and ASO markets differ in their response
to negotiated prices. Employers shopping for ASO services may (or may not) be better
informed and responsive than individuals shopping for fully-insured products. As a result,
it is ambiguous whether zIN S or zASO is higher. Moreover, outside our model, regulation
differs between the ASO and fully-insured markets (for instance, medical loss ratios do not
apply to ASO markets), and this may affect negotiated prices. Finally, payers may face
constraints making it difficult for zIN S to diverge substantially from zASO , such as threat of
bad publicity or regulation. Nonetheless, the observed differences in ASO prices is consistent
with this prediction.

2.5. Conclusion
There is substantial variation in prices paid by different payers to the same hospitals for the
same service. This variation affects the value of insurance products, implying substantial
welfare effects for consumers. Insurer incentives are critical to understanding the variation
in our data: prices paid are higher for ASO contracts holding fixed both payer and provider.
Insurer size does not necessarily predict negotiated rates in our setting; however, we show
that the ability to “steer" consumer demand (as proxied for by HMO contracts) is important,
consistent with previous studies (Cutler et al. 2000).
36

See Appendix A.2.1 for proof.
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Provider prices are hard to observe: the level of negotiated provider prices could be an
important dimension of price transparency efforts. Consumer response (among individuals
and large employers) to negotiated provider prices is a crucial determinant of insurers’
negotiation effort. Yet we know little about this parameter; additional measurement of
across payer price variation and consumer preferences over negotiated prices is an important
direction for future work.
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CHAPTER 3: Mergers and Marginal Costs: New Evidence on Hospital Buyer Power
In the last several decades, hospital systems have consolidated substantially through
horizontal mergers (Cutler and Scott Morton 2013; Gaynor and Town 2012).1 Researchers
and regulators have raised concerns about these mergers’ potential negative welfare effects
due to increased concentration, and hospital mergers are heavily represented in Federal Trade
Commission investigations (Coate 2018; Dafny 2014). A typical justification for these (and
many other) horizontal mergers is their potential to generate various “efficiencies,” leading
to lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, and/or new product introductions,
with a particular emphasis on price (U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission 2010; Vogt and Town 2006). A necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
mergers to lower prices is that they first lower marginal costs. Whether any true marginal
cost reductions should then be counted as “cognizable efficiencies” by antitrust authorities
is a contentious issue (Hemphill and Rose (2018)).
In this merger retrospective, we provide new estimates of the effects of hospital mergers on
marginal costs, using unique data containing hospital supply purchase orders issued by a
large sample of US hospitals from 2009-2015. Hospital supplies and devices accounted for a
quarter of the growth in inpatient hospital spending between 2001 and 2006 (Maeda et al.
2012). These estimates are interesting not only as a window into potential downstream
price effects, but also in that they allow us to investigate “buyer power.”

For each of

the products in our data, prices are determined in negotiation. It is conventional wisdom
that “bigger is better” in bilateral negotiations, and this issue has broad policy relevance,
not just for antitrust (Carlton and Israel 2011) but also as a key issue for evaluating the
efficiency of decentralized procurement markets. For example, many policymakers advocate
for more centralized procurement of healthcare products and services by federal and state
governments (LaVito 2018), rather than procurement via decentralized bilateral bargaining
as is the norm in the U.S.
1

Note: this chapter is based on joint work with Matthew Grennan and Ashley Swanson, originally
published in the Rand Journal of Economics(Craig et al. 2021b).
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The hospital supply product markets in our full dataset account for 23 percent of hospital
operating costs (34 percent, excluding labor). Thus, savings on supply input costs represent
perhaps the largest potential merger-related savings that are unambiguously marginal.2 In
the current context, negotiation can take place directly between a hospital or health system
administrator and a representative of the product’s manufacturer, or hospitals may rely on
group purchasing organizations (GPOs) to negotiate their contracts for some products.
In calculating the potential savings they could achieve as an integrated entity, merging
parties typically cite the wide variation in prices paid across hospitals and argue that the
merged entity will be able to obtain discounts based on taking the best price among the
merging parties, plus leveraging any “buyer power" the larger merged entity might possess.
This variation is indeed large, with a Gini coefficient of 0.073 (or a coefficient of variation of
0.219) for the average category, across hospitals for the same exact brand-month. The Gini
coefficient (equivalent to one half of the mean absolute difference between any randomly
selected pair of hospitals) is a useful benchmark for potential savings, as it translates the
pre-merger price variation in our data into the expected savings that might be achieved if the
worse off party in a random pair of hospitals were able to improve their price by “splitting
the difference.” 3

4

Together, the magnitude and variation in supply spending are also substantial relative to
both hospital profit margins and downstream costs of hospital care.5 However, whereas
a hospital’s exercise of market power as a supplier of health care services might entail
2

When labor costs are cited as merger “efficiencies,” they are often either administrative in nature or
due to the shifting of services across facilities. The former are arguably less “marginal,” whereas the latter
may involve a quality trade-off (Noether and May 2017).
3
We note that the Gini coefficient would only precisely align with theoretical expected savings in a
very restrictive model of possible sources of contracting heterogeneity. However, it represents the type of
expected savings calculation merging hospitals might perform, as input prices are not typically shared during
pre-merger due diligence.
4
In a more extreme example, when the two large insurers Anthem and Cigna proposed to merge, they
argued that the integrated entity would obtain the best of their pre-merger prices (United States District
Court for the District of Columbia 2017).
5
According to the American Hospital Association 2018 Trendbook, the average hospital operating margin
in 1995-2016 was 4.4 percent. The coefficient of variation (CV) for knee replacement procedure prices across
hospital markets is 0.32 (Cooper et al. 2019), whereas we estimate the CV across hospitals for knee prosthesis
prices is 0.24.
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renegotiation over a menu of prices with a handful of commercial insurers, that same
hospital’s exercise of market power as a buyer of medical and surgical supplies might entail
renegotiations with hundreds of vendors and also might require substantial managerial effort
obtaining buy-in from disparate end-users within the hospital.6 That is, it may be relatively
costly to reduce costs.7
This article builds on a large body of literature on the effects of hospital mergers, and
particularly on recent work that estimates the effects of mergers on overall hospital costs
(e.g., Dranove and Lindrooth 2003; Harrison 2010; Schmitt 2017) and on labor costs
(Prager and Schmitt forthcoming). The general literature to date on the effects of hospital
concentration has not suggested that consolidation improves efficiency.

Although an

exhaustive review of the evidence is outside the scope of this article, the dominant narrative
appears to be one of mergers decreasing quality (Beckert et al. 2012; Capps 2005; Ho and
Hamilton 2000; Romano and Balan 2011; Town et al. 2006), increasing prices (Capps and
Dranove 2004; Dafny 2009; Dafny et al. 2019; Haas-Wilson and Garmon 2011; Krishnan 2001;
Sacher and Vita 2001; Tenn 2011; Thompson 2011), and weakly decreasing costs (Dranove
and Lindrooth 2003; Harrison 2010; Schmitt 2017). We follow this literature in estimating
difference-in-differences models that compare cost trends at target and acquirer hospitals to
control hospitals. The unique contribution of this article relative to this prior literature is
the fine-grained nature of the cost data, with precise prices and quantities paid across nearly
all hospital supplies at the sample hospitals.
We find that, for a fixed basket of 37 of the most important hospital supply categories, the
average merger target in our sample can expect to save 1.9 percent or $214 thousand dollars
per year (95 percent confidence interval [$79,568, $349,236]), and the average acquirer can
expect no savings (point estimate -$90 thousand “savings”; confidence interval [-$158,518,
6

This price variation has been found to be driven by heterogeneity in hospital preferences and bargaining
ability (Grennan 2013, 2014), and by variation in information and contracting frictions (Grennan and
Swanson 2018, 2019).
7
Following this logic, if savings on “important” product categories in our analysis here are easier to obtain
than savings on the more than 3,000 medical supply categories in our data, our results are likely an upper
bound on total supply savings achieved post-merger.
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-$21,968]). To put this in context with a simple example, for a merger with the same size
target and acquirer, this would suggest total savings across merging parties of

1.9−0.9
2

= 0.5

percent.8 Based upon our understanding of the information typically available to merging
parties regarding input costs, a simple approach via which merging parties might claim
expected savings would be based on a measure of price dispersion such as the Gini coefficient
(across hospitals, controlling for brand-time), which gives an estimate of what expected
savings would be if two randomly chosen hospitals in the data were to merge and obtain
the better of their contracts for every item they purchase. Our results would translate into
average realized savings that are about 7 percent of that claimed under this approach. If
merging parties claimed higher expected savings based on supposed greater “buyer power” of
the integrated entity, this ratio of realized savings to expected savings would be even lower.
In addition to being interesting in their own right, mergers also provide useful variation
to examine economic mechanisms underlying “buyer power" at a scale beyond individual
case studies, as they represent a shock to hospital system size that is plausibly uncorrelated
with trends in any particular supply category market. As discussed in Section 3.2, the
literature on buyer power points to multiple theoretical mechanisms via which increased
buyer size might impact input prices, and we examine several of these through tripledifference specifications allowing for heterogeneity in the merger treatment effects.
Much like in markets for hospital services, prices in hospital input markets are typically
determined via bilateral negotiations. The literature over time has developed an increasingly
sophisticated approach to modeling downstream hospital price negotiations (Town and
Vistnes 2001; Capps et al. 2003; Ho 2006, 2009), and many of the same principles apply to
considering input price negotiations. In such an environment, the effects of mergers can be
complex, depending on how they impact market structure and bargaining abilities (Dafny
et al. 2019; Gowrisankaran et al. 2015; Grennan 2013; Lewis and Pflum 2015). Market
8

Most mergers involve acquirers that are larger than targets, so the average merger would tend to involve
even smaller savings. And of course these are average treatment effect estimates, so the outcomes for any
particular merger could differ.
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power in upstream supply markets may decrease input prices directly, but an important
countervailing indirect effect may also occur: market power in downstream markets for
hospital services may lead to higher downstream prices, and that greater overall pie may
be “shared” with suppliers (Ho and Lee 2017). Finally, as managerial attention, skill, and
incentives play an important role in supply contracting, mergers may have disruptive effects
in the short run and may be mediated by geographic proximity, and returns to scale may
be positive or negative in the long run (Agrawal et al. 1992; Beckmann 1960; Fulop et al.
2002; Minemyer 2017; Uysal et al. 2008).
To shed light on mechanisms underlying pricing, we explore heterogeneity in our reduced
form merger treatment effects by:

merging parties’ size and market overlap, supply

market concentration, and downstream market power. Our analyses consider whether cost
reductions (if any) are achieved through lower negotiated prices, cost-reducing shifts in
utilization, or both. We also examine the role of “standardization”—industry terminology
used to refer to hospitals’ use of restrictive supply sets (e.g., use of one implant vendor for
most joint replacement procedures). Recent research has found that restrictive networks
of health care providers (Gruber and McKnight 2016; Ho and Lee 2018), restrictive drug
formularies (Duggan and Scott Morton 2010), and restrictive pharmacy networks (Starc and
Swanson forthcoming) can lead to lower costs for insurers; similarly, hospitals argue that
standardization of medical supply purchasing results in large savings (Noether and May
2017).
We find that target hospitals’ post-merger savings are driven by a 3.4 percent decrease
in prices negotiated within physician preference item (PPI) brands.9 PPIs are expensive
implantable devices over which physicians typically have strong brand preferences, and are
frequent targets in policy discussions around excessive spending on medical technologies
and tensions between physicians and hospitals as coproducers of health care.10 The within9
The acronym PPI is commonly used in the healthcare industry (e.g., Lagasse 2018) and we accordingly
use it here as well, but note that it refers everywhere in this manuscript to “physician preference item” and
not to any price index as is common in economics (e.g., “producer price index.”)
10
Past efforts by hospitals to manage utilization of surgical inputs have encountered significant resistance

35

brand effect is slightly smaller, though not statistically different, from the within-category
effect of 3.8 percent (which accounts for shifts in quantity utilized to different brands within
the category). Thus, targets’ PPI savings can be almost entirely accounted for by targets
negotiating lower prices, rather than cost-saving changes in usage patterns. These savings
are significantly larger for local mergers (5.9 percent). The point estimates are also larger
when the acquiring system is large (4.3 percent). Targets do not show economically or
statistically significant savings on relatively inexpensive non-PPI supplies. Finally, there is
no effect of merging on targets’ standardization rates.
By contrast, acquirers show little evidence of savings post-merger. We document a quite
small, though statistically significant, increase (1.7 percent within brand; 1.2 percent within
category) in acquirers’ PPI costs post-merger. These are only slightly counterbalanced by a
small, marginally significant 1.2 percent reduction in acquirers’ non-PPI prices. Interestingly,
the cost increase point estimate for PPIs is larger for large acquirers than for small acquirers.
Positive price effects for large acquirers are consistent with several managerial and economic
theories, which we discuss in Section 3.2. However, we interpret this result with some
caution, as it (unlike the result for targets’ purchase of PPIs) disappears in analyses of
longer time horizons.
In sum, the net effect of merging on any given party’s costs is small. Where significant
effects do exist, they depend on multiple countervailing forces, and these forces bear out
unevenly across targets and acquirers. Our findings are consistent with mergers inducing an
increase in buyer power that is (1) driven by local returns to scale, and (2) more influential
for merger targets than for (even small) acquirers. The finding of a positive price effect for
large acquirers is consistent with the costs of a merger disrupting management outweighing
any benefit from improved buyer power, for merging parties experiencing small relative size
increases. We find little evidence that savings, where they exist, are mediated by supplier
from surgeons (Nugent et al. 1999). Navathe et al. (2017) estimate that one health system’s participation
in a bundled payment program led to substantial savings on implant costs, perhaps aided by gainsharing
arrangements with physicians.
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concentration or by a change in downstream market power. Notably, in contrast to previous
empirical findings on restrictive contracting by insurers, we find no evidence that merger
savings are amplified when hospitals are standardized.

3.1. Data and Setting
3.1.1. Hospital Purchasing Data
The primary data used in this study come from a unique database of all supply purchases
made by over 1,000 US hospitals during the period 2009-2015. The data are from the
PriceGuide™ benchmarking service (hereafter, “PriceGuide data”) offered by the ECRI
Institute, a non-profit health care research organization. For each transaction, we observe
price, quantity, transaction month, and supplier. The reported data are of high quality
because they are typically transmitted as a direct extract from a hospital’s materials
management database. Hospitals have strong incentives to report accurately because the
analytics the benchmarking service’s web portal provides are based on comparing the
hospital’s submitted data to that of others in the database.
Our analyses consider price negotiations between hospitals and suppliers for a large number
of important product categories. Throughout this draft, we use the term “product category”
to refer to the “Universal Medical Device Nomenclature System (UMDNS)” grouping code
included in the transaction files. The UMDNS system generally classifies products by
intended purpose and mechanism of action (e.g., drug-eluting coronary stents have UMDNS
code 20383). We use the term “brand” to refer to the “product” level at which prices are
negotiated; e.g., Medtronic Resolute Integrity drug-eluting coronary stent. In practice,
we identify brands using an algorithmic approach that groups together stock-keeping-units
within manufacturers that vary in terms of factors such as size and color, but not price.
The algorithm endeavors to balance our goal of identifying meaningful, pricing-relevant
differences in product attributes (e.g., quality) against the potential for sparsity problems.
The patterns we document are insensitive to how we classify brands. Finally, we use “product
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class” to refer to the distinction between FDA risk classes I-II, which tend to be commodities
(e.g., dressings) and other medical/surgical products (e.g., catheters), vs. FDA risk class
III, which are placed in this class because they are deemed “necessary for the sustainment of
life" and thus tend to include high-tech physician preference items (e.g., coronary stents).
Our empirical analyses examine products that are among the top 50 product categories by
either total spending or transactions. There are 71 such “top” categories total, but once we
omit product categories that are too broad or with missing or inconsistent data, 37 remain.
Some categories in the UMDNS grouping are excessively broad and would not necessarily
be used in the same procedures or by the same providers. Codes such as “food item,” “office
supplies,” and various “kits” are flagged as too broad. For example, “IVD Kits” include
microbial detection kits costing $2.14 on average, as well as tests for antibiotic-resistant
bacteria colonization costing $4,400 on average. We also excluded codes for which we could
not confidently calculate price per unit due to missing conversion factors (e.g., 10 units
per box) or inconsistent unit of measure (e.g., “box” vs. “case”). Other categories were
omitted based on “reasonableness” of the observed price variation – categories for which
the coefficient of variation in price exceeded 200 percent were excluded. See Grennan and
Swanson (2019) for further details and examples.
3.1.2. Hospital and Merger Data
To perform the analysis in the current study, we obtained permission to contract a trusted
third-party to match facilities in the PriceGuide data to outside data from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the American Hospital Association (AHA), and a
merger roster. The third-party then provided us with access to the merged data for analysis,
with hospital-identifiable information removed.
We obtained merger data from Cooper et al. (2019), which contain nearly all hospital mergers
from 2000-2014. The data were generated by correcting known problems in the AHA: errors
in timing of mergers due to lagged survey response and erroneous combination of multiple
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facilities into single observations post-merger. These data were cross-checked against data
from Schmitt (2017) and several business intelligence databases: Irving Levin Associates,
Factset, and SDC Platinum. For more details on the merger data, see Appendix D of Cooper
et al. (2019).
3.1.3. Representativeness
Each analytic sample includes facilities in the PriceGuide data that merged uniquely by
name and location to general acute care hospitals in the AHA data. The top panel of Table
4 describes how the full sample of AHA-surveyed general acute care hospitals compares to
our sample of PriceGuide subscribers. The facilities in the purchase order data voluntarily
joined a subscription service that allows them to benchmark their own prices and quantities
to those of other members in the database and thus may not be a random sample of US
hospitals. In particular, subscription is costly, so we expect hospitals with greater concerns
about, or attention to, supply costs to be over-represented in the database. In a survey of
database members, “cost reduction on PPIs" and “cost reduction on commodities" were the
first and second (and nearly tied) most commonly cited reasons for joining. This accords
with our own conversations with purchasing managers who cite a broad array of reasons and
product areas as motivations for benchmarking.
The PriceGuide data contain a large number (855) of hospitals, covering 17 percent of the
hospitals in the AHA sample.11 These hospitals tend to be relatively large (in terms of
employment, bed count, and admissions), they use more technologies, and they are more
often teaching and nonprofit hospitals, relative to the overall AHA sample. The PriceGuide
sample also weights the Northeast and West Census regions of the US, as opposed to the
Midwest and South regions, relatively heavily.
The second and third panels of Table 4 summarize the M&A transactions in the AHA and
11

The full PriceGuide database includes 1,155 facilities coded as “Hospitals” or “Health Systems” for which
we observe the date of database join. 891 of these facilities match uniquely to a general acute care hospital
in the AHA data, and 855 also purchase at least one of our focal product categories.
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Table 4: Merger Sample Restrictions

Hospital Characteristics
Beds
FTEs
Technologies
Teaching
Admissions
Non-Profit
Number of HMO Contracts
Percent Medicaid
Percent Medicare
Output Price
Urban
Midwest
Northeast
South
West
Transaction Characteristics
Number of Transactions
Number of Targets
Number of Acquirers
Number of Controls
Median Target Size
Median Acquirer Size
Merging Hospital Characteristics
Beds
FTEs
Technologies
Teaching
Admissions
Non-Profit
Number of HMO Contracts
Percent Medicaid
Percent Medicare
Output Price
Urban
Midwest
Northeast
South
West

(1)

(2)

(3)
PriceGuide
Hospitals, Full
Support, 2009-2015

Full Sample,
2009-2015

PriceGuide
Hospitals, 2009-2015

166.6
960.3
45.2
0.245
7,367.1
0.610
1.1
0.172
0.505
9,256
0.617
0.302
0.129
0.386
0.183

269.7
1,784.0
62.9
0.407
13,077.2
0.784
1.6
0.193
0.461
10,731
0.704
0.238
0.222
0.291
0.248

445
661
1,753
2,560
1
45

211
121
301
433
1
8

49
33
86
433
2
13

191.0
1,065.4
48.1
0.272
8,755.6
0.636
1.3
0.171
0.499
9,415
0.679
0.297
0.131
0.431
0.141

260.5
1,710.6
62.2
0.385
12,707.4
0.849
1.6
0.183
0.472
10,720
0.671
0.262
0.233
0.263
0.242

279.8
1,790.3
65.7
0.369
14,131.0
0.811
1.9
0.183
0.480
10,569
0.721
0.245
0.262
0.234
0.259

Notes: Each column reports the counts and characteristics of hospitals in the data at varying levels of sample
restrictions. Column (1) reports data on AHA hospitals and mergers for 2009-2015. Column (2) presents the
overlap between the AHA hospitals and the PriceGuide member hospitals satisfying our inclusion criteria as
described in the text. Column (3) presents data on merging and control hospitals in the PriceGuide data for
our main analytic sample. Data on beds, FTEs, technologies, admissions, teaching status, non-profit status,
number of HMO contracts, Medicare and Medicaid share come from the AHA Annual Survey. Following
Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) and Cooper et al. (2019), we measure technologies using the complete list of
binary facility indicators available in the AHA. Output price is calculated using data from the CMS HCRIS
and Medicare Impact Files as in Dafny et al. (2019).
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PriceGuide samples from 2009-2015.12 The full AHA merger panel contains 445 transactions
impacting 661 targets and 1,753 acquirers. The full PriceGuide merger panel covers a large
sample of these: 211 transactions impacting 121 targets and 301 acquirers. However, our
analytic samples are limited to the first transaction observed for each target and acquirer
in the PriceGuide data, and our main specifications include only those transactions for
which we observe at least one full year of pre- and post-merger data.13 Because PriceGuide
members join the database in a staggered fashion over time, such that our data include many
more hospitals in 2015 than in 2009, this requirement reduces our sample to 23 transactions
with 33 target hospitals, 31 transactions with 86 acquirer hospitals, and 433 non-merging
controls. The data contain 49 unique merger transactions. Thus, for most of our mergers,
we have detailed purchasing data for either the target or acquirer, not both. This provides
little ability to explore issues such as price convergence for the different parties involved
in a given merger. Although this restriction is costly, our sample contains many merger
case studies – whereas many analyses have considered single mergers in isolation (Kwoka
2015) – and the rich transaction-level cost information across 37 different product categories
compensates in detail for these limitations.
Focusing on the third panel, a comparison of columns (2) and (3) to column (1) illustrates
that, along most dimensions, the PriceGuide merger samples are slightly more representative
of the AHA merger sample on observables, than the full PriceGuide sample is of the full
AHA sample. This is primarily because larger hospitals are more likely to be involved in
M&A transactions. However, it remains the case that our analyses are identified from a
sample of relatively large hospitals enrolled in a benchmarking service; if, for example, this
implies that sample hospitals are especially sophisticated, they may benefit more or less
from merging than the average treated hospital in the AHA data.
For one product category – coronary stents – we have been able to compare the PriceGuide
12
All analytic samples used in this study impose that merging facilities have at least one calendar year of
transaction data pre- and post-merger. Accordingly, all mergers in this study take place during 2010-2014.
13
Post-merger here refers to years following the calendar year of the merger (i.e. y > τh ).
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sample to an external source that is explicitly intended to provide an accurate picture
of market shares and prices by US region: the Millennium Research Group’s (MRG)
Markettrack™ survey of catheter labs. As discussed in Grennan and Swanson (2019), the
prices paid in the MRG and PriceGuide samples during 2010-2013 are statistically close
to one another, with the average prices paid (controlling for brand-time trends) in the
MRG sample being slightly higher (mean $1,666, s.d. $149) than those paid by hospitals in
the PriceGuide sample (mean $1,631, s.d. $120) during the period before they joined the
benchmarking service. The matching specifications described in Section 3.3 are intended to
ameliorate concerns regarding internal validity of our estimates given sample selection, but
cannot speak directly to questions of external validity.
Appendix A.10 addresses external validity by reweighting our regression sample to
approximate the national distribution of merging hospitals on various observable
characteristics. These results are qualitatively similar, with point estimates that are slightly
smaller in magnitude. However, we offer all findings in this study with the caveat that we
cannot rule out bias driven by dimensions of sample selection not observable in publiclyavailable sources.
3.1.4. Price Variation, by Product Class
Each product category in our analytic sample is summarized in Table 5. The top panel
of Table 5 contains non-PPIs. Non-PPI products can be used in a hospital setting by
staff members with a variety of roles and scopes of practice. Some of these are essentially
commodities (e.g., surgical drapes): conditional on a few characteristics, such as material, we
do not expect particular manufacturers to be strongly preferred. Some are used by physicians
in moderately invasive procedures and brands may vary in perceived quality (e.g., surgical
staplers), but they tend to be less critically linked to patient outcomes than Class III PPIs.
The average non-PPI category is purchased by 483 sample hospitals. A non-PPI product
costs $714 per unit on average, and the average sample hospital spent $13,459 per month on
the average non-PPI. These averages obscure substantial heterogeneity. For example, nylon
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Table 5: Summary of Product Categories
% of
N
N
Nj HHIv q hmy phjmy CVh|jmy Ginih|jmy
spend spendhmy tar acq
Nylon Sutures
0.1
1,111
29
77
201 0.25
325
8
0.27
0.06
Bone Wires
0.1
1,658
27
72
123 0.17
42
102
0.38
0.13
Surgical Drapes
0.2
2,146
31
71
310 0.31
841
11
0.28
0.08
Tracheal Tubes
0.1
2,558
27
75
176 0.26
443
63
0.54
0.15
Trocars
0.3
4,942
26
73
188 0.16
141
76
0.31
0.09
Suture Anchors
0.4
6,327
24
71
61
0.41
19
381
0.19
0.07
Drill Bits
0.4
7,104
26
72
335 0.26
51
189
0.22
0.08
Electrosurgical Forceps
0.6
9,076
22
63
93
0.10
28
905
0.40
0.12
Polymeric Mesh
0.5
8,867
32
75
385 0.17
16
977
0.20
0.06
Allografts
0.5
10,537 21
56
249 0.84
71
1,634
0.19
0.05
Bone Nails
0.5
10,938 23
65
123 0.29
8
1,558
0.19
0.07
Trauma Bone Plates
0.6
11,417 27
72
549 0.56
16
787
0.14
0.05
Surgical Staplers
0.7
10,897 26
69
238 0.20
51
367
0.24
0.08
Bone Implant Putty
0.5
12,536 23
60
229 0.22
12
1,114
0.16
0.05
Embolization Coil
0.5
13,908 20
57
186 0.40
33
955
0.12
0.04
Spinal Bone Plates
0.5
13,881 16
43
234 0.18
9
1,709
0.26
0.08
Guiding Cath.
0.8
13,949 26
73
324 0.17
276
226
0.26
0.09
Guide Wires
1.0
17,878 30
77
423 0.13
317
122
0.26
0.09
Trauma Bone Screws
0.9
19,272 29
75
317 0.52
195
154
0.19
0.08
Bone Allografts
0.8
20,465 21
53
141 0.98
741
2,562
0.16
0.04
Ablation/Mapping Cath.
0.8
28,121 13
41
107 0.27
28
1,188
0.18
0.07
Spinal Bone Screws
2.6
68,515 20
52
568 0.22
130
615
0.31
0.10
Non-PPIs: Total
13.3 240,093 33
85 5,560
3,382
Non-PPIs: Average
0.6
13,459 24
66
253 0.32
172
714
0.25
0.08
Intraocular Lenses
0.2
6,786
14
33
39
0.55
34
293
0.13
0.05
Spinal Rod Implants
0.2
7,170
16
43
265 0.18
18
444
0.32
0.09
Mammary Prosth.
0.5
14,369 14
46
28
0.45
17
843
0.11
0.04
Acetabular Hip Prosth.
0.7
16,239 25
56
75
0.21
13
1,422
0.30
0.12
Spinal Stimulators
0.6
25,193
8
27
12
0.34
2
15,693
0.13
0.05
Tibial Knee Prosth.
1.2
27,858 25
60
206 0.19
23
1,371
0.23
0.08
Aortic Stents
1.0
27,664 18
49
67
0.33
5
6,144
0.09
0.03
Femoral Hip Prosth.
1.3
31,404 25
60
437 0.21
20
1,767
0.30
0.10
Pacemakers
1.3
30,878 16
53
33
0.43
7
4,409
0.14
0.07
Cardiac Valve Prosth.
0.7
31,703 11
42
10
0.40
6
5,752
0.15
0.07
Femoral Knee Prosth.
1.4
34,459 25
60
221 0.21
17
2,355
0.21
0.07
Spinal Spacers
1.4
43,020 16
39
486 0.14
14
3,524
0.22
0.06
Cardioverter Defib.
1.6
45,482 12
42
31
0.45
3
15,594
0.13
0.05
Resynchronization Defib.
1.7
49,308 12
38
10
0.47
2
20,897
0.12
0.05
Drug Eluting Stents
2.1
71,965 16
53
15
0.32
49
1,543
0.08
0.04
PPIs: Total
15.7 327,278 29
74 1,935
172
PPIs: Average
1.0
30,900 17
47
129 0.33
15
5,470
0.18
0.06
Notes: Summary statistics for main analysis sample. Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. For each
product category: “% of spend" is percent expenditure in entire PriceGuide database; spendhmy is average
monthly spending; Njhmy , Nh , Ntar , Nacq and Nj are total number of observations, hospitals, target hospitals,
acquirer hospitals, and brands; HHIv is vendor Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI); q hmy is average monthly
quantity; phjmy is average unit price; CVh|jmy is within-brand-month coefficient of variation across hospitals,
averaged across all brand-months; Ginih|jmy is within-brand-month Gini coefficient of price, averaged over
brand-months. “Total” rows contain aggregate statistics for all categories in each product class; unweighted
average statistics across category-level analyses listed in the “Average" rows.

sutures cost $8 per unit, whereas bone grafts cost $2,562 per unit.
The bottom panel of Table 5 contains physician preference items. For PPIs, usage is driven
by brand preferences of physicians, often surgeons, choosing which brand to use to treat
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a given patient. PPIs tend to be expensive cardiac and orthopedic surgical implants used
in advanced procedures and are not purchased by all hospitals: only 378 sample hospitals
purchased the average PPI, and only 254 purchased “Cardiac Valve Prostheses.” PPIs are
also used less frequently by hospitals that purchase them: the average PPI category sees 15
products used per month vs. 172 for non-PPIs. Nevertheless, purchasing hospitals spend
twice as much per month on the average PPI category ($30,900 vs. $13,459), due to PPIs’
higher average prices. PPIs are more likely to be sold and distributed by highly specialized
sales representatives whose relationships and expertise are valued by physicians. In some
cases, representatives are even present in the operating room during procedures.
The competitive landscape varies dramatically across these classes. There are more brands
to choose from in non-PPIs (253) vs. PPIs (129). For PPIs, each brand is typically purchased
directly from its manufacturer (there are 17 in the average category), and hospitals/systems
tend to negotiate their own prices. By contrast, the average non-PPI is available from 39
vendors, brands produced by a particular manufacturer may be sold by multiple vendors,
and hospitals are more likely to rely on GPO pricing (Schneller 2009).14 Despite these
differences, both classes are highly concentrated according to the standards typically applied
by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and there
is a great deal of price dispersion: the average coefficient of variation, controlling for brandmonth fixed effects, is 0.25 in non-PPIs and 0.18 in PPIs. The analogous Gini coefficient
is 0.08 in non-PPIs and 0.06 in PPIs. This variation in prices across hospitals could imply
large potential savings to be captured by merging parties, if the merged entity can achieve
equivalent or better pricing than the best of the pre-merger contracts. To the extent that a
larger merged party will have more “buyer power", savings could be even larger. Whether
this will indeed happen depends upon the economic mechanisms at work.
14
We do not directly observe which products are purchased via a GPO in our data, but there is significant
price dispersion in all product categories in our data in spite of them. As discussed in Section 3.2, we consider
GPOs to be an unobserved feature of the setting that may mediate the effects of mergers for some products.
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3.2. Mechanisms of Interest
The welfare effects of any merger “efficiencies” driven by input cost reductions will depend
on the underlying mechanisms (Carlton and Israel 2011). In evaluating proposed mergers,
the FTC and DoJ consider whether cost savings are likely to be large, whether they are
likely to pass through to consumers, and whether they are “likely to be accomplished with
the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed
merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects” (that is, whether they
are “merger-specific” (U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 2010)).
Thus, the agencies’ consideration of cost savings focuses for the most part on potential
welfare gains in the downstream market.
Input cost savings could also be welfare-neutral – a transfer between upstream and
downstream firms – or themselves welfare-reducing. Hemphill and Rose (2018) distinguish
cases where mergers increase monopsony power or bargaining leverage from cases where
there are real resource savings, such as reduced waste. They conclude that the former cases
reduce competition and should not be viewed by regulators as cognizable efficiencies. One
potential harm cited that may be particularly relevant for medical technology is dynamic
inefficiency, in which upstream firms reduce investment and innovation due to increased
downstream monopsony power.
Hospital costs include substantial fixed and variable components. The variable portion
of hospital costs scales with the number and severity of patients treated, the quantity of
labor and “capital” inputs used per patient, and the prices of those inputs. The prices of
inputs are, in turn, determined by brand choice and the price negotiated within each brand.
Mergers may in theory impact any part of the hospital’s cost function. However, fixed costs
are unlikely to pass through to patients in the short run, changes in patient mix raise a
battery of questions regarding agency and quality of care, and potential negative effects of
monopsony power on labor costs are not rated kindly by antitrust authorities (Gaynor and
Town 2012). Thus, in this study, we focus on variable costs that are truly marginal in the
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sense that they are incurred along with the provision of additional patient care – those costs
most likely to impact downstream prices. Specifically, we examine whether mergers lead to
economies of scale in variable supply costs due to changes in negotiated prices and/or input
choices.
Analyzing prices requires close attention to the details of hospital procurement. In hospital
input markets, prices are determined via bilateral negotiations between suppliers and
hospitals. In some cases, a GPO may negotiate on behalf of its hospital members. For
products purchased through a GPO, a merger could impact purchasing if it moved the
combined entity to a more favorable GPO membership volume tier, or if it induced a
change in GPO (which could be favorable for some products and unfavorable for others). In
many cases, though, the GPO price acts as a starting point for individual hospital/system
negotiations, or there is no relevant GPO contract for a given product. This may explain
the presence of significant price dispersion in all product categories in our data in spite of
the GPO market being dominated by a few large players (Gooch 2017). Thus, much of
hospital purchasing is the result of direct bilateral bargaining between suppliers and a given
hospital/system.
The effect of mergers on bilateral bargaining is ambiguous in the economics literature. A
merger could affect a supplier’s marginal cost or bargaining position (e.g., via economies of
scale in distribution). It could also affect the integrated buyer’s bargaining position (e.g.,
via introducing competition from another supplier if there are fixed or search costs involved
in contracting). In general, larger buyer firms may obtain better prices if the bargainingsurplus function is concave, in which case the supplier’s surplus in bargaining with two
independent firms is smaller at the margin than the average surplus in bargaining jointly
with an integrated firm (Chipty and Snyder 1999; Horn and Wolinsky 1988; Inderst and Wey
2007; Stole and Zwiebel 1996). Further, larger buyer firms may spur competition among
multiple suppliers (Dana 2012; Gans and King 2002; Marvel and Yang 2008; Snyder 1996,
1998), implying an important role for supplier market structure. A merger may also affect
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the buyer’s bargaining power/ability (the share of gains from trade obtained, conditional
on bargaining positions). In work on insurer-hospital bargaining, Lewis and Pflum (2015)
find that bargaining power is a greater determinant of post-merger markups than bargaining
position.
Post-merger changes in bargaining power may be driven by various factors, including firm
organizational structure, information, incentives, management, and leadership. These same
factors may impact the efficiency of input utilization within firms. It is important to note
that these effects may be positive or negative. On the one hand, Bloom et al. (2014) find that
larger hospitals have better management practices. Conversely, mergers may have disruptive
impacts on management, organizational culture, or earnings (Agrawal et al. 1992; Beckmann
1960; Fulop et al. 2002; Minemyer 2017).
Input choice and input pricing may also interact. Dana (2012) posits that buyer groups’
primary advantage results from their commitment to purchase from a single supplier in
differentiated product markets. We see evidence of this in the hospital-insurer bargaining
world: Sorensen (2003) shows that insurers’ steering ability impacts pricing more than
insurers’ size; Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) model how insurers steer patients towards cheaper
hospitals; and Ho and Lee (2018) note that restrictive hospital networks could reduce
insurers’ prices by up to 30 percent.
In this particular context, it is also important to note that hospital mergers entail changes
in market power both upstream (with respect to suppliers) and downstream (with respect
to insurers). This creates a linkage between upstream and downstream prices, as both
negotiations will depend on total surplus. For example, whereas a merger-induced increase in
market power in upstream supply markets may have a direct negative effect on input prices,
a contemporaneous increase in market power in downstream markets for hospital services
would simultaneously have a direct positive effect on service prices, and that greater overall
pie may be “shared” with suppliers. Ho and Lee (2017) document how similar countervailing
forces create variation in the effects of insurer competition, when such competition impacts
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upstream negotiations with hospitals and downstream negotiations with employers.
Many of these mechanisms may depend on details such as the geographic location of the
merging hospitals or the extent of competition among suppliers. Prior research has found
that geographic proximity is a success factor for mergers, perhaps due to information
advantages (Uysal et al. 2008). If transmission of management that might affect bargaining
power is similarly impacted by geographic proximity, then mergers involving hospitals with
market overlap may be more successful at reducing costs. The geography of medical supply
sales and hospital competition may matter as well. For example, economies of scale in
distribution might be achieved, or joint post-merger negotiation of supply contracts might be
easier, if hospitals are in the same geographic sales territories for suppliers. A countervailing
factor would be that mergers of hospitals competing in the same local hospital markets
may, as noted above, involve downstream price increases for hospital services that could
theoretically be shared with hospitals’ suppliers.
Competition among suppliers could likewise interact with the mechanisms via which mergers
might affect input prices. In a competitive market where markups are low, mergers are only
likely to affect prices via cost mechanisms like potential economies of scale in distribution.
In a less competitive market, cost changes might be less likely to be passed through, as
other changes to bargaining position or bargaining power/ability would have larger potential
effects.

3.3. Empirical Specification and Identification
We estimate two difference-in-differences price specifications.

First, using a dataset

containing unit prices for each product category (UMDNS code) u, hospital h, brand j,
month m, year y, we estimate:
lnPuhjmy = αu ∗ 1[y = τh ] + βu ∗ 1[y > τh ] + θhj + θjmy + Xhmy θX + εuhjmy
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(3.1)

where τh is the year of hospital h’s merger (if any), θhj is a hospital-brand fixed effect,
and θjmy denotes brand-month-year fixed effects (with j implicitly uj as brands do not
span categories by construction). Brand-specific time trends are necessary to control for
the presence of brands both early and late in their life cycles in these data. Measuring
these trends at the monthly, rather than yearly, level becomes important for our event
study specifications in Section 3.4 below; we do so here as well for the sake of consistency.
Xhmy θX can in principle control for any further time-varying hospital characteristics, but
in our baseline analyses it contains a single dummy variable to indicate month-years after
the hospital joins the benchmarking database, so that join effects are not conflated with
merger effects.15 We estimate separate regressions for acquirers and targets; the acquirers
regression excludes targets, and vice versa.
Because the month of merger is unknown, we estimate separate treatment effects for the
merger year (αu ) and the post-merger period (βu ), focusing on βu as our main coefficient of
interest. Prior work has shown that these hospital supply contracts are typically renegotiated
roughly annually (Grennan and Swanson 2019), and we find that the same is true across
our focal product categories. The effects of hospital mergers on hospital procedure prices
have been shown to manifest immediately post-merger (Cooper et al. 2019). Therefore,
focusing on βu allows us to estimate merger treatment effects that are unlikely to be biased
downward by delayed price adjustments due to structured renegotiations.16 In our baseline
results, we report specifications focusing on one year pre-merger, the year in which the merger
occurs, and one year post-merger. Appendix A.7 also contains analyses for alternative time
horizons. In each specification, we always limit our estimation sample to the set of hospitals
with complete pre- and post-merger data over the specified timing support, and use only
the specified range of years. This decision enables us to interpret the resulting treatment
effect as the effect of merging on the average treated hospital over that time horizon.
15

67 percent of hospitals are post-join for at least one year prior to the merger event in which they are
used. Appendix Table 27 includes estimates using only such hospitals. The results are slightly larger in
absolute magnitude, though broadly consistent with our main findings.
16
In unreported analyses, we estimate the effect of mergers on renegotiation timing and find no statistically
significant effects at conventional levels.
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Finally, within each hospital-UMDNS code, we weight each brand using quantity share
within hospital. This approach allows us to interpret the resulting coefficient of interest βu
as the treatment effect of merging on the average unit price of product u while also including
brand-level controls on the right-hand side.17 For estimation of specification (3.1), we hold
quantity share weights across brands fixed at those observed for the hospital’s first year in
the analytic sample. Intuitively, this regression examines the weighted average within-brand
effect of mergers on negotiated prices, for brands purchased both before and after the merger.
Next, using the same dataset, we estimate:
lnPuhjmy = αu ∗ 1[y = τh ] + βu ∗ 1[y > τh ] + θuh + θjmy + Xhmy θX + εuhjmy

(3.2)

where θuh denotes a set of hospital fixed effects (that vary by category in regressions where
we pool categories). To avoid overweighting products purchased in small quantities in this
specification, we weight each hospital-brand-year using the brand’s quantity share within
the hospital-year. Intuitively, this regression examines the effect of mergers on negotiated
prices per unit across all brands within-category. That is, specification (3.1) uses fixed premerger quantity share weights, whereas specification (3.2) uses contemporaneous quantity
share weights; thus, the estimates from (3.1) measure the extent to which renegotiation leads
to lower prices for the same brand at the same hospital, and (3.2) will further include the
extent to which the hospital switches usage to different brands. We find this specification of
interest because switching to cheaper brands could be one mechanism via which savings could
be achieved. However, we interpret these results cautiously, as changes in usage patterns
could affect welfare via mechanisms other than price changes, if there are average or patientspecific match quality differences across brands within a category. In all regressions where
the dependent variable is price, standard errors are clustered by hospital-brand.
In addition to the product category-specific regressions, we also estimate pooled regressions
17

Note that we would obtain similar estimates if we just estimated a regression where the unit of
observation was the hospital-use case-month-year (for example, a separate observation for each coronary
stent used by a hospital in a given year) and ran (unweighted) OLS.
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across all categories within each class (PPI vs. non-PPI). We stack all category-specific
data within each class and estimate specifications (3.1) and (3.2) with a single α and β
for the class, weighting by the total expenditure share for each category across all years of
the data. This approach allows us to frame our findings in terms of total potential savings
associated with horizontal mergers. Implicitly, however, this approach downweights product
categories with low spending shares and hospitals that tend to purchase less expensive
product categories.
3.3.1. Identification
Our empirical approach compares input price trends at merging hospitals to those at nonmerging hospitals, around the time of the merger. In Table 6 below, we compare merging
and non-merging hospitals in our final analytic sample. Columns in each panel of Table 6
compare the full set of controls (1) to merging target (3) and acquirer (5) hospitals.
Relative to all non-merging controls, target hospitals tend to be smaller (lower employment,
fewer beds); they are also less likely to be teaching hospitals and more likely to have
non-profit ownership. Although they are smaller than controls, they tend to use more
technologies, and have higher monthly purchase quantities for the product categories they
purchase.18 Relative to the average control hospital, target relationships with payers are
nuanced: they have above-average contracting with managed care organizations (proxied
by count of contracts with health maintenance organizations (HMOs)); they rely relatively
less on Medicaid and more on Medicare for admissions; and their average case-mix-adjusted
price per inpatient admission is significantly lower.
Acquirers show a different pattern. Relative to controls, they: are larger; are more often
teaching hospitals and more often non-profit; use more technologies; have more HMO
contracts; and have a similar price per admission.
18

Following Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) and Cooper et al. (2019) we measure technologies using the
complete list of 153 binary facility indicators available in the AHA. These vary widely, encompassing burn
care, chemotherapy, Meals on Wheels, psychiatric child/adolescent services, and proton beam therapy.
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Table 6: Comparison of Merging and Non-Merging Hospitals
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Controls

Target
Controls
(Matched)

Targets

Acquirer
Controls
(Matched)

Acquirers

2,540
74.26
355.08
49.09
244.80
17,431
0.55
0.75
1.68
0.20
0.44
12,440
4.95

2,533
77.69
333.62
32.24
326.99
16,936
0.49
0.94
1.95
0.16
0.49
12,397
4.96

2,246
76.13
306.37
34.95
356.36
15,384
0.39
0.91
2.05
0.15
0.51
9,518
4.93

2,893
79.28
406.51
37.77
229.31
20,458
0.63
0.81
1.89
0.19
0.45
12,624
4.95

2,713
79.53
404.91
42.01
220.11
19,995
0.60
0.77
1.85
0.20
0.45
12,593
4.92

433

286

33

369

85

2,674
75.74
372.06
23.68
24.34
18,336
0.58
0.75
1.71
0.20
0.44
12,693
7.22

2,484
78.78
346.59
15.08
27.48
17,258
0.50
0.95
2.01
0.16
0.48
12,250
7.21

2,366
79.62
324.79
16.50
31.90
16,314
0.43
0.93
2.03
0.15
0.50
9,538
7.19

2,945
78.86
417.31
15.12
27.14
20,865
0.63
0.80
1.91
0.19
0.45
12,816
7.21

2,897
81.46
427.50
18.73
30.35
20,964
0.64
0.75
1.77
0.20
0.44
12,711
7.17

403

242

29

330

74

Panel A: Non-PPI Purchasers
FTEs
Technologies
Beds
Number of Unique Products
Average Monthly Quantity
Admissions
Teaching
Non-Profit
Number of HMO Contracts
Percent Medicaid
Percent Medicare
Output Price
Input Price Index (θh )
Number of Hospitals
Panel B: PPI Purchasers
FTEs
Technologies
Beds
Number of Unique Products
Average Monthly Quantity
Admissions
Teaching
Non-Profit
Number of HMO Contracts
Percent Medicaid
Percent Medicare
Output Price
Input Price Index (θh )
Number of Hospitals

Notes: Each column reports the counts and characteristics of merging and non-merging hospitals in the data.
Column (1) shows characteristics of all non-merging hospitals. Column (2) shows the subset of these controls
that serve as the matched sample of controls for target hospitals. Column (3) shows characteristics of target
hospitals. Column (4) shows the characteristics of matched controls for acquirer hospitals. Column (5) shows
the characteristics of acquirer hospitals. Panel A shows the samples used for estimation for non-PPI products
and Panel B shows the samples used for estimation for PPIs. Matching is at the hospital-UMDNS level, so N
of matched samples is the superset of controls used in each class-merger type, and variable means are weighted
the same as each hospital’s weight in the pooled regressions. Data on beds, full time equivalent employees
(FTEs), technologies, admissions, teaching status, non-profit status, number of HMO contracts, and Medicare
and Medicaid share come from the AHA Annual Survey. Following Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) and Cooper
et al. (2019) we measure technologies using the complete list of binary facility indicators available in the AHA.
Output price is calculated using data from the CMS HCRIS and Medicare Impact Files as in Dafny et al. (2019).

Given these differences in composition, we might be concerned that merging and non-merging
hospitals exhibit very different purchasing patterns even prior to the merger, and more
importantly, that they might have different latent trends in input purchasing (which would
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invalidate the core assumption behind the differences-in-differences research design). To
address this issue, first we note that the input price indices for merging and non-merging
hospitals are not very different. In Table 6, we see that, relative to non-merging control
hospitals, targets have about 2-3 percent lower prices pre-merger, whereas acquirers have
about 3-5 percent lower prices pre-merger.19
We also address observed differences directly in our preferred specifications. We match both
target and acquirer hospitals to a subset of non-merging hospitals in order to ensure that
“treated” merging hospitals are similar to the “control” non-merging hospitals, at least along
observable dimensions. Within each product category, we match each merging hospital to its
10 nearest non-merging neighbors using Mahalanobis distance.20 Distances are calculated
based on the hospital’s following characteristics as in Dranove and Lindrooth (2003): inputs
and outputs (log admissions, log full-time equivalent (FTE) employment, log technologies,
number of unique products purchased, and average monthly purchase quantity); number of
beds; payer mix (Medicare and Medicaid share of discharges, number of HMO contracts);
teaching hospital status; and non-profit ownership. The weighted average characteristics of
the matched samples are included in columns (2) and (4) of Table 6. The matched samples
for both the target and acquirer samples are closer on most observable dimensions within
both PPIs and non-PPIs.
In implementing the preferred specification, we generate a dataset containing a copy of each
transaction for each of the 10 neighbors along with the full set of data from each treated
hospital. Each of the 10 neighbors is therefore weighted equally in specifications (3.1) and
(3.2), though some control hospitals are used as a comparison for multiple treated hospitals.
For the stacked class-level regressions, matching is performed within each product category.
As discussed in detail in Dafny (2009), we note that this reduced form identification approach
19

Input price indices are hospital fixed effects recovered from a stacked regression of log price on brandmonth-year fixed effects and hospital fixed effects. Intuitively, they represent hospital-level residual price
variation holding the basket of product categories and brands fixed.
20
Appendix A.3 discusses the performance of alternative matching algorithms, and includes pooled
regression results for a subset of matching approaches.
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cannot address endogenous selection of hospitals into the merger “treatment” on unobserved
dimensions. In order to provide greater confidence that our results are not driven by
differential trends across merging and control hospitals, we augment our results with detailed
monthly event studies with different pre- and post-merger time horizons. The results are
reassuring as to our main conclusions; and to the extent that endogeneity bias remains, it
must be due to time-varying factors that are precisely contemporaneous with the mergers
in our sample.
Lastly, we only observe mergers which were proposed and consummated. Implicitly, this
subset of all potential mergers that might take place was deemed to have lower anticompetitive effects by antitrust enforcement agencies. In the event that cost savings were
used as a justification for these mergers, the cost savings we estimate are likely an upper
bound on what one might expect from the average proposed horizontal merger in this setting.

3.4. Estimates of Merger Treatment Effects
We discuss results in three subsections, beginning with the effect of mergers on prices for each
product category. We then consider the pooled effects obtained by stacking the categories
into a single regression for each product class. Finally, we use triple-differences versions of
the pooled regressions to evaluate treatment effect heterogeneity corresponding with various
potential buyer power mechanisms.
3.4.1. Product Category-Specific Price Effects
In Figure 4, product categories are grouped by class (non-PPIs vs. PPIs), then ordered
from top to bottom in order of increasing total expenditure in the database. We show the
estimated coefficients βu and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals for specifications
(3.1 – hj fixed effects; solid markers) and (3.2 – h fixed effects; hollow markers).
The first pattern of interest is that, for both targets (left) and acquirers (right), the
within-hospital-category estimates (hollow markers) closely mimic the within-hospital-brand
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Figure 4: Merger Treatment Effects

Notes: Regression coefficients from specifications (3.1) and (3.2), post-merger year τh + 1 only. Authors’
calculations from PriceGuide data. Bars indicate 95% confidence interval with standard errors clustered
at hospital-brand level. Left panel: Targets. Right panel: Acquirers. Circular/green markers: non-PPIs.
Triangular/orange markers: PPIs. Solid markers: specification (3.1), within-brand price effects. Hollow markers:
specification (3.2), within-category price effects.

estimates (solid markers), and the point estimates of the two are rarely statistically
significantly different. This suggests that there is not a prevalence of large changes in
composition of products purchased to higher or lower dollar products post-merger. Given
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this, and given our concerns that any such switching might have ambiguous welfare effects,
we focus most of our discussion on within-hospital-brand differences moving forward.
Next, we focus on the left panel: merger effects on target hospitals. Among non-PPIs (circle
markers), there is no discernible pattern of savings post-merger. Point estimates are a near
equal mix of positive and negative, with most small in magnitude and not statistically
different from zero. Exceptions include significant price decreases within-hospital-brand of
3 and 15 percent, respectively, for trauma bone plates and polymeric mesh.
In contrast, among PPIs (triangle markers), the majority of within-hospital-brand price
effect point estimates are negative. Also, several of these effects are significant at the category
level, including decreases on the order of 5-9 percent for cardioverter defibrillators, femoral
knee prostheses, mammary prostheses, and pacemakers.
We observe a dramatically different pattern for acquirers in the right panel of Figure 4.
Price effects are generally more precise, as expected given the larger sample of acquirers.
The point estimates are also clustered much closer to zero for both non-PPI products and
PPI products. Among non-PPI products, we observe several negative and significant results
on the order of 2-4 percent for bone implant putty, drill bits, spinal bone plates, trauma bone
plates, and trauma bone screws. Second, in contrast to the target results, the coefficient
estimates for some PPIs are positive, ranging from 2-5 percent for acetabular hip prostheses,
cardioverter defibrillators, drug eluting stents, and spinal stimulators.
3.4.2. Pooled Product Class Price Effects
Given the large number of coefficients estimated across the individual product categories,
it is useful to turn to the stacked regressions presented in Table 7 in order to shed light on
average patterns at the hospital level. The left columns of Table 7 show pooled coefficient
estimates for target hospitals, for each specification and class. These results indicate that
targets obtain no significant price decreases on non-PPI product categories post-merger.
However, they obtain more meaningful within-hospital-brand savings of 3.4 percent on PPIs.
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Finally, the within-hospital-brand coefficient is only slightly smaller than the within-hospitalcategory coefficient. This indicates that, on average, nearly all savings can be accounted for
by renegotiations, rather than brand switching. We have also run specifications examining
changes in product usage patterns as well as prices. Unfortunately, what can be done on
usage is in part limited by the fact that for most of our mergers, we have detailed purchasing
data for either the target or acquirer, not both, so we cannot examine “convergence" between
merging parties with any precision.21
Table 7: Merger Treatment Effects – Pooled
ln(P rice)uhjmy

Dependent Variable:
Non-PPIs
PPIs

Fixed Effects:
Treatment:

-0.006
(0.008)
-0.034†
(0.010)

0.003
(0.011)
-0.038†
(0.009)

θuhj + θjmy
θuh + θjmy
Targets

-0.004
(0.004)
0.017†
(0.006)

-0.012**
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.005)

θuhj + θjmy
θuh + θjmy
Acquirers

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors clustered at the hospital-brand level in parentheses. Coefficients estimated from pooled
specifications (3.1) and (3.2). The dependent variable ln(Price) is the logged transaction price
measured at the hospital-brand-month-year. All price specifications include brand-month-year fixed
effects.

The pooled acquirer results are summarized in the right columns of Table 7. The nonPPI coefficients are again fairly precise zeros.22 Prices go up slightly (1.7 percent withinhospital-brand, 1.2 percent within-hospital-category) post-merger for acquirers’ purchase
of PPIs. This result is interesting because, although there are several managerial and
economic theories via which mergers might increase input prices (relative to non-merging
control hospital trends), we might expect most of these mechanisms to perhaps be less
prevalent among acquirers, who are typically the larger (sometimes significantly larger) or
more dominant entity involved in the merger. We return to how we interpret this result
as we examine event study evidence, robustness to matching and inference decisions, and
21

We explore how standardization mediates price effects in Section 3.4.3.
The results are still small, though statistically significant, if we exclude the “outlier” categories observed
in Figure 4: tracheal tubes, polymeric mesh, and embolization coils. The within-hospital-brand effect
increases in magnitude to -0.9 percent, the within-hospital-category effect to -1.5 percent, and each are
significant at the 5 percent level.
22
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treatment effect heterogeneity.
Event studies of merger treatment timing
We next examine whether the results above are (1) driven by preexisting differential trends
in prices among merging facilities; or (2) biased due to merger effects that develop slowly over
time (e.g., due to fixed contracts that take time to renegotiate as in Grennan and Swanson
(2019)). In Figure 5 below, the left panels show pooled raw average price trends, controlling
only for brand-category fixed effects to account for the fact that hospitals may use very
different amounts of various products. The right panels show the pooled event studies for
the within-brand version of the above difference-in-differences specification, fully controlling
for hospital-brand effects and brand-specific time trends. We focus on PPI prices for targets
(top panels) and acquirers (bottom panels). In each panel, we show one full calendar year
pre- and post-merger; the year of merger is highlighted in gray. The first and second panels
of Appendix Table 28 compare our baseline difference-in-differences results, in which the
treatment effect of merging is identified by comparing the post-merger year τh + 1 to the
pre-merger year τh − 1, to an alternative set of estimates comparing τh and τh + 1 to τh − 1.
Intuitively, the latter imposes α = β in specification (3.1). The point estimates are slightly
smaller in magnitude in the specification with α = β, indicating that most, but not all, of
the treatment effect of interest is realized in the merger year.
As expected in markets with evolving technology and new product entry, PPI prices are
decreasing for both targets and acquirers. In panel (a), it appears that targets have a steeper
negative trend pre-merger than their matched controls. However, this may be driven by any
number of features that differ between targets and controls, such as different patterns in
when expensive brands are purchased throughout the year. Indeed, in panel (b), which
controls for such compositional differences, there is little evidence of remaining pre-trends
in our preferred specification, and there is strong evidence that targets’ PPI prices decrease
more steeply in the merger and post-merger year. For acquirers, we observe in panels (c)
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Figure 5: Merger Treatment Effects – Event Studies, PPIs
Panel A: Targets
(b) Estimated Treatment Effect

(a) Average Prices

Panel B: Acquirers
(c) Average Prices

(d) Estimated Treatment Effect

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. The left panels present the raw average price for treated
hospitals and matched controls, adjusted for the composition of products using a product-category-brand fixedeffect. The right panels present regression coefficients from pooled event study version of specifications (3.1), each
month within one year of merger year τh . Hold-out date is December of last pre-merger year; all coefficients
represented relative to pre-merger year mean. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval with standard errors
clustered by hospital-brand.

and (d) that acquirers’ and control hospitals’ prices are on a parallel downward trend in the
pre-merger year, consistent with our identifying assumption. Interestingly, it appears that
the positive price effects for acquirers purchasing PPIs are driven by a slightly flatter trend
among acquirers in the merger year than we observe for non-merging controls. Finally, in
both panels (b) and (d), although the point estimates suggest that savings begin accruing
early in the merger year, the standard errors are such that we cannot rule out zero price
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effects for the first five to eight months of the merger year. This could be due to price effects
being realized slowly over time, or to mergers being consummated during the later part of
the grayed-out “merger year.” Unfortunately, we do not observe the exact timing of the
merger. However, the trend in treatment effect estimates is flat in the post-merger year,
indicating that, where merger effects exist, they are not continuing to evolve at the end
of the time horizon observed. In event studies using alternative time horizons (Appendix
Figure 16 and Appendix Figure 17, discussed in more detail below) we find some evidence of
differences in the pattern of merger-year monthly treatment effects, but a similar qualitative
and quantitative pattern of treatment effect point estimates in the post-merger year. This
emphasizes that it is more appropriate to focus on the post-merger year than the merger
year.
In all of these results, we have focused on the largest sample for which we have complete
pre- and post-merger years: a panel of treated and matched control hospitals in the years
{τh − 1, τh , τh + 1}. These results are, for the most part, robust to estimation on (smaller)
samples of hospitals with longer pre- and post-merger periods. First, Appendix Figure 16
confirms that there are no differential pre-trends in targets’ prices in the two years prior
to the merger year; Appendix Figure 17 confirms analogously that there is no evidence of
differential pre-trends in acquirers’ prices for PPIs. There is a stronger negative pre-trend in
acquirers’ non-PPI prices, but it appears to be contained within the year τh − 2 and would
not be a source of bias in our main specifications.
Appendix Figures 16 and 17 also examine whether price effects are continuing to evolve after
τh +1. The strongest evidence of this is in panel (b) of Appendix Figure 16, in which targets’
non-PPI prices exhibit some larger negative point estimates two years after the merger.
We summarize the estimated treatment effects with alternative timing supports in Appendix
Table 28. Although the results are qualitatively similar to our baseline results, we note a few
key differences. First, the subsample of targets for which we observe two pre-merger years
exhibits larger non-PPI and PPI savings. Second, neither of our subsamples of acquirers
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with extended timing support shows evidence of positive, significant PPI price effects; thus,
we interpret this result with some caution.
3.4.3. Robustness
Quantity Effects
In this Section, we consider “quantity” effects that may have implications for welfare or for
the validity of our research design. The results are briefly summarized here and shown in
detail in Appendix A.5
First, an important issue for thinking about the welfare effects of mergers is whether they
impact the composition of products purchased.

To investigate this issue, we estimate

whether and how merging hospitals changed the set of brands they purchased around the
time of acquisition, relative to a set of matched controls. In contrast to the theory that
merging would lead to greater switching (due to standardization or to some other alteration
of procurement practices), we find that brand switching is significantly less likely for merging
hospitals than for matched controls, with similar results for targets and acquirers. This would
be consistent with mergers disrupting the regular procurement activities of merging firms,
but other mechanisms may also be at work here. Taken together with our finding in Figure 4
and Table 7 that the treatment effects of merging on prices within hospital-category are very
similar to the treatment effects within hospital-brand, these results suggest that, although
we do observe a different pattern of brand switching post-merger among treated hospitals
(relative to controls), this pattern does not significantly change the composition of brands
purchased in favor of higher or lower dollar products post-merger. Thus, switching patterns
have little implication for savings via switching to cheaper brands, but they may be related
to documented price effects through the threat of switching or propensity to renegotiate.
We also caution that merging hospitals’ relative lack of switching could have positive or
negative effects on the quality of products purchased.
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Second, we examined the effect of mergers on purchase volume, motivated by the logic that
targets may have enjoyed price reductions due to increases in their quantity purchased rather
than changes in negotiated prices.23 In the Appendix, we report the results of differencesin-differences specifications with ln(Quhy ) as the dependent variable. The summary results
mostly suggest that there is no consistent effect of mergers on volume of supplies purchased.
Importantly, comparing Figure 14 to Figure 4, we do not find evidence that savings are
correlated with quantity effects.
Lastly, we investigate whether there is nonrandom attrition in our sample. For example,
if merging hospitals are more likely to disappear from our sample after a merger takes
place, then the price treatment effects we estimate may be systematically biased upward
or downward. Similarly, mergers could impact the attribution of transactions to specific
facilities; e.g., a target facility’s transactions might be attributed to the acquiring system
due to centralized reporting post-merger. We find that there is some differential attrition of
targets. However, as discussed in Appendix A.5, this is greatly driven by targets merging at
the end of our sample, and dropping those targets has no effect on our documented pattern
of price effects. We speculate that this differential attrition may be driven by a longer delay
in data submission for targets post-merger.
Sensitivity of Price Treatment Effects
We have examined the sensitivity of our results to several decisions regarding modeling,
regression sample, and inference.

In Appendix Table 19, we present estimates from

specifications (3.1) and (3.2) using different matching approaches. Panel A presents the
baseline estimates for reference. Panel B presents the non-matched results, using all nonmerging hospitals as controls. Panel C uses a 10 neighbor Probit version of the match
as in Dranove and Lindrooth (2003). Panel D uses a 1-to-1 Mahalanobis match as in
Schmitt (2017) – these results are the most notable in that all merger effect estimates
23

We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
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are significantly noisier, with the target PPI savings no longer statistically significant. The
alternative matching approaches generally track our preferred estimates, with largest savings
for targets’ purchase of PPIs and positive treatment effects for acquirers’ purchase of PPIs.
However, none of the estimates is statistically significantly different from those in our main
results, indicating that observed compositional differences do not generate large differences
in input price or trends between treated (merging) and control (non-merging) hospitals.
Next, although the matching exercises described above focus on selecting the best
comparison groups for our in-sample mergers to ensure internal validity, they do not address
external validity: our data only include hospitals that voluntarily joined a benchmarking
database, which may be different in observable and unobservable ways from the average
merging hospital.

In Appendix A.10, we estimate our main merger specification from

equation (3.1), with sample treated hospitals re-weighted to be representative of the
distribution of the full sample of targets and acquirers in the AHA based on (a) bed size,
or (b) ownership and teaching status. These results are qualitatively similar, with point
estimates that are slightly smaller in magnitude. We also investigated this issue using an
alternative source of hospital cost data – total cost per adjusted discharge in the HCRIS data
reported by hospitals to CMS (as in Schmitt (2017)) – to investigate how cost treatment
effects change as we impose the sample limitations that lead us to our final analytic sample.
The results are shown in Appendix Table 30. We do not observe significant changes in the
merger treatment effects as we narrow the sample from all mergers 2009-2015, to mergers
2009-2015 among hospitals in the PriceGuide data, to our analytic sample of PriceGuide
hospitals with “full support” merging in 2009-2015.24 However, we note that this is not
a particularly high-powered test due to the large standard errors. For example, the point
estimate of the treatment effect of mergers on costs for targets in the post-merger year is
-0.011 in the full sample and in the PriceGuide, full support sample, but the standard error
for the latter treatment effect is 0.046.
24

Appendix Table 30 presents results for 434 targets and 964 acquirers; Table 4 column (1) has 661 targets
and 1,753 acquirers. This difference is due to the fact that we follow the approach in our price regressions
of limiting the regression sample to the first transaction observed for each target and acquirer.
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We also attempt to directly address any potential confounding of merger effects and database
join effects. Our baseline analyses contain a dummy variable to indicate month-years after
the hospital joins the benchmarking database, so that join effects are not conflated with
merger effects. Appendix Table 27 shows a slightly cleaner specification, estimated only on
hospitals whose three focal periods {τh − 1, τh , τh + 1} are entirely post-join.25 The results
are slightly larger in absolute magnitude, but confirm our main findings.
Next, we address potential bias introduced by hospitals’ involvement in multiple mergers.
Our main specification identifies the first merger for each of our treated hospitals over the
sample period 2009-2015. At baseline, we impose that treated hospitals have no merger in
τh − 1, and that matched control hospitals have no merger in {τh − 1, τh , τh + 1}. In Panel
C of Appendix Table 27, we implement a stricter version of this restriction, ensuring that
no mergers occur between τh − 2 and τh + 1 except for the focal merger in τh , applying this
rule to both treated and matched control hospitals. The results are qualitatively similar to
our main estimates in Table 7.
Lastly, Appendix Table 29 explores various alternative approaches to standard errors: a
wild bootstrap method as well as alternative clustering at the hospital-vendor and systemUMDNS levels. Our main findings are stable across approaches to standard errors.
3.4.4. Price Treatment Effect Heterogeneity and Mechanisms
In this Section, we examine heterogeneity in treatment effects along several dimensions in
order to explore mechanisms. This is intended not to be an exhaustive exploration, but
rather to shed light on those mechanisms highlighted in Section 3.2 for which we have
relevant data.26 For the sake of brevity, we continue to focus discussion on within-hospitalbrand price effects, as our previous results indicated that these were where the strongest
evidence of merger-driven savings were concentrated.
25

We also remove matched controls when their associated treated hospital is removed from the data based
on this restriction.
26
There are numerous interesting questions for which we do not have relevant data. E.g., regarding the
supplier’s cost function, regarding convergence of target and acquirer prices for a given merging pair, etc.
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Size effects
As noted previously, much of the literature regarding mergers and cost savings focuses on
advantages associated with firm size. Within our sample, we observe substantial variation
in the (absolute and relative) buyer firm size change induced by the merger: with one
exception, all of our transactions involve 1-2 target hospitals, but our acquirer systems
range from very small (1 or 2 hospitals) to large (over 70 hospitals). The effect of target
and acquirer size on purchasing is ex ante ambiguous. Theories such as that of Chipty and
Snyder (1999) and others would predict that – if the surplus function is concave – we should
see larger effects when a merger entails a larger change in the size of a hospital system. This
would predict the largest effects on targets’ prices when acquirers are large. On the other
hand, price decreases may be driven by improved management practices, and there may
be economies or diseconomies of scale in sharing management between merging hospitals
(Beckmann 1960).
The top two rows in each panel of Table 8 show separate results for mergers involving
small (1-3 hospitals) vs. large (4+ hospitals) acquirers.27 For both targets and acquirers,
point estimates of merger price effects for non-PPIs are small and negative (2.1 percent for
targets and 0.6 percent for acquirers) when the merger involves small acquirers. The positive
treatment effect previously documented for acquirers’ PPI prices appears to be driven by
large acquirers. The savings on PPIs for targets is slightly larger for large acquirer mergers
(average acquirer system size of 41.8 hospitals) than for small acquirer mergers (average size
1.8 hospitals). These point estimates are consistent with mergers involving countervailing
effects of improved buyer power and managerial disruption. The net effect is small and
negative for merging parties with the largest relative system size change (small targets of
large acquirers), but small and positive for merging parties with the smallest relative system
size change (large acquirers of small targets). However, these differences are not statistically
27
Our average sample target is acquired by a 26-hospital system; our average sample acquirer is part of
an 11-hospital system prior to the focal merger.
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significant.
Geographic proximity
Next, as noted in Schmitt (2017), many of the mergers in the recent “great reconsolidation”
involve hospital systems acquiring hospitals in distant geographic markets. We next split
the treatment effects according to whether any of the merging hospitals share a hospital
referral region (HRR). Heterogeneity in merger effects by market overlap may be due to local
economies of scale in management or distribution of inputs, to local diffusion of management
practices, to the countervailing effects of changes in upstream and downstream market power,
or to the relative roles of bargaining power vs. bargaining position in mediating mergerrelated cost savings.
We compare treatment effects for in- vs. out-of-market mergers in the second pair of
rows in each panel of Table 8. The strongest merger savings previously documented –
for targets’ purchase of PPIs – are concentrated in in-market mergers, where we see a
price decrease post-merger of 6 percent, relative to the control trend. Targets also achieve
larger reductions on non-PPIs when there is market overlap (2.5 percent savings, versus
price increases of 1.1 percent for out of HRR mergers). Acquirers show price increases for
both in- and out-of-market mergers; point estimates are smaller, but not significantly so,
for in-market mergers. These results stand in contrast to the large out-of-market merger
effects documented in Schmitt (2017), in which merger effects were strongest for targets
in out-of-market acquisitions, perhaps due to the differing nature of the marginal costs of
inputs in our purchasing data from hospital costs more broadly construed. Instead, they
echo Dranove and Lindrooth (2003), in which cost savings are greatest when previously
independent hospitals integrate under a single license and consolidate facilities. They are
also consistent with theories of concavity and economies of scale, given the qualitative fact
that some non-PPIs and almost all PPIs tend to be sold by highly specialized, regional sales
representatives who spend large amounts of time with a few local accounts. Finally, our
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Table 8: Merger Treatment Effects – Heterogeneity, Within Brand

Ntar

Targets
β

SE

Nacq

Acquirers
β

SE

Panel A: Non-PPIs
Acquirer Size
Small
Large
Difference

13
20

-0.021*
0.007
0.028

(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.019)

26
59

-0.006
-0.000
0.006

(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.009)

Market Exposure
In HRR
Out of HRR
Difference

14
19

-0.025**
0.011
-0.036**

(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.018)

36
49

-0.007
0.003
-0.010

(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.008)

Vendor Market Structure
High HHI
Low HHI
Difference

33
33

-0.004
-0.008
0.003

(0.012)
(0.010)
(0.016)

85
85

-0.004
-0.004
0.001

(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.008)

Controlling for Output Price
Post-Merger
ln(Output Price)

33

0.000
0.023

(0.008)
(0.018)

85

-0.005
0.003

(0.004)
(0.005)

Standardization Interaction
Post-Merger
Post X Std.

30

-0.013
0.015

(0.009)
(0.016)

80

0.000
-0.009

(0.005)
(0.008)

Panel B: PPIs
Acquirer Size
Small
Large
Difference

12
17

-0.023
-0.043**
-0.021

(0.015)
(0.018)
(0.026)

26
48

0.009
0.026**
0.016

(0.006)
(0.010)
(0.012)

Market Exposure
In HRR
Out of HRR
Difference

12
17

-0.059†
-0.012
-0.047**

(0.018)
(0.011)
(0.021)

35
39

0.014**
0.023**
-0.008

(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.010)

Vendor Market Structure
High HHI
Low HHI
Difference

29
29

-0.052†
-0.027*
-0.025

(0.012)
(0.014)
(0.019)

74
74

0.011**
0.021**
-0.009

(0.004)
(0.009)
(0.010)

Controlling for Output Price
Post-Merger
ln(Output Price)

29

-0.037†
0.034*

(0.011)
(0.018)

74

0.018†
0.020†

(0.006)
(0.008)

Standardization Interaction
Post-Merger
28
-0.054**
(0.024)
65
0.007
(0.009)
Post X Std.
0.031
(0.027)
0.016
(0.012)
Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at the hospital-brand level in parentheses. Coefficients estimated from pooled specification (3.1). The
dependent variable is the logged transaction price measured at the hospital-brand-month-year. Small acquirers
are hospital systems consisting of 1-3 hospitals pre-merger, and large acquirers are hospital systems with more
than 3 hospitals. A target is categorized as “In HRR" if there is at least one hospital in the acquiring system
in the same HRR, and vice versa. A product category is classified as “High" concentration if its vendor HHI is
above the median within its product class. ln(Output Price) is estimated using the HCRIS as in Dafny et al.
(2019). Standardization is an indicator for whether the hospital purchased at least 75% of all units in a product
category from a single vendor in its first sample year.
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results are consistent with Farrell and Shapiro (2001)’s argument that the agencies should
give consideration to “efficiencies based upon the close integration of specific, hard-to-trade
assets owned by the merging parties,” while noting that “the same conditions that tend to
make synergies more merger-specific and more beneficial to consumers also tend to make
the merger itself more problematic.” I.e., we find evidence of greater savings associated with
local mergers; unfortunately, Cooper et al. (2019) and others also find evidence of greater
anticompetitive effects of local hospital mergers in the downstream markets for hospital
services.
Supplier market structure
We also examine whether merger effects are mediated by supply-side market structure. To
this end, we separate UMDNS codes within each product class into those above or below the
median HHI for the class. As noted in Table 5, the product categories analyzed in this article
are almost all moderate-high concentration according to typical FTC and DoJ standards.
That said, the mean “High HHI” non-PPI has an HHI of 0.419, vs. 0.179 among the “Low
HHI” non-PPIs; the same measures among PPIs are 0.497 and 0.227, respectively. The
third pair of rows in each panel of Table 8 show that there is no economically or statistically
significant difference in price effects as a function of supplier competition.28
Downstream hospital-insurer market power
The fourth pair of rows in each panel of Table 8 examines whether the cost effects
documented above are muted due to mergers causing hospitals’ supply side and demand side
market power to increase concurrently. For example, if merger-enabled market power allowed
hospitals to exercise monopoly power and increase procedure prices, then most bargaining
models would predict that some of that pie could be shared with suppliers, mitigating cost
28

Appendix Figure 18 presents this in richer detail, in the form of a scatterplot of the treatment effect
estimates from Figure 4 vs. vendor HHI for each UMDNS code. Each scatterplot is essentially a cloud, with
no clear relationship between merger price effect and vendor HHI.
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decreases due to increased monopsony power (e.g., see the discussion of insurer-hospital
bargaining in Ho and Lee (2017)). To that end, we estimate our same input price regression
specifications, controlling for output prices.29 We employ the method described in Dafny
et al. (2019) to infer hospital prices from HCRIS reports. The results indicate that, although
hospitals’ downstream price changes tend to be positively correlated with upstream price
changes, this does not change the estimated merger treatment effect.
Standardization and renegotiation
The final set of rows in each panel of Table 8 examines the interaction between merger
effects and standardization. We estimate a simple modification of the above specifications,
in which the year-of and post-merger dummies are interacted with a dummy for pre-merger
standardization at the hospital-category-level. That is, this specification indicates whether
merger-induced savings are larger for hospitals that were standardized pre-merger.
The results confirm our previous result that targets receive savings on PPIs after merging.
This correlation is significant for acquirers’ non-PPI prices, and marginally significant for
targets’ PPI prices. However, the merger price effect is not significantly amplified for
hospital-categories that are standardized, for any combination of product class and type
of merging entity. For targets, standardization appears to diminish post-merger savings, if
anything.

3.5. Conclusion
The US hospital industry has experienced a large amount of contentious consolidation via
mergers over the last several decades. Marginal cost savings have been perhaps the most
common justification offered for these mergers, often appealing to the large input price
variation across hospitals and notions that “buyer power" is increasing in hospital system
29
The goal of this regression is simply to test for the “mitigation” effect described above. In a model like
Ho and Lee (2017), input and output prices will be codetermined and thus we would need to use extreme
care in interpreting any parameter estimates in this regression.
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size. Prior research examining aggregated accounting measures of hospital costs has found
mixed results.
In this study, we use data on all purchase orders issued by a large set of US hospitals 2009-15
in order to conduct a detailed examination of the effects of mergers on the prices paid for
medical/surgical supplies, an important component of hospital marginal costs. The most
robust finding is target savings of 3.4 percent on targets’ purchase of physician preference
items. Across our 37 product categories, targets save an estimated $214,402 per year (1.9
percent) due to within-brand price decreases after horizontal mergers, whereas acquirers
experience an (insignificant) average net price increase of $90,243.30 Perhaps the simplest
way to summarize these findings is that, given the precision of our estimates, we can rule
out average input price savings of greater than 3.1 percent at the 95 percent level for both
targets and acquirers. This seems modest relative to the cross-sectional price variation across
hospitals and claims of potential savings via increased“buyer power."
The variety of product categories in the data allows us to look more closely at merger effects
and examine mechanisms underlying “buyer power" (which has previously been studied in
theory and in case studies of specific product markets). We examine heterogeneity in merger
treatment effects across different product categories, and by acquirer size, market overlap,
and vendor market concentration. We find that the observed target savings on PPIs is driven
by local mergers. These savings may be consistent with local returns to scale in sales and
distribution or transfer of managerial practices. Merger treatment effects on targets are also
larger when acquirers are larger, consistent with savings driven by concavity in the surplus
function as in Chipty and Snyder (1999), though the size comparison is not statistically
significant. These findings are echoed in the results for acquirers’ purchase of PPIs, in which
price increases are smallest for small acquirers (where the relative size increase is larger) and
for local mergers. Although there are multiple factors that may drive cost increases after
30
Calculation details in Appendix A.6. For comparison, a recent AHA-sponsored study documented a
decrease in operating expenses of 2.5 percent for acquired hospitals (Noether and May 2017); our estimate
is lower, though our 95 percent confidence interval would include 2.5 percent.
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a merger – e.g., managerial attention – the countervailing force of increased buyer power
is most powerful for local mergers involving larger relative size changes. Our remaining
explorations suggest that our average treatment effects are not obscuring a great deal of
heterogeneity: merger effects on marginal costs are small regardless of standardization,
supplier concentration, or downstream prices.
Antitrust agencies consider a merger’s “efficiencies” to be cognizable if they are likely to
occur if the merger proceeds, and unlikely to occur if it does not. The agencies also
ask whether efficiencies are large and/or likely to pass through to consumers (Farrell and
Shapiro 2001). We have limited ability in our data to speak to the merger-specificity of the
savings we document, or to potential pass-through. However, whether cognizable or not, our
estimates of post-merger savings are small, indicating little effect of mergers on buyer power.
Moreover, estimated savings are largest for local mergers where hospitals’ market power vis
à vis insurers is also likely to increase (Cooper et al. 2019). Finally, the largest estimated
savings, by targets on PPIs, can entirely be attributed to renegotiation, rather than brand
switching, in that savings estimates within hospital-brand are statistically equivalent to
estimates within hospital-category. This transfer of surplus from device manufacturers to
hospitals is suggestive of increased monopsony power and may not increase efficiency. For
example, it may negatively impact dynamic incentives of suppliers to innovate or maintain
product quality or manufacturing reliability (see discussion in Hemphill and Rose (2018)).
Each proposed merger should certainly be judged on its own merits, given its specific context.
However, each of these features of our findings urges caution regarding the use of expected
hospital purchasing efficiencies as justification for horizontal hospital mergers.
We offer these and all results with the caveat that our sample size of mergers is smaller
than we would like due to the relative newness of detailed purchasing order data availability.
Another drawback of our data is that we do not observe which products are purchased
through group purchasing organizations, which are an important feature of the setting that
may mediate the effects of mergers for some products. However, our data cover a larger
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sample than that of many merger retrospective case studies from which economists have
learned a great deal (e.g. Miller and Weinberg (2017)). We also believe the detail and
breadth of the purchasing data brings new light to the study of hospitals and buyer power
broadly, and mergers specifically.
For hospital mergers in particular, another important phenomenon to consider is the
simultaneity of input market negotiation and output market negotiation. We control for
this using a proxy for hospital output prices. However, a more detailed study would require
matching hospital purchasing data with private insurer claims, and modeling demand and
negotiated prices explicitly in both upstream and downstream markets. We see this as an
important area for future research.
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CHAPTER 4: Competition in Employer Sponsored Health Insurance
Implications for a Public Option
Health care reform has become a central issue in US policy debate due to concerns about
access and affordability of health insurance. Although health care spending in the United
States represents nearly 20 percent of GDP, roughly 30 million Americans remain uninsured.
Health insurance premiums make up the bulk of consumer health expenditures for the nonelderly and are substantial. The average individual paid $7,470 in health insurance premiums
in 2020 (Claxton et al. 2020). Existing reform proposals range from small regulatory changes
to existing markets to Medicare for All, in which the government would step in to act as
a universal insurer, effectively replacing the existing private insurance market. In between
these extremes, a public option would establish a government-run insurance plan to compete
in existing insurance markets.
Despite the recent popularity of the public option, there is little in the way of economic
analysis to understand the potential effects of such a policy. While a public option would
alter the market only by offering an additional choice to consumers, critics argue that the
public option would inefficiently — or unfairly — crowd out the private insurance market,
which would not be able to compete with a government-run insurer. Proponents predict that
the policy would result in lower premiums to consumers by regulating the prices of health
care services, setting premiums without a markup, and reducing administrative overhead.
These arguments are often accompanied by a prediction that such characteristics will also
cause insurers to compete more aggressively by raising quality, or by lowering costs and
therefore premiums.
This paper examines the impact a public option would have on the existing private insurance
market. I study the employer-sponsored insurance market to identify the conditions under
which a public option would generate enrollment or provide additional premium competition
in the market.

I focus in particular on the interaction between premium setting and
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adverse selection. Whereas large employers obtain employer-specific premium offers, publicly
provided health insurance plans tend to favor uniform, or “community rated,” premiums.
Hoffman et al. (2021) note that adjusting prices across employers groups “cuts squarely
against coverage and equity goals” of a public plan. At the same time, a public option
that sets uniform premiums has the potential to attract only the most expensive employers,
who obtain high risk-rated premium offers in the private market. If the public option has
to maintain a break-even constraint, it will tend to unravel (Akerlof 1978). The degree to
which this is likely to occur depends critically on markups in the existing market – since
the public option will not maximize profits in the same way – and the differences in costs
of providing insurance to different employers. If low cost employers face disproportionately
high markups due to insurer market power – rather than cost concerns – then the set of
employers who find it optimal to abandon the private market may be larger. In the absence
of an existing policy allowing employers to purchase insurance through a public option,
I estimate estimate a structural model of employer-insurer contracting and simulate the
market-wide effects under varying assumptions about the cost and quality of a governmentrun insurance plan.
Prior work on insurer competition in this setting is limited due to the lack of quality data on
prices and quantities. Many existing studies focus on competition between insurers within
large firms who offer many plans to their employees (Cutler and Gruber 1996, Ho and Lee
2017, Tilipman 2018), or aggregate data on premiums and market shares (Dranove et al.
2003). Using data from a commercial brokerage service, Dafny et al. 2012 and Dafny 2010
demonstrate the existence of market power and price discrimination in the employer market.
However, these data capture a select subset of large national employers, preventing them
from characterizing demand and competition in any one market.
This paper uses a unique source of panel data containing insurer choices and premiums,
representing the vast majority of the large group market in Massachusetts from 2001-2018,
where three insurers — Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS), Harvard
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Pilgrim Health Care (HPHC), and Tufts — serve over 80 percent of the market. I find that
premiums vary considerably across employers, and that switching between health insurers is
rare despite potential savings revealed by the switches that do occur. I also find evidence of
switching costs. Insurers price discriminate between old and new contracts by offering low
premiums to “invest” in acquiring new employers, and raising premiums to “harvest” rents
from those who are locked in.
I use the premiums and choices in these data to estimate a model that separates the
components of premiums driven by (1) employer preferences over health insurers, (2) costs
that vary flexibly to reflect the degree to which their underlying health risk or taste for health
care consumption, and insurer’s relative advantages in negotiating favorable contracts with
up-stream health care providers, and (3) switching costs. I then use the model to study the
impacts of a public option under varying assumptions about the degree to which the public
plan would replicate the quality of existing insurers, or use its regulatory power to curtail
the prices it pays to health care providers.
I estimate the model in two steps. First, I estimate demand to recover employers’ preferences
for insurers and their switching costs. In order to capture the variation in preferences
that would lead to variation in markups and credibly separate brand preferences from
switching costs, I implement a mixed-logit specification that allows for a flexible distribution
of preferences (Train 2016, Bansal et al. 2018). The average employer is willing to pay $489
(per person per year in 2018 dollars) for their most preferred insurer. This result adds
to findings from Dranove et al. (2003) — who show that national and local insurers tend
to serve distinct segments of the market — by showing that employer groups have strong
preferences, even between three dominant local insurers. I also find that switching costs
are substantial, averaging $3,020 per person per year, which is consistent with prior work
measuring switching costs for individual plan choices (Tilipman 2018),
Second, I use the supply side of the model to recover costs.

I specify a dynamic

premium setting game, in which forward-looking insurers compete by setting employer75

specific premiums in a Nash-Bertrand sub-game each period. This model both rationalizes
the invest-harvest premium setting observed in the data, and demonstrates the potential
for dynamic incentives to create downward pressure on premiums despite highly inelastic
demand. I find that employer-groups differ considerably in their taste for health care
consumption, and that HPHC and Tufts each have a cost advantage relative to BCBS.
I then use the model to simulate the impact of allowing employers access to a public option.
To accommodate uncertainty over the ultimate policy proposal, and the granularity of the
model, I recompute counterfactual equilibria under a range of assumptions about the quality
of a public plan, and the degree to which it exercises a strong cost advantage.
I find that a public option that replicates the cost and quality of existing insurers, but cannot
price discriminate, has a minimal impact on the market due to strong brand preference,
switching costs, and adverse selection into the public option. In most cases, only the most
expensive employers choose to opt in, and this negative selection generates high premiums
that further limit demand for the public option. This finding is consistent with work by
Shepard et al. (2020), who show that a uniform public health plan is unlikely to serve the
specific needs of individuals with varying tastes for health care consumption.
A public option that exercises a cost advantage by regulating provider payments is able to
lower the unit cost of health care consumption, increasing the number of employers who
find it optimal to abandon the private market. Naturally, this effect is substantially smaller
in cases where the public option also has a quality shortfall relative to existing insurers.
Finally, employers who continue to purchase insurance in the private market do so because
they have lower utilization relative to a negatively selected public option, or because they
have large switching costs or strong preferences for private insurers. For these reasons,
the public option has a relatively small impact on premium competition for employers who
remain in the private market.
While providing insight into the likely impacts of a public option, this paper makes

76

two additional contributes to existing literature.

First, I offer new evidence on price

discrimination and competition in the employer-sponsored health insurance market. Thus
far, prior work has focused on the relationship between market structure and premiums,1
estimated demand for insurers using individuals’ health plan selections within a single
employer,2 or inferred measures of market power using aggregate data on premiums and
markups.3 Dafny (2010) uses panel data on employers across many markets to demonstrate
the existence of first-degree price discrimination. I add to this literature by separately
estimating the components of demand that are driven by employers’ heterogeneous
preferences over insurers and the costs employers face in switching between insurers. To my
knowledge, this is the first study to estimate demand for insurers using data from multiple
employer-groups. My model also allows me to characterize insurer incentives to provide
insight into competition and premium setting at the stage where employers select a health
insurer. I provide new evidence that employers have strong preferences over insurers as well
as large switching costs, and show that switching costs play a complex role in premium
setting. Moreover, I develop a procedure to recover measures of consumer preferences and
market power that can be extended to answer a range of policy questions in any state market,
and requires only publicly available data.
Second, I contribute to a substantial literature on inertia and competition in health insurance
markets.4 In Medicare Part D, inertia has been attributed to inattention, and multiple
studies have found that this leads to higher premiums (Ericson 2014, Ho et al. 2017).
In employer-sponsored settings, this has been attributed to information and “hassle costs”
(Handel and Kolstad 2015), and the cost of switching doctors under a new network (Dahl
and Forbes 2014, Tilipman 2018). I show that the magnitude of switching costs are similar
for employer-groups selecting health insurers, providing evidence that these inertial forces
1

Trish and Herring (2015), Dafny et al. (2012)
Cutler and Gruber (1996), Gruber and McKnight (2016), Ho and Lee (2017), Tilipman (2018)
3
Dranove et al. (2003)
4
Employer-sponsored insurance (Handel 2013, Handel and Kolstad 2015, Dahl and Forbes 2014, Tilipman
2018), Medicare Part D (Abaluck and Gruber 2011, Ketcham and Powers 2016, Ericson 2014, Ho et al. 2017,
Polyakova 2016), and the ACA exchanges (Drake et al. 2020).
2
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are present even when the agent is a plausibly more sophisticated purchaser. Moreover,
theoretical predictions regarding the equilibrium effects of switching costs are mixed and
depend on the balance of selling firms’ dynamic incentives.5 Indeed, empirical work in
other settings has identified markets in which switching costs generate lower prices in
equilibrium (Dubé et al. 2009). I contribute to this literature by documenting the impact of
switching costs on premiums in the employer-sponsored insurance market, while addressing
the potential for dynamic incentives to restrain market power.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.1, I describe the relevant
institutional features of the employer sponsored market and the public option. I also describe
a simple model of price discrimination to provide intuition for the selection issues that govern
the extent to which a public option might cause insurers to compete more aggressively.
Section 4.2 introduces the data on employer-insurer contracting and describes the variation
in insurance premiums. In Section 4.3, I present a model of employer-insurer contracting
that accounts for employer-specific premium setting, and the dynamic incentives of insurers.
I describe the method I use to estimate the model in Section 4.4, and report the results of
the estimation procedure in Section 4.5. In Section 4.5.2, I use the model to simulate public
option policies under various assumptions about cost and quality. Section 4.6 concludes.

4.1. Setting and Motivation
The public option is distinct from proposals for more dramatic policies changes — like
Medicare for All — in that it would allow for consumers to continue purchasing private
coverage if they preferred to do so. For those who are currently uninsured — particularly
for those without access to coverage through an employer — the public option is expected
to increase voluntary coverage by providing an insurance option at a lower premium than
existing public plans. For this reason, the public option would be incorporated into the
exchanges established by the ACA under all existing proposals. For those already insured,
5

Arie and Grieco 2014, Cabral (2016), Farrell and Klemperer (2007), Farrell and Shapiro (1988),
Klemperer (1995)
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the public option is expected to generate additional competition among the existing insurers
in the market, which many view to be charge exorbitant premiums due to consolidation and
other sources of market power.
At least eight different bills were introduced in the 116th Congress, all with different design
features (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019). Two of these bills – the Choose American Act
(S. 1261/H.R.2463, hereafter CMA) and the Medicare for American Act of 2019 (H.R. 2452,
hereafter MAA) – would provide large employers with access to a public run insurance plan.
Provider Reimbursements and Network Inclusion In addition to running a public
plan that forgoes a markup, the CMA, MAA, and most other proposals envision a public
option that generates cost savings for consumers by reducing the reimbursements paid to
health care providers. Typically this is tied to reimbursements currently set by Medicare or
Medicaid, which are substantially lower than those negotiated by private insurers (Cooper
et al. 2019, Clemens and Gottlieb 2017). In some cases, policy proposals or bills suggest
these rates as a starting point or minimum payment rate. MAA would set provider payment
rates using the larger of current Medicare or Medicaid rates. The CMA specifies that the
public option will set reimbursement rates no lower than existing Medicare and no higher
than existing private insurance plans.
Obtaining low reimbursement rates may be possible if the public option ties its network to
Medicare and Medicaid participation. Both the CMA and MAA would require Medicare and
Medicaid participating providers to participate in the public option network. The majority
of health care providers currently accept Medicare patients. But it is not necessarily the
case that they would continue to do so if participation in a large public option were tied to
Medicare participation – particularly if doing so allowed the public option to out-compete
private insurers with higher reimbursement rates.
The welfare consequences of regulating lower provider prices are ambiguous, and depend
on the ex ante efficiency of prices set in the private market. Recent work has identified
private prices as a source of dynamic incentives for providers. Garthwaite et al. (2020)
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find that hospitals with access to larger private markets do more to invest in quality
improvement.

Clemens et al. (2020) show that privately negotiated prices also create

incentives for physicians to invest in expanded capacity. Moreover, a public option that
aggressively regulates prices may find it difficult to replicate the network breadth and quality
of existing private plans.
Both the overall welfare impact of regulating these payments, and the feasibility of
maintaining a broad provider network while providing substantially lower reimbursement
rates, are beyond the scope of this paper. In order to address uncertainty around this issue,
in Section 4.5.2, I simulate the impact of a public option with varying degrees of cost savings
and quality differentials, while noting that not all of these possibilities may be feasible.
Premium Setting

Neither the CMA or the MAA would tailor premiums to specific

employers. Prior policy analysis has discussed the role of adverse selection in the individual
market Fiedler (2021). In a proposal aimed at a public option for employers, Hoffman et al.
(2021) suggests requiring employers to opt in or out of the public option completely, to
avoid a case where only the least healthy employees select into the public plan. This insight
builds on a robust literature demonstrating adverse selection within employer groups (see for
example Handel 2013, Einav et al. 2010). However, less is known about cost variation across
employers, and the degree to which it might generate adverse selection in this context. This
is the focus of the current paper.
Competition and Selection

Here, I provide a simple model of first-degree price

discrimination to provide intuition for the conditions under which an employer would choose
a public option, and under which a public option generates additional price competition in
a market where private insurers can flexibly set premiums. Under a Thisse and Vives (1988)
style model of price discrimination, insurers would set premiums so that an employers’ most
preferred insurer extracts the full social surplus relative to the employer’s next best option.
A given employer i, with willingness to pay θj for each of the insurers j ∈ J , experiences
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utility according to uj = θj − pj , and chooses an insurer according to

dj = 1{uj ≥ uk , ∀j, k ∈ J }.

(4.1)

In the event of a tie, the employer chooses the insurer that maximizes the joint surplus
(θj − cj ). The insurer with the highest joint surplus wins the sale by setting premiums
p∗1 = c1 + [(θ1 − c1 ) − (θ2 − c2 )]

(4.2)

= θ1 − (θ2 − c2 ),
and all other insurers, j ≥ 2, set premiums according to p∗j = cj . The employer always
chooses the insurer with the highest joint surplus, and that insurer fully extracts its costadjusted quality advantage over the next best alternative.
To understand the impact a public option would have in this setting, I assume that a the
new plan does not charge a markup and instead sets premiums to cover average costs, but
that it cannot price discriminate. Therefore, if each employer in the market costs cP O(i) to
insure under the public option, the premium for the public plan is
P
pP O =

Ni · cP O(i)
,
i∈P O Ni

i∈P O

P

(4.3)

where each employer has its own utility over the public option θP O(i) , so that the set of
employers who choose the public option (i ∈ P O) is determined in equilibrium by whether
or not θP O(i) − pP O is higher or lower than the utility each employer can obtain from the
private insurers, who continue to price strategically.
For a given employer, introducing a non-strategic public option in this setup can result in
three distinct outcomes depending on the cost and quality of the public plan. In the following
results, I add (i) to the subscripts of the primitives above to emphasize that insurers compete
in a separate game for each employer.
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First, if the public option provides lower utility than the joint surplus of the second-best
insurer (θ2 − c2 ), then equilibrium is completely unchanged. That is, if the public option
has quality that is too low, or the premium for the public option exceeds the cost of insuring
employer i for all relevant competitors in the market, then it will not present a desirable
outside option to the employer.
Second, if the employer obtains a higher net utility from the public option than insurer 1
could possibly offer with positive profits (θP O(i) −pP O ) > θ1(i) −c1(i) ), then the employer will
abandon the private market in favor of the public option. A public option with sufficiently
high quality or low costs will crowd-out the private market for consumer i.
In the third case, the public option presents the consumer with net utility that is between
(θ1(i) − c1(i) ) and (θ2(i) − c2(i) ), in which case the second-best insurer no longer competes
for the employer and insurer 1 prices as a monopolist relative to the employer’s new outside
option
p∗1M (i) = θ1(i) − (θP O(i) − pP O ).

(4.4)

In this third case, the public option generates additional price competition by reducing the
employer’s excess demand relative to the outside option. The employer continues to purchase
from the insurer with the highest joint surplus, but it obtains a lower premium.
This model helps clarify the conditions under which a public option will either supplant
private insurers or cause them to offer lower premiums. The results also highlight the scope
for adverse selection to limit the role of a public option. If employers who choose the public
option are more costly to insure, then pP O will be higher, and therefore less likely to be a
desirable first- or second-best choice for other employers. Because of the public option sets
premiums according to average cost, the impact of such a policy will depend on the joint
distribution of θ and c across employers. Holding preferences constant, the magnitude of
cost dispersion across employers relative to the size of existing markups will determine the
set of employers for whom it is optimal to chose the public option, and the set of employers
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who will experience additional price competition. On the other hand, selection issues could
be limited if lower cost employers have a larger gap between θ1(i) and θ2(i) . The joint
distribution of θ and c is the empirical issue I focus on for the remainder of the paper.

4.2. Data
The primary data used in this paper come from the Department of Labor’s (DoL) Form
5500, which is an administrative filing required of nearly all employers with at least 100
employees, in compliance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).6 The form was jointly developed by the DoL and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) as a compliance and disclosure document for a range of benefits plans, including health
plans. Filings are audited regularly and employers face financial penalties for incomplete or
delinquent filings.
I focus on the market for health insurance in Massachusetts, for which data are available
from 2001-2018. For insurance-based health arrangements (i.e. fully-insured health plans),
the data include employer identifiers and address, as well as detailed information about the
duration of the contract, identity of the insurer, the number of employees and enrollees, the
type of plan (e.g. HMO or PPO), and total premiums paid for each plan-year. All premiums
in this market are adjusted based on individual employers’ expected utilization. However,
roughly 28 percent of plans in the data are explicitly experience rated and therefore include
a measure of total claims in the Form 5500. I focus on average premiums and claims per
enrollee, which capture a measure of prices and costs that is invariant to fluctuations in
firm size.7 The data are subjected to a number of restrictions and cleaning rules, which are
6

ERISA is a federally enacted policy regulating health and benefit plans offered by employers. On many
dimensions, fully-insured health plans are typically regulated by the state in which a business operates.
The term “ERISA plans” is often used in industry and the literature to refer to employer plans that are
self-insured by an employer, in which case ERISA preempts many state regulations. However, both fully
and self-insured plans are subject to ERISA regulations in situations where there is no conflicting state law,
and are therefore required to file the Form 5500 unless otherwise exempt from ERISA altogether. Examples
of exempt employers include 403(b) non-profits, government plans, and plans maintained outside the US for
which the majority of members are non-resident aliens.
7
I observe enrollment counts at the beginning and end of each year. Total enrollees are calculated as the
average of these two values.
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detailed in Appendix A.9. The final sample contains an unbalanced panel of 1,061 employers
from 2001-2018. In 2018, these employers represent 258,133 covered lives — 24 percent of
the total large group enrollment reported in regulatory filings reported to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).8
Table 9 summarizes the employers in my sample. The average employer is a medium sized
firm with 274 employees and 461 enrollees, including dependents. Employers primarily offer
a mix of HMO and PPO products. Average premiums and claims in the data match closely
to published estimates of aggregate premiums in the CMS filings. The average employer is
observed for 7 years in the data.
Table 9: Characteristics of Employer Panel, 2001-2018

Mean

Standard
Deviation

274

303

461

520

Offers HMO

0.879

0.326

Offers PPO

0.651

0.476

Offers Indemnity

0.025

0.156

Average Premiums (2018)

6,249

1,337

Average Claims (2018)

5,411

1,408

Employer and Plan Characteristics
Number of Employees
Number of Enrollees

Insurer Market Shares
BCBS

0.628

HPHC

0.112

Tufts

0.132

Other Insurer

0.128

Notes: Table contains statistics on 1,051 employers, in the sample representing 7,660 employeryear observations. Premiums and claims are reported for 2018. Appendix figure 22 plots
premiums over time in comparison with other published data sources.
8

CMS regulates markups in this industry by instituting Medical Loss Ratios (MLR). Under ACA
regulation, insurers in the large group must meet an MLR threshold of 85 percent. That is, insurers must
spend at least 85 percent of total premiums collected on health care claims. However, these regulations are
rarely binding (Cicala et al. 2019), and apply to the market segment as a whole rather than to any individual
employer.
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This level of detail data on employer-insurer contracting provides an unprecedented look
at the functioning of this market. However, the data have several important limitations.
First, the Form 5500 provides limited information on self-insured employers, who are
therefore excluded from the sample. In Appendix A.10, I conduct multiple exercises to
assess the potential magnitude of this issue.

For the demand analysis supporting the

main policy question, employers may have an option to self-insure. However, self-insured
employers typically contract with a health insurer to provide Administrative Services Only
(ASO). These services include access to a network, claims administration, and utilization
management. Self-insured employers face a similar market for ASO providers even if they
choose to take on their own utilization risk.

In Massachusetts the insurers providing

administrative services are broadly the same as those who are active in the large group
market.
I also restrict my analysis to firms who contract with a single insurer at any given time.
In some situations, the structure of the data make it difficult to distinguish the enrollment
counts across multiple insurers within an employer. Additionally, focusing on the the firms
who contract with only one insurer simplifies the modeling in a discrete choice framework.
According to data from the Kaiser Family Foundation’s Employer Health Benefits Survey
(KFF-EHBS), 75-80 percent of employers only offer a single plan to their employees, implying
that an even greater share only contract with a single employer. However, these employers
tend to be smaller.
These sample limitations create potential internal and external validity concerns. Model
estimates for smaller, fully insured may not generalize to the fully distribution of firms.
Moreover, because the counterfactuals focus on an equilibrium in which multiple employers
may choose to purchase the same insurance product, these unobserved employers could
potentially change the equilibrium premium a public option would be able to offer. As
noted in Section 4.1, the primary issues governing the degree of adverse selection – and
therefore the impact a public option would have on premium competition – are the size of
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markups employers face, and the differences in cost between employers. In Appendix A.10,
I use data from the KFF-EHBS to analyze premium variation across the distribution of firm
size and between the fully and self-insured markets. I find that average premiums, as well
as the variation in premiums, are similar for large and and medium sized employers and
regardless of whether they self-insure.
Finally, the data are sparse in the sense that not all employers purchase from all insurers,
and I only observe choices that were made. In a market with individually determined
premiums, modeling employers’ choices requires some assumptions about the premium offers
an employer would obtain if they were to choose a different health insurer. These premium
offers will be a function of the employers’ underlying tastes for health care, and the health
status of the employees. They will also be a function of the cost at which each insurer can
provide those services through their network, and the degree to which employers prefer the
differentiation of those services.
4.2.1. Premium Variation and Dynamic Insurer Incentives
A unique feature of the large group market, relative to the small group or individual markets,
is that premiums are tailored specifically to each employer. Employers may differ in expected
cost because of their health status or underlying taste for utilization, and insurers incorporate
this by experience rating premiums. These premiums may also reflect differences in the
extent to which certain employers prefer the insurer they currently contract with, relative
to other available options. Moreover, the aggregate distribution of premiums may reflect
differences in insurers’ underlying cost structure stemming from their ability to negotiate
more favorable contracts with upstream health care providers. Ultimately, the purpose of
the model in Section 4.3 is to carefully identify the contributions of each of these channels.
However, I describe the premium variation in this section.
I begin by decomposing premiums into employer and insurer components in the spirit of
decomposition methods used to separate worker and firm wage effects (Abowd, Kramarz,
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and Margolis 1999). I estimate

pijt = γi + γj + γt + εijt

(4.5)

using OLS. γt is a year fixed-effect, which captures aggregate shocks to premiums, which
are substantial over 2001-2018. γi separates the employer’s contribution to premiums, that
is common across insurers that it contracts with, while γj represents the average premium
differences employers’ experience when they switch between insurers.
Figure 6 displays the raw distribution of premiums in the data for 2018, as well as the
distribution net of γi and γj respectively. Employer differences explain a large fraction of
the variation. Insurer differences appear much smaller, but are economically significant.
The table below shows average premiums across insurers, and estimates of γj from a version
of equation (4.5) that is estimated in logs. The variation provided by employers who switch
insurers reveals that, conditional on employer, Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts offer premiums
that are approximately 5 percent lower than BCBS on average. While these differences
appear small relative to the overall scale of premium variation, the average employer in the
data spent 2.9 million dollars in 2018, meaning that 5 percent lower premiums would result in
an average annual savings of 145 thousand dollars. These between-insurer differences could
be due to differences in insurer cost structure, or to differences in employers’ willingness
to pay for Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts relative to BCBS among employers who switch.
Nonetheless, these estimates provide evidence that employers remain with with a more
expensive insurer when potential savings are available.
The results in Figure 6 could also arise if the timing of the switches that identify γi in
equation (4.5) are coincident with shocks to employers’ underlying demand for health care
services. To investigate this issue, I estimate an event study regression focusing on the years
surrounding the first observed switch for each employer. To ensure common support across
all of the estimates, I restrict to the 171 employers who I observe for at least three years
before and after the switch. In place of separate insurer and time fixed-effects, I now control
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Figure 6: Variation in Premiums, 2018

Mean pijt

γj

Mean
(SD)

(1)
Overall

(2)
BCBS

(3)
HPHC

(4)
Tufts

(5)
Other

6,249
(1,337)

6,231
(1,313)

6,444
(1,248)

6,516
(1,075)

5,882
(1,677)

-0.055**
(0.021)

-0.056**
(0.018)

-0.080
(0.032)

Coefficient
(SE)

Notes: Figure presents distribution of raw premiums, premiums net of fixed-effects in equation (4.5) as
described in the text. The table presents means and estimated premium differences across insurers. Mean
pijt presents the raw average premiums. The second row presents estimates of γj from (4.5) using logged
premiums as the dependent variable.

for insurer-by-year shocks.9 As a comparison group, I also include employers who never
switch throughout the panel to contribute to estimating λjt . Formally, the specification is

log(pijt ) = λi + λjt +

3
X

βτ τit + βX Xit + εijt ,

(4.6)

τ −3

where βτ estimates the difference between premiums among switchers and non-switchers in
9

I use employer-time fixed effects to be as restrictive as possible about the relative time trends of each
insurer. However, the results are qualitatively similar with the fixed effect specification used in equation
(4.5).
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year τ , where τit indexes the year relative to an employers’ switch. To ensure that observed
trends in premiums do not represent coincident changes in plan quality – other than the
identity of the insurer – I also control for a vector of plan characteristics, Xit .10
In Figure 7, I plot the estimates from the regression in equation 4.6. Employers who switch
have broadly similar premiums to other employers enrolled with each insurer, before and after
they switch. However, premiums in the year of the switch are substantially lower than would
be predicted by the switching employers’ average premium levels and the premium trends
of non-switching employers who contract with the same insurer. Indeed, employers appear
to receive a one-time discount of 9 percent in the year they switch. This result is consistent
with models of dynamic pricing in the presence of switching costs, in which supplier firms
set low prices to invest in acquiring new market share, and raise prices to harvest rents from
locked-in consumers. This intuition is built into all models of switching costs (Beggs and
Klemperer 1992, Farrell and Shapiro 1988, Klemperer 1995, Farrell and Klemperer 2007).
However, these models typically address the balance of invest-harvest incentives for firms
setting uniform prices. Individually set premiums allow me to observe the invest-harvest
dynamics because insurers can price discriminate between incumbent employers and new
customers, as in Cabral (2016).
A competing explanation for this pattern is that employers’ health care utilization is lower in
the year of a switch. This could occur if, for example, employers face frictions in navigating
a new referral system or searching for new physicians. In that case, employers may pay less
because they have lower expected costs in the first year of a contract. To test whether low
first-year premiums are driven by underlying costs, I use average claims reported for the
subset of experience rated plans to calculate the load (or margin) of the insurance contract,
where load = premiums/claims. In Panel (b) of Figure 7, I plot the average load over the
tenure of observed employer-insurer relationships (τ ). The average load for τ = 0 indicates
that insurers tend to set premiums below cost for in the first year of a contract, with the
10

The results of the event study regression in equation (4.6) are robust to inclusion or exclusion of plan
controls.
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Figure 7: Dynamic Premium Setting
(a) Premiums Relative to Non-Switchers

(b) Load by Contract Tenure

Notes: Panel (a) shows estimates of βτ from equation (4.6). Range bars show 95% confidence intervals, with two-way
clustered standard errors at the employer and insurer level. Panel (b) shows the average load by time relative to the
switching event (τijt ). Range bars present 95% confidence intervals.

expectation of earning positive margins in future years. The data on claims are sparse –
not all employers report their claims experience, and those who do report claims often do
not report consistently year-after-year. Therefore, the estimates in Panel (b) are not based
on a balanced panel. The prevalence of claims reporting in τ = 0 is especially rare, making
that estimate particularly noisy. However, taken together, these results are consistent with
invest-harvest premium setting.
4.2.2. The Role of Switching Costs
The reduced form results on dynamic pricing provide two important insights for the purpose
of modeling employer choices. First, because premiums reflect each employer’s costs and
preferences, the data do not contain premiums for employer-insurer contracts that did not
occur. The presence of these discounts reveals that the counterfactual premium for switches
that do not occur is actually a “sale” price.
Second, the presence of switching costs reveal that employer decisions are the result of factors
other than preferences over insurers and their marginal utility of income. Instead, demand
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may be less elastic simply because employers prefer to remain with the same insurer for
multiple periods, irrespective of the identity of that insurer. To understand the magnitude
of this issue, consider the simple example of a random utility model for consumer i choosing
between insurers j and k. I index whether a choice represents the previously chosen insurer –
or home insurer – by superscript {h, −h}. In the absence of switching costs, the probability
−h
h
of shij = s−h
ij , but switching costs imply that sij > sij .

Assuming employers have time-invariant preferences over insurers, the likelihood of observing
two sequences with the same set of choices, but different numbers of switches, quantifies the
magnitude of switching costs. By examining sequences of three choices, a higher prevalence
of sequences containing a “stay” followed by a “switch,” relative to a “switch” followed by a
“return switch” to the choice observed in the first period, indicates the presence of switching
costs. That is, observing employers who choose the sequence BCBS-BCBS-HPHC more
frequently than BCBS-HPHC-BCBS provides information about the magnitude of switching
costs.
This exercise is based on the intuition from Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000), and is in the
spirit of prior work assessing state dependence in binary choice settings (Halliday 2007), and
under stronger assumptions over heterogeneity in brand preference (Drake et al. 2020). In
Appendix A.11, I demonstrate that this test is robust to the number of choices in the market,
the underlying distribution of brand preferences, and the initial conditions of the sequences. I
find that, on average, employers are 18.9 times more likely to choose a sequence that involves
one switch instead of two, and strongly reject a null hypothesis of no switching costs. The
probability of observing any sequence declines in the number of switches it involves, despite
the fact that switching involves obtaining a short-term discount in premiums.
These patterns indicate that accounting for switching costs in demand estimation is
important for separating true preference over insurers from state-dependence. Switching
costs also have implications for modeling the supply side. A model of dynamic pricing will
predict that insurers will set higher premiums for locked-in employers than they do for those
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they wish to attract from competing insurers. However, a forward-looking insurer may be
restrained from fully extracting the surplus associated with switching costs because they
value retaining the employer in future periods.11 For the purpose of supply estimation,
failing to account for dynamic incentives could lead to biased estimates of costs.

4.3. Model
In this section, I describe a model of employer preferences and insurer premium setting to
separate the components of premiums described in Section 4.2. Employers obtain utility from
contracting with each insurer, and face costs associated with switching between insurers.
Insurers compete for employers in a dynamic price setting game, by setting premiums in
each period over an infinite horizon. For each employer, insurers compete in a Nash-Bertrand
sub-game each period, where utilities and premiums depend on the identity of the insurer
the employer contracted with in the previous period.
4.3.1. Demand
Each period an employer chooses among insurers j = {1, 2, 3...} ∈ J with utility

uijt|h−1 = θij − αi pijt|h−1 + ηi 1{j = h−1 } + ijt .

(4.7)

θij is an employer-specific preference for insurer j and αi is a price (premium) coefficient.
There is no outside option in the model. Empirically, nearly all employers of the relevant size
purchase insurance, and self-insured firms contract with the same set of insurers to provide
networks and other administrative services. h indexes the employer’s choice in the current
period, and h−1 ∈ H indicates the identity of the insurer chosen in the previous period. ηi
therefore captures the additional utility employer i obtains from remaining with the same
insurer they chose in previous period. Because there is no outside option in the model, this
is equivalent to specifying a negative cost to switching. ijt is a type-1 extreme value shock.
11

These forces are at the crux of the theoretical work on switching costs and competition, which yields
theoretically ambiguous predictions regarding whether switching costs raise or lower prices on net.
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I denote the employer-specific, and state-dependent choice probabilities by

sijt|h−1 (Pit ) = P

e

θij −αi pjt|h−1 +ηi 1{j=h−1 }

k∈J

e

θik −αi pkt|h−1 +ηi 1{k=h−1 }

,

(4.8)

where Pit contains the vector of premiums available from all insurers.
4.3.2. Supply
I now specify a model of insurer premium setting that allows for insurers to incorporate
the employer’s state-dependent utility into their pricing policy by setting low premiums to
attract new employers, and raising them for incumbent employers. For a given employer i,
insurer j sets premiums to maximize the sum of expected flow profit in the current period,
as well as the expected value of future periods over an infinite horizon. The value of winning
the sale in period t can be written
Vijt (h|h−1 ) = π(p∗ijt|h−1 , cij )· 1{h = j} + 0· 1{h 6= j}


X
+β
P(h+1 |h, pijt|h , p−ijt|h )· Vijt+1 (h+1 |h) .

(4.9)

h+1 ∈H

If the employer chooses insurer j, then h = j and the insurer earns flow profit π =
pijt|h−1 − cij , which depends on the premiums it sets and the expected cost of insuring
the employer. For simplicity, I assume that the expected cost varies only by employer and
insurer. Employers may have additional time-varying costs due to transitive (i.i.d.) shocks
to their health care utilization, which the insurer provides insurance over. In this case,
cij can be thought of as the unbiased expectation of the employers’ cost realization, and
π is easily interpreted as the profit the insurer expects to earn upon winning the sale but
before health care consumption is realized. Assuming that costs vary only by (i, j) greatly
simplifies the model and estimation because the possible states are observed directly and
fully characterized by the set of possible choices in the previous period (H). Although doing
so is beyond the scope of the current paper, it may be desirable to relax this assumption to
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allow for employers’ costs to evolve over time and for insurers to incorporate shifts in cost in
premium setting. In particular, employers may experience different expected costs over time
if employee turnover generates some drift in health status or preferences of employees, or if
shocks to income generated by the employer’s output market shift its employees’ willingnessto-pay for health care consumption.
In the case where expected costs are at least as coarse as (i, j, h−1 ), time enters each insurer’s
value function only through h−1 , and the problem can therefore be written as stationary,
provided that each insurer only sets one premium for each employer-state combination.
Then, equation (4.9) can be re-written
Vij (h|h−1 ) = 1{h = j}· (pij|h−1 − cij ) + 1{h 6= j}· 0


X
+β
P(h+1 |h, pij|h , p−ij|h )· Vij (h+1 |h) .

(4.10)

h+1 ∈H

I denote the ex ante value of a given state

Vij (h) =

X

P(h+1 |h, pijt|h , p−ijt|h )· Vijt+1 (h+1 |h)

(4.11)

h+1 ∈H

Then, the ex ante value of h−1 is defined recursively as
Vij (h−1 ) =

X

P(h|h−1 , pij|h−1 , p−ij|h−1 )· Vij (h|h−1 )

h∈H

= P(j|h−1 , pijt|h−1 , p−ijt|h−1 )· (pij|h−1 − cij )


X
+β
P(h|h−1 , pij|h , p−ij|h )· Vij (h) .

(4.12)

h+1 ∈H

Because the employer’s choice fully characterizes the state transition, I can substitute the
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choice probabilities into equation (4.12) to obtain
Vij|h−1 = Vij (h−1 )
(4.13)

!
= sij|h−1 · (pij|h−1 − cij )· +β

X

sih|h−1 · Vij|h

,

h∈H

where I have moved h to the subscript for parsimony.
Now, faced with an employer in state h−1 , insurer j’s optimal premium decision is
characterized by
(
∗
Vij|h
−1

= max

pij|h−1

!)

sij|h−1 (pij|−h − cij ) + β

X

∗
sik|h−1 Vij|h=k

(4.14)

.

k∈J

and its first order condition is

p∗ij|h−1
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(4.15)

In setting premiums, the insurer optimizes over the balance of obtaining the sale and earning
flow profit, as well as the dynamic incentive to obtain or return a position as the home insurer
in future periods. Equation (4.15) demonstrates that premiums are a function of the cost of
insuring employer i, the standard markup incentives implied by a static trade off between
higher prices and higher market share, and the discounted marginal value of being the home
insurer in the next period.
Each insurer has a policy function containing premium offers for each state (H). In a
model with no public option H = J because every employer purchases insurance in each
period. The premium setting game for employer i is in equilibrium when the vector of each
insurers’ premium offers is optimal given the expected future values of states generated by
the premium offers of all other insurers in all states. The solution in this case is a J × H
set of premiums — one for each insurer-state combination. Even in the case where costs are
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not state-dependent, each insurer may make H distinct premium offers if the probability of
winning a sale differs depending on the identity of h−1 . This J × H matrix of premium
offers, along with the demand parameters, determines a set of employer choice probabilities
∗ ), and therefore fully characterizes the equilibrium.
and equilibrium continuation values (Vij|h

Both my preferred method of estimating costs and the counterfactuals in which I introduce
a public option require that I solve the model. I follow prior work in dynamic oligopoly
settings (Pakes and McGuire 1994), which use Gaussian methods, to compute the markov
perfect equilibrium. I solve the system of J × H first-order conditions from equation (4.15)
using a Gauss-Seidel updating procedure (as in Benkard 2004 and Doraszelski and Judd
2004). I begin with a guess of the value functions. I then cycle over each state, computing
the optimal policy function for each insurer, updating the premium offers and value functions
at each step until the system converges.
I do not know whether an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, nor if any particular solution is
a unique equilibrium. In practice, the solutions I obtain are (i) insensitive to starting guesses,
(ii) smooth in parameters, and (iii) consistent with the comparative statics demonstrated by
Cabral (2016), who derives both existence and uniqueness results for a similar model with
two selling firms.
4.3.3. Introducing a Public Option
I model the public option as an additional element in the employer’s choice set. The public
option is non-strategic in the sense that it does not set premiums in a profit maximizing way.
However, I assume that the public option must break even so that it charges a premium
equal to average cost among the employers who purchase it, plus a small administrative
load. Softening this constraint would be equivalent to subsidizing premiums to the public
option. While premium subsidies are common on the individual exchanges, it is not obvious
that they would be desirable in the employer-sponsored market, where nearly all employers
currently purchase plans.
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A real-world policy implementation may allow for some degree of risk-pricing in the public
option. For example, the CMA would levy an 8 percent payroll tax on employers who
choose to opt in. Bundorf et al. (2010) document a positive correlation between health risk
and income in the large group market, suggesting that payroll-based premiums may address
some aspects of selection. However, this is unlikely to be as complete as the first-degree
price discrimination in the large group market, where insurers can fully adjust premiums
to the employers’ expected cost. To the extent that total payroll is not perfectly correlated
with employers’ costs, the solvency of the public option will still depend on the composition
of employers who opt-in. I abstract from the details of this type of financing, and assume
average cost pricing, in order to focus on the broad mechanisms of competition and adverse
selection.
Prospective policies vary with respect to the quality and costs of benefits and proposed
methods to contain costs. Given the model, testing these in detail would involve a large
number of weakly defensible assumptions. Instead, I simulate the creation of a public option
under a range of assumptions about quality and cost, relative to the preferences and costs
in the data. I then examine take-up, premiums, and costs to discern the general conditions
under which a public option would crowd out private insurer or impact premium competition
in the private market.
Cost Advantage I evaluate policies where the public option has varying degrees of cost
advantage over private insurers. Insurers’ commonly negotiate prices with hospitals and
physicians that are substantially higher than those regulated by Medicare or Medicaid. A
public option with the ability to regulate prices could make it difficult for private insurers’ to
compete, holding fixed their own level of bargaining power. In each of the counterfactuals,
I test three scenarios where the public option has a cost advantage of 0, 25 and 50 percent.
The 0 percent cost advantage represents a case in which the public option replicates the
cost structure of BCBS. The 50 percent cost advantage approximates a polar case in which
the public option regulates provider prices in a manner similar to Medicare. The 25 percent
cost advantage represents a middle ground, where the public option has some additionally
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monopsony leverage over providers or otherwise regulates provider prices at a somewhat
higher level than Medicare rates. This policy is similar to the proposed Colorado Affordable
Healthcare Option, which would fix provider payments at 155 percent of Medicare payment
rates.
The primary goal of this exercise is to understand the general conditions under which
employers will take up the public option, and the short-run impacts on premium competition.
However, there is considerable uncertainty over the long-run impacts of a public option that
exercises a cost advantage by regulating provider prices. Recent work has shown that higher
payments from private insurers create incentives for hospitals to invest in quality (Garthwaite
et al. 2020), and physicians’ incentives to invest in capacity (Clemens et al. 2020). Achieving
lower costs by exercising monopsony purchasing power may distort dynamic incentives for
providers. A public option may also find it difficult to sustain a large network with lower
reimbursement rates, suggesting that some combinations of quality and cost advantage are
infeasible.
The current model also takes each insurer’s cost advantage as fixed. However, a public option
may substantially change the bargaining problem between hospitals and insurers (Ho and
Lee 2017). Under the public option, insurers with lower remaining market share may be in
a less favorable bargaining position. On the other hand, if employers with high willingnessto-pay for hospital services disproportionately sort into the public option, insurers may be
able to negotiate lower prices with hospitals.
Quality

I consider a public plan that closely replicates the product offered by BCBS. I

then consider policies that offer a public option with a horizontal “quality shortfall” relative
to BCBS. Placing the public option in employers’ preference space in this way requires an
assumption that employers will have homogeneous preferences for it, relative to BCBS. In
practice, employer groups may have heterogeneous preferences depending on the nature of
the quality differences. If BCBS is primarily differentiated from HPHC and Tufts on network
structure, and the quality shortfall of a public option represents characteristics other than
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network, there may be additional heterogeneity in employer demand for the public option.12
Since the model allows for a flexible distribution over insurers, these preferences do not
necessarily have a clear vertical interpretation. However, there are reasons to expect that
BCBS is vertically differentiated, and that employers differ in their tastes for quality. BCBS
is the most commonly preferred insurer in the market, and has the weakest cost position
and highest premiums. BCBS also maintains the largest coverage in the state, making it a
natural starting point for thinking about what a public option with complete coverage would
attempt to replicate. Notwithstanding, this necessarily means that a public option which
replicates BCBS quality will compete most directly for consumers who do not have strong
tastes for HPHC, Tufts, or other insurers. A public option with lower simulated quality will
compete more directly with HPHC and Tufts for most employers.
Relationship to the Simple Model There are two primary differences between the
model I describe in this section and the one presented in Section 4.1. First, because I
specify a random utility model, the logit shocks will smooth over the thresholds at which
a public option generates competition or induces an employer to exit the private market.
The choices will be probabilistic, and the pricing responses will be smooth functions of the
choice probabilities.
Second, switching costs will alter the interactions between the public and private insurers.
The model presented in this section provides predicts that insurers alternate between setting
premiums as an incumbent and a challenger, where they set low premiums to attract new
employers and higher premiums for employers who are locked in. The maximum additional
markup an insurer would rationally charge in response to switching costs, would be the
switching costs themselves.

However, insurers are forward looking and non-incumbent

insurers offer discounts to attract the employer, generating competitive pressure on the
incumbent. The markups over cost in the incumbents “harvest” state will therefore be lower
12

This may have material implication for the results, particularly regarding selection into the public
option. Polyakova (2016) studies selection between public and private insurance in Germany and finds that
preference heterogeneity over horizontal quality limits adverse selection in that context.
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than the full amount of the switching cost. For this reason, a public option that is close to
an employers first-best choice, but does not offer discounts to attract the employer may fail
obtain sizable market share.

4.4. Estimation
In order to estimate the complete model, I pursue a two-step estimation strategy. In the
first step, I estimate demand using a mixed-logit model to generate a measure of choice
probabilities, which form the transition probabilities between states. For unobserved states
and choices, I use a Lasso regression to estimate the unobserved premium offers. In the
second step, I use the insurers’ first-order conditions to recover costs.
The key output I am interested in obtaining is a joint distribution of preferences and costs,
with which I can simulate the market-level impact of introducing a public insurance option.
That is, I wish to recompute the equilibrium premiums and choices, as described in Section
P O and
4.3, with a choice set that includes a public option with assumed characteristics θij

premiums pP O . The joint distribution of preferences and costs matters primarily because
it will impact the break-even premium that a public option could offer based on which
employers choose to enroll at a given level of quality and premiums. However, the equilibrium
premium offers from private insurers contain to be made on an employer-by-employer basis.
4.4.1. Data
The data include a panel employer-insurer contracts from Massachusetts over 2001-2018. I
observe total enrollment, premiums, and identifiers for employers and insurers. There are
three insurers that account for nearly 90 percent of the market share in any given year and I
consolidate the remaining insurers into a composite choice. In order to credibly identify the
demand model, I restrict the data to employers who I observe for at least three years, and
who switch at least once. This restriction reduces the number of employers from 1,051 to
384. Although this reduction in sample is substantial, it is largely driven by short employer
panels. In Appendix A.10, I conduct additional analyses testing the relationship between
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sample inclusion, attrition, and characteristics of the employers’ choices. I find that the
number of firms that meet Form 5500 filing requirements has increased over time, generating
a large number of short panels. Moreover, because switching is infrequent, shorter panels
provide fewer opportunities to observe a switch between insurers. However, conditional on
an employers first appearance in the data and tenure, switchers are no more likely to attrit
from the sample than non-switchers, suggesting that these restrictions do not systematically
bias the sample toward employers with different preferences.
As in the preceding analyses, I compute a per-person per-year measure of premiums to
standardize premiums across employers of varying sizes, and within employers as they
experience changes to the number of employees. In order to account for aggregate shocks
to health care costs, I inflation adjust premiums to 2018 dollars using the managed care
producer price index.
4.4.2. Demand Estimation
I specify a mixed logit demand specification that follows equation (4.7), now with time (t)
and employer subscripts (i) to denote the panel dimension of the data

uijt|h−1 = θij − αi pijt|h−1 + ηi 1{j = h−1 } + ijt .

(4.16)

To estimate this equation, I follow the logit-mixed logit method outlined in Train (2016)
which allows for a flexible distribution of preferences. Specifically, I specify a grid of over
a finite parameter space to generate predicted choice sequences for each employer over the
varying parameter values. I then use a second logit to estimate probability weights over the
grid.
Formally, the probability that employer i made a given sequence of choices is the product
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of choice probabilities over observed choices implied by preferences θr :

Li (θr ) =

Y

sij(it) t|h(it) (θr ).

t∈Ti

θr is a specific draw of parameters from a finite preference space Si . The simulated log
likelihood for the estimator is

L=

X
i

log 


X

Li (θr )wi (θr |α) ,

r∈Si

where wi (θr |π) is the probability that (θi = θr ) as a function of π,
0

eπ z(θr )
.
π 0 z(θs )
s∈Si e

wi (θr |π) = P

The estimator recovers the vector of parameters, π, for a basis function z(θ) that maximizes
the simulated log likelihood. The basis function z(θ) can be specified in a number of ways.
I estimate using spline functions with 5 knots for each model parameter for a total of 30
(= (5 + 1) × 5) estimated (π) parameters.
Finally, the recovered distribution relates back to the data through

hi (θr |π̂) = P

Li (θr )wi (θr |π̂)
.
sinSi Li (θs )wi (θs |π̂)

(4.17)

Equation 4.17 allows me to generate employer-specific predicted values ŝijt|h that respect
the premiums each employer faces, and the information revealed by its sequence of realized
choices. These values form the transition probabilities used in the supply estimation.
Unobserved premium offers:

One key challenge to estimating demand in the discrete

choice framework is that I only observe premiums for choices that actually occurred. The
average employer appears in the data for approximately 7 years and visits two insurers,
meaning that many ij pairs are unobserved throughout the entire sample. However, even ij
pairs that are sometimes observed require imputed prices for years in which the employer
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makes a different choice. For example, an employer who switches from insurer 1 to insurer
2 halfway through the panel needs an estimate of premiums for insurer 2 in the early years
and insurer 1 in the later years.
To address this, I impute premiums for unobserved choices in observed states and for all
choices in unobserved states. These imputed premiums facilitate the estimation of the
demand system. They also form the “policy function” used to compute costs in the supply
estimation.
To impute premiums, I use a Lasso regression, where premiums are a high-dimensional
function of
• Employer i’s average observed premiums for insurer j in states that are observed
• Indicators for whether the averages for certain states were missing for each employer
(not all employers are observed in all states)
• Summary measures of the employers’ choice sequence (shares of observed choices each
insurer, number of switches)
I estimate a separate Lasso for each insurer, restricting to employers who ever choose that
insurer – in order to avoid training the estimates on observations with missing dependent
variables – and predict premiums for each insurer in the full sample.
The intuition behind this approach is that observed premiums for employer i, in other states
and with other insurers, will capture information about employer-specific contributions to
cost. Allowing these to vary by insurer will capture insurer specific costs. Incorporating
the choice sequence measures will capture premium variation that is driven by price
discrimination on employer preferences (θij , αi and ηi ). For example, an employer whose
choice sequence reveals lots of persistence should correspond to a larger invest-harvest
motive. Additional detail about the estimation approach, and fit of the model is provided
in Appendix A.12.
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4.4.3. Recovering Costs
The remaining parameters to recover are the costs. I do this by estimating the nested
fixed point of the model.

For each employer, I select the vector of cost parameters

that, together with the demand parameters, minimize the distance between predicted
and observed premiums. Given the demand parameters, and a guess of costs, I compute
equilibrium premium offers for each insurer-state combination.
Identification

The cost parameters can be obtained from the insurers’ first-order

conditions from equation (4.15), which imply an estimate of cij .

cij = p∗ij|h−1 − s∗ij|h−1 /(−∂s∗ij|h−1 /∂p∗ij|h−1 )


!
X ∂s∗ik|h−1 /∂p∗ij|h−1
∗
∗ 
+ β Vij|j
−
Vij|k
−∂s∗ij|h−1 /∂p∗ij|h−1

(4.18)

k6=j

or in logit notation

cij = p∗ij|h−1



∗
X ŝik|h−1 Vij|k
1
∗
,
+ β Vij|j
−
−
αi (1 − ŝij|h−1 )
1 − ŝij|h−1

(4.19)

k6=j

This is analogous to the inversion commonly used to recover costs in static settings
(Bresnahan 1981, Berry et al. 1995, Nevo 2001), where costs are inferred as the residual
between observed premiums and the markups implied by demand elasticities. The dynamics
only require that these markups be corrected for the dynamic incentives implied by the
premiums of other insurers and the resulting discounted future profits.
In equilibrium, the complete set of premium offers and costs imply a set of equilibrium
∗
continuation values, Vij|h
, which depend on the costs, demand parameters, and optimal
−1

premium offers. Given estimates of demand, costs are identified from equation (4.19) as
long as there is an estimate of p∗ij|h−1 (and therefore sij|h−1 ) for each employer-insurer-state.
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For each employer, there exist J × J first-order conditions, one for each insurer in each
state. Since I have only J cost parameters, the system is over-identified, and I implement
a minimum distance criterion and a simplex algorithm to find the vector of cost parameters
that minimizes the sum of squared differences between observed premiums and those implied
by the model.
Measurement Error Notably, this estimation approach relies on an error term that is not
in the theoretical model. Because insurers set premiums based on the employer’s expected
cost, the insurer has already integrated over any i.i.d. cost shocks. The most common
source of measurement error is variation in the number of employees, which is used as the
denominator to standardize premiums. Employers fluctuate in size continuously, whereas I
observe premiums for the entire year and a once-per-year measure of enrollment. Because
I cannot observe the precise timing of these changes, I may over or under-estimate the
measure of premiums per person. Additional detail on enrollment, and measurement error
in premiums is provided in Appendix A.13.
This specification of the error term is also consistent with fluctuations in premiums that
reflect actual pricing decisions. For example, measurement error may also enter the data if
insurers’ imperfectly predict employers’ expected costs. This kind of “measurement error”
is modeled in Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), and is equivalent to noise generated by
imperfect measurement of enrollment as long as it does not systematically reflect changes
to an employers’ cost or preferences over time.
Assuming that employers’ costs and preferences are constant over time is an assumption
I impose for tractability. In practice, employers may experience changes on both of these
dimensions due to employer turnover or other exogenous factors. However, this limitation
stems from the use of the panel data to identify the model. Inferring preferences from choice
sequences, and therefore the costs from premiums, requires an assumption that the choices
and premium offers in different periods were made under similar conditions.
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Multiplicity

Since I do not know whether the equilibrium of my model is unique, the

nested fixed point is not guaranteed to find the equilibrium observed in the data. In order
to address this concern, I estimate the cost parameters using the observed premiums in the
data, and the corresponding transition probabilities implied by the demand model. Given
a guess of costs, I estimate the payoffs for each state and use the transition probabilities to
simulate forward to obtain the value function. I then use the insurers’ first-order conditions
to obtain an optimal premium offer, which I compare to the observed premiums.
Specifically the estimation algorithm proceeds by
1. Guessing a value of cij for each (i, j, h−1 )
2. Simulating forward to find the value function given the full set of premium offers and
transition policies
3. Solving the first order condition using the value functions in (2) to obtain p̂ij|h−1
4. Minimizing the sum of squared residuals between observed and implied premiums:

ĉij = argmin

X 

2
p∗ijt|h−1 − p̂ij|h−1 (cij )

ijt|h−1

where p∗ijt|h−1 is given by the data and p̂ij|h−1 (cij ) is the implied optimal premium
calculated in step (3)
This method of estimating the costs is computationally fast and does not require that I solve
for the equilibrium. However, one limitation of this method is that there is no guarantee
that the costs I obtain will reproduce prices close to the observed policy function when
re-calculating the equilibrium. In this method, the policy function is taken as given when
simulating the value functions. Measurement error in observed premiums may propagate
the value functions, moving the estimated costs away from the true equilibrium – or indeed
any equilibrium that could be implied by the model.13 Therefore, I interpret these estimates
13

Additional detail on sources and magnitudes of measurement error is provided in Appendix A.13.
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with caution, but view them as a complement to the approach described above. Estimates
from this approach that are qualitatively similar to the those obtained using the nested
fixed point providing supportive evidence that those parameters were not obtained from the
wrong equilibrium.
4.4.4. Simulating the Public Option
While the public option does not set premiums strategically, its premiums will be an
equilibrium outcome. Since insurers compete independently for employers, the break-even
premium offer a public option can provide depends on the equilibrium responses of the
private insurers and the sorting of employers in response to those premiums. In order to
solve for the new equilibrium for a public option with a given cost and quality, I compute
equilibrium premium offers from insurers for each employer over a grid of potential public
option premiums, spanning the support of the cost distribution.

Under each of these

potential public option policies, I compute the expected average cost for the public option
using the predicted choice probabilities of the model, so that enrollment and cost are based
on the probability weighted set of employers who opt in, under each possible premium offer.
This identifies the set of possible premia that are feasible. I then select the public option
premium that maximizes enrollment for a given level of quality and cost advantage.
The model produces premium offers and predicted choice probabilities for each employer
(i), insurer (j), state (h−1 ) combination. That is, the underlying costs and premiums an
employer experience depends on the choice that employer makes. In order to summarize
employer-level estimates of expected premiums and costs, I aggregate these to represent the
employers’ expected outcome given the steady state choice probabilities of the model. For
example, average premiums are calculated as

Epi =

X
h−1

P(h−1 ) 


X

j∈J
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sij|h−1 pij|h−1  .

(4.20)

4.5. Results
4.5.1. Model Primitives
Demand Figure 8 presents the results of the demand estimation. As aggregate market
shares would imply, the average coefficients on HPHC, Tufts, and Other insurers are negative.
They are also widely dispersed. Panels (a) and (b) present distributions of employers’
\
willingness to pay for insurers, calculated by dividing W
T P ij = θ̂ij /α̂i . Employers display
strong brand preferences. The average employer is willing to pay $489 per person, per year
for its most preferred insurer relative to its second most preferred insurer.
Switching costs are also large. The average employer has switching costs of $3,020, which is
roughly 49 percent of average premiums. This estimate is in line with prior work examining
switching costs of households choosing among plans in the Massachusetts Group Insurance
Commission (GIC), which provides an insurance exchange for public employees in the state.
Tilipman (2018) estimates individual consumers choosing among health plans in the GIC
face average switching costs of $250 per household per month, or $3,000 per year. These
estimates are therefore consistent with employers’ switching costs representing aggregations
of those faced by their employees, rather than additional agency problems or contracting
frictions faced by the employer-group.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that both brand preference and switching costs
are large in absolute terms. However, the importance of these magnitudes depend on the
degree to which they translate into markups over cost, which I turn to in the next section.
Costs

In Figure 9, I show the final results of the cost estimation. Each point shows a unique

cij estimate under each approach. The accompanying table summarizes the estimates.
Column (1) shows the estimates based on the nested fixed point approach. Column (2)
shows the cost estimates based on the method that uses the equilibrium policy functions to
simulate the value functions before solving the first-order condition. Both sets of estimates
are similar, revealing that HPHC and Tufts have sizable cost advantages relative to BCBS.
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Figure 8: Estimated Demand Parameters
(a) Preferences for Harvard Pilgrim

(b) Preferences for Tufts

(c) Switching Costs

θHP HC
θT uf ts
θOther
η
α

Mean

SD

-0.274
-0.213
-0.364
1.088
0.357

0.142
0.065
0.118
0.236
0.035

Notes: Estimates of parameters from the demand system as described in Section 4.4. Panels (a)
and (b) show the distributions of willingness-to-pay measures for Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts relative
to Blue Cross and Blue Shield. Panel (c) displays the distribution of switching costs. The table in the
Southeast corner presents the mean and standard deviations of each parameter in equation (4.16).
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The standard deviations reveal that both sets of estimates also produce a sizable amount
of variation across employers. The simulated value functions produce estimates that are on
average $300-$500 lower than the nested fixed point and more dispersed across employers,
which I attribute to the role of measurement error in premiums.
Figure 9: Cost Estimates

(1)
Nested Fixed Point

(2)
Simulated Values

BCBS

Mean
SD

5,579
(636)

5,057
(943)

HPHC

Mean
SD

5.093
(473)

4,757
(618)

Tufts

Mean
SD

5,143
(559)

4,817
(704)

For the counterfactuals in Section 4.5.2, I privilege the estimated obtained using the nested
fixed point, but interpret this as suggestive evidence that the nested fixed point likely does
not suffer from a multiplicity problem. These estimates are also closer to aggregate estimates
of average claims per covered life published by CMS of $5,400. Additionally, more dispersion
in costs across employers will tend to exacerbate adverse selection in the counterfactuals. I
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therefore view the results of the nested fixed point as a more conservative estimate for the
purpose of this paper.
4.5.2. Crowd Out and Competition Under a Public Option
I now turn to the counterfactuals on the impact of introducing a public option. Table 10
presents the results of the public option under the various assumptions of cost advantage and
horizontal quality. The first row shows the baseline premiums for reference. Each following
row represents the outcomes of a public option with varying cost advantages, and quality
shortfalls relative to BCBS. Columns (1) and (2) present the steady state public option
enrollment and the equilibrium break-even premium for each policy. Column (3) presents
the average premium among employers who continue to purchase insurance in the private
market.
Enrollment

A public option that replicates BCBS on cost and quality absorbs only 1.4

percent of the market. As one would expect, enrollment declines in the quality of the public
option. However, enrollment in the public option is much larger when it has a large cost
advantage and can offer substantially lower premiums than the private market. A public
option that replicates BCBS with a 50 percent cost advantage crowds out 74.6 percent of the
private market. The impact of the cost advantage is typically much larger than differences
generated by any quality differential.
Selection To illustrate how adverse selection across employer groups governs the impact
of the public option, I plot the enrollment probabilities across the cost distribution in Figure
10. Because each employer has a different cost depending on the insurer it chooses, I use the
expected cost, weighting by the steady state market shares of the employer’s choices. These
results build on the intuition discussed in Section 4.1. Under uniform premium setting, lowcost employers do not find the public option attractive. When the public option has a larger
cost advantage, it can provide the underlying health care services at a lower price, thus
expanding the set of employers who find it optimal to enroll. The result is consistent with
theoretical work by Shepard et al. (2020), who show that a uniform health insurance plan
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Table 10: Market Shares and Premiums Under a Public Option

Cost
Advantage

Quality
Shortfall

(1)
PO
Enrollment

(2)
PO
Premium

Baseline

(3)
Market
Premium
6,058

100

0
-500
-1000
-2000

0.014
0.015
0.111
0.016

6,300
6,300
6,300
6,300

6,053
6,049
5,911
6,042

25

0
-500
-1000
-2000

0.129
0.115
0.109
0.111

4,800
4,800
4,800
4,800

5,959
5,935
5,921
5,911

50

0
-500
-1000
-2000

0.746
0.711
0.672
0.608

3,100
3,100
3,100
3,100

5,612
5,505
5,407
5,279

would involve substantial dead-weight loss because of wide variation in preferences for health
care consumption. In this setting, where employers may opt in or refrain from participating
in the public plan, only the highest cost employers tend to enroll, and the market unravels.
One limitation of these estimates is that I can only speak to a broad notion of horizontal
quality relative to existing insurers. In the model, employers with preferences for a high level
of health care consumption can continue to receive the same level of consumption under a
public plan, and the public option unravels to varying degrees depending on the parameters
of the policy. If instead, the public option alters plan quality by restraining utilization,
more costly employers may remain privately insured, and the public option may be more
positively selected.
Competition and Markups Table 10 shows that premiums in the private market decline
as the public option becomes more attractive. The sources of this are two-fold. First, as
discussed above, public option is negatively selected and therefore the subset of employers
who remain privately insured have systematically lower costs. Second, the public option

112

Figure 10: Employer Costs and Public Option Enrollment

Notes: Figure presents estimates of steady state enrollment probabilities across employers
for a public option that replicates BCBS quality. For parsimony, each line presents a local
polynomial of the underlying data.
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Figure 11: Change in Premium Offers Under a Public Option

Notes: Figure presents estimates of changes to expected premium offers across employers. Premium offers and
expected costs are weighted using the steady state market shares.

creates competitive pricing pressure. However, as discussed in Section 4.1, these competitive
pricing effects will only occur for employers who are near the indifference point between the
public plan and their private alternatives.
In Figure 11, I plot the difference in premium offers employers experience across the cost
distribution for a public option that with no cost advantage or quality shortfall (row 1 from
Table 10). Employers at the top of the cost distribution, who most prefer the public option,
experience the largest reductions in premiums, whereas employers whose individual premium
offers place them well below the indifference point between the public option and available
private plans experience almost no competitive effect.
Switching Costs

Table 11 provides further insight into the way switching costs shape the

impact of a public option, by repeating the exercise in Table 10 with all switching costs set
to zero. Take-up of the public option is substantially greater in this case because insurers
can no longer retain market share as the home insurer, and therefore have no incentive to
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Table 11: Market Shares and Premiums Under a Public Option, No Switching Costs

Cost
Advantage

Quality
Shortfall

(1)
PO
Enrollment

(2)
PO
Premium

Baseline

(3)
Market
Premium
5,149

100

0
-500
-1000
-2000

0.086
0.089
0.092
0.097

6,200
6,200
6,200
6,200

6,488
6,529
6,566
6,620

75

0
-500
-1000
-2000

0.281
0.287
0.295
0.312

4,600
4,600
4,600
4,600

6,320
6,356
6,397
6,481

50

0
-500
-1000
-2000

0.604
0.629
0.633
0.647

3,100
3,000
3,000
3,000

6,184
6,193
6,216
6,283

make low introductory premium offers. Focusing again on the case where the public option
replicates BCBS, the public option absorbs 8.6 percent of the market in the absence of
switching costs. Even in this case, negative selection into the public option keeps it from
fully crowding out – or evenly splitting market share with – BCBS, which has a 64.7 percent
market share at baseline.
Policy proposals have acknowledged the importance of switching costs. Hoffman et al.
(2021) even proposes offering introductory discounts in the first years of the public option
to facilitate the transition of providers. However, these counterfactuals represent the steady
state market shares of all plans, where switching costs allow insurers to continually engage
in invest-harvest premium setting. This suggests that a one-time introductory offer may not
be sufficient to guarantee the attractiveness of the public option.
Markups are lower at baseline without switching costs, which is consistent with the
conventional wisdom that switching costs leads to higher prices.

However, removing

switching costs does not improve the public option’s ability to generate premium
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competition. If anything premiums are larger because the set of employers who remain
are higher cost or have strong brand preferences for existing insurers.
Taken together, these results indicate that the reimbursement rates a public option sets
with health care providers a crucial determinant of how likely employer groups are to enroll.
The key economic insight the model provides is that this cost advantage interacts with the
premium setting rules in important ways. Lower costs allow for lower prices in nearly any
market. However, this cost setting mechanism has additional importance because it directly
impacts the degree of adverse selection in the market.

4.6. Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of a public option on crowd out and premium competition
in the market for employer-sponsored health insurance. I combine panel data on employerinsurer contracting with a structural model of supply and demand to estimate the strength of
employers’ preferences and associated costs. The key empirical challenges are that premiums
in this market are set individually, reflecting differences in preferences and costs. I use
a flexible mixed-logit estimation to recover the distribution of employer preferences, and
account for insurers’ dynamic incentives to recover the distribution of costs. I find that
employers have both strong brand preferences and experience large switching costs, and
that both of these forces generate market power for insurers. Insurers price discriminate
between employers with differing costs, brand preference, as well as between employers who
are locked-in and those they wish to compete away from rival insurers.
I find that a public option that does not price discriminate between employers has low take
up, even in the case where it perfectly replicates the cost and horizontal quality of the most
preferred insurer in the market. Take up is limited by both negative selection into the public
option and large switching costs. Allowing the public option to exercise a cost advantage
by regulating payments to health care providers allows the public option to absorb more
of the negative selection, but potentially involves distortions to the provider market. The
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public option only generates premium competition in the private market for employers who
are close to the indifference point between the public plan and existing private insurers.
I also find that insurers set premiums in a forward looking way, which keeps them from fully
extracting the rents generated by switching costs. While the model does not explicitly
account for bargaining, my results suggest that dynamic incentives are an important
mechanism restraining insurers from fully extracting surplus in setting premiums. Future
work should consider the role of switching costs and dynamic incentives as they relate to
unexplained bargaining ability in cross sectional studies.
This paper focuses specifically on the large group market in Massachusetts, where employers
receive experience rated premium offers. These findings may or may not generalize to
other states, where insurers may be more or less differentiated, or employer may have lower
switching costs. The findings may also differ from impacts in the self-insured market, though
self-insured employers contract with insurers to provide networks and other administrative
services that represent the most obvious forms of insurer differentiation.
Finally, while I do not consider the details of any particular policy proposal. The the model
provides general insight into the way that employers and insurers would respond to the
entry of a public insurance program. The results suggest that a public option that exercises
a larger cost advantage will do more to crowd out private insurers. Therefore, the efficiency
implications of this crowd out depend on the ex-ante efficiency of the prices negotiated with
providers. Cicala et al. (2019) study the introduction of regulation mandating minimum
medical loss ratios (MLR) and find that private insurers who operate below the MLR
raise claims to comply with regulation – a finding that suggests employers are more elastic
to quality than they are to premiums. Additional work should explore the implications
of employer preferences and switching costs on insurer investments in quality and cost
containment.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Error in Estimating ASO Price Incentives
The purpose of this appendix is to argue that our estimation of ASO price incentives in
Panel A of Table 3 provides a potential under-estimate of the magnitudes of such effects.
Several empirical facts motivate our approach
(a) ASO and PPO plans are correlated in the data (see Table 16)
(b) While we observe multiple distinct contracts at a given hospital-insurer pair, these
are often negotiated at the product level, rather than by funding source directly.
While we observe contract segmentation imperfectly, this observation is informed by
conversations with industry participants. We also attempt to document the nature of
this segmentation in our discussion of Figure 2, Panel (c) in Section 2.3 of the text.
Given these observations, we assume the following data generating process. First, each
observed contracted price is the aggregation of price incentives for the patients who choose
that plan-hospital combination:
P
pi|f jhp =

i∈f jhp pijhp

Njhp

where each individuals’ negotiation incentives are given by

pif jhp = θhp + Zif j
where Zi is a vector of indicators for funding (f ) and product type (j). The intuition behind
this formulation is that both ASO and PPO provide price shocks that are driven by patient
steering and financial incentives of payers, and that the negotiated price is in fact the average
contribution of characteristics across the relevant patients.
We then carry out the following simulation exercise.
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1. We use the vector of hospital-payer fixed effects as estimated in Column (6) of Table
3.1 The actual values of these “base” prices is irrelevant since we will assume for
the purpose of this exercise that they are orthogonal to the product and funding
characteristics.
2. We simulate prices by drawing a distribution of HMO/ASO according to the following
process.
HM Oi = 1{i > 0}
ASOi = 1{ηi > 0}
and






−0.8

 1
[, η] ∼ N [0, 0], 

−0.8
1

3. We assume an individual’s price contribution

ln(P riceif jhp ) = log(θhp ) − 0.05HM Oi + 0.03ASOi
That is, HM Oi provides 5% of downward pricing pressure and ASOi softens the
payers’ negotiating incentives by 3%.
4. We further aggregate these price contributions by product-contract j (defined as HMO
vs. PPO) such that the observed price
P
ln(P riceif |jhp ) =

i∈jhp (log(θhp )

− 0.05HM Oi + 0.03ASOi )
Njhp

1

We use MRI prices for this exercise because it is easier to observe the stable contract, as in Figure
3. Because we have defined MRIs as narrowly as single CPT-code, each observation will have the same
chargemaster (list) price. Our observed prices will therefore not reflect any heterogeneity in price that
would result from a price that is set as a share of charges.
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5. We estimate OLS price effects

ln(P riceif |jhp ) = θhp + βHM O HM Oi + βASO ASOi + εijhp

Column (1) of Table 17 presents the results of this exercise, which results in an overestimate
of HMO price effects (−0.068) and an underestimate of ASO incentive effects (< 0.001).
The intuition behind this problem is that averaging price at the contract (HMO) level,
introduces a kind of non-classical measurement error by which within hospital-payer ASO
price incentives are not associated with additional price variation. However, the correlation
between ASO and HMO means that the contribution of ASO price incentives are “well
explained” by the HMO indicator.
To solve this problem, we can regress price onto the ASO share by contract

ln(P riceif |jhp ) = θhp + βHM O HM Oi + βASO ASOj + εijhp
where
P
ASOj =

i∈jhp ASOi

Njhp

The results of this regression are reported in Column (2) of Table 17, which yields the
correct parameter values. Here, product-type still defines the contract, however identification
of ASO effects is driven by relative differentials in HMO/PPO prices for contracts with
more or less ASO penetration. With a clean identification of contracts (Figure 3), this
method is easily extendable to a setting in which one does not know the precise rationale for
segmentation of plans into contracts. To do this, we can simply calculate average HMO and
ASO (and “other”) shares by identified contract. In our simulation, this is identical to the
method in Column (2) of Table 17 because, in that exercise, we have assumed HMO is either
0% or 100% throughout the contract. We apply this method to the MRI data, where it is
easy to identify stable contracts that typically differ based on product type. When we apply
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this correction, the ASO effect as originally reported in Panel A of Table 3 moves from 2.2%
to 13.2% and the HMO effect falls from -2.1% to 1.7% (though it becomes insignificant).
We therefore conclude that the estimates reported in Panel A of Table 3 likely provide an
underestimate of the ASO effect. Indeed, controlling for plan characteristic shares in this
way increases the magnitude of the ASO coefficient across all clinical cohorts, as seen in
Panel B of Table 3.

A.2. Implications: The Value of an Insurance Plan
To assess how price variation translates into expected out of pocket costs, we use data
from Truven MarketScan for 2010, and select a population of working age adults aged
24-64 (inclusive). Truven MarketScan is used by HHS to calibrate the ACA Marketplace
risk adjustment, and provides similar distributions as the MEPS. We limit to those with
12 months of continuous enrollment, and take a 1 percent sample of those enrollees for
computational ease. We drop a small number of people for whom at some point there was
a service date with a negative net payment, giving us 216,983 individuals. We then sum up
their inpatient and outpatient claims for the year.2
We do not examine prescription drug claims in this analysis, as our work has not assessed
price variation in prescription drug claims.3 Moreover, the impact of prescription drug
prices to consumers is complex: for instance, many plans use tiered copays, rather than
coinsurance. Our results should be interpreted as roughly characterizing an insurance plan
with a separate medical and drug deductible.
The impact of negotiated prices on consumers will depend on the insurance plan design
(as well as on the distribution of underlying health care claims). We examine the effect of
negotiated prices using a high-deductible health plan: a plan with a deductible of $5,000, a
2

We use the same approach as in Ericson and Sydnor (2017). Note that we do not use the Massachusetts
APCD here. Our analysis of the enrollment files suggested that the APCD had an unreliable measure of the
fraction of enrollees with zero claims. Unreliable number of zero claim enrollees poses a challenge to using
the APCD to measure the population distribution of claims (for which zero claims are important). However,
it is not a problem for our measure of prices (since they are conditional on a transaction occurring), or for
other work looking at demand conditional on using services
3
For more on price variation in prescription drug spending, see Starc and Swanson (2017).
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coinsurance rate of 30%, and a maximum out-of-pocket (maxOOP) limit of $6,350. This is
similar to a bronze plan on the ACA Marketplaces. The observed spending in Marketscan
comes from a mix of insurers and providers, and we cannot distinguish among them. To
simulate the effect of price variation, we multiply all the observed spending by a multiplier—
that is, a multiplier of 0.5 to simulate what would happen if prices were 50% of the observed
prices. We take the observed and the multiplied spending levels and translate them into 1)
out-of-pocket (OOP) spending and 2) actuarial value for this population.
Before applying any price multiplier, the average OOP spending in this data is $1,900, and
the average actuarial value of this plan is about 44%. If this data underestimates the right
tail of the claims distribution—i.e. underestimates very high spenders—then the actuarial
value will be understated, since the plan covers 100% of claims beyond the maxOOP. Figure
12 plots the average OOP spending and actuarial value for this plan from multipliers ranging
from 0.5 to 2. The average OOP spending in the plan ranges from $1,267 at prices 50% of
observed to $2,641 at prices that were 200% of observed. This is equivalent of moving a tier
in actuarial value: AV for the 50% prices is 0.59 while for the 200% prices is only 0.31
Across all our sampled services and providers, higher-cost payers were about 15% more
expensive than lower-cost payers. A 15% discount relative to observed prices is an average
OOP savings of $182. Individuals likely have more information about which types of services
or providers they will use (i.e., a young person might expect to have a birth at a nearby
hospital, while an older person might expect to be more likely to have a hip replacement at
a different hospital near them). We estimated price variation between insurers of about 50%
for more specific services—such as Tufts versus Harvard Pilgrim for knee replacements, or
the national carriers versus BCBS for MRIs. A 50% discount relative to observed prices is
an average OOP savings of $633. While we have focused on expected OOP spending, note
that risk aversion will increase the disutility from spending that comes from cost-sharing as
opposed from premiums.
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A.2.1. Proof of Result 4
Result 4 For small enough response of insurance demand to negotiated prices (e.g.
∂DIN S
∂zIN S

=

∂DASO
∂zASO

= 0), zASO > zIN S .

Proof: To see that zASO > zIN S when

∂DIN S
∂zIN S

=

∂DASO
∂zASO

= 0 , consider the first order

conditions for choice of negotiation effort:

c0 (eIN S ) = αM DIN S and c0 (eASO ) = 0.

Hence, eIN S > eASO = 0. Note that we have assumed that if eIN S = eASO = 0, then
zIN S = zASO , so given that zIN S decreases in eIN S , we have zASO > zIN S .
Note that the payer has an incentive to set positive negotiation effort for the fully insured
market, since it pays for the insured portion of medical spending. However, the payer does
not have incentive to put forth negotiation effort in the ASO market, since it does not pay
these prices. The payer only cares about the level of zASO insofar is it affects the level
demand, but we have

∂DASO
∂zASO

= 0 by assumption.
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419,139

All Inpatient

12,548

11,790

823

6,147

9,654

20,955

22,046

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

2,773
22.1%

2,765
22.0%

1,819
15.4%

1,804
15.3%

218
26.5%

221
26.9%

979
15.9%

1,017
16.6%

1,845
19.1%

1,862
19.3%

3,412
16.3%

3,353
16.0%

3,477
15.8%

3,442

(4)

15.6%

(3)

Yes
Yes
Yes

21.9%

2,747

15.4%

1,821

26.9%

221

16.2%

995

19.2%

1,850

16.0%

3,359

15.8%

3,478

(5)

No
No
Yes

8.6%

1,081

9.5%

1,117

12.9%

106

18.8%

1,158

13.5%

1,307

15.1%

3,172

13.6%

2,993

(6)

Yes
No
Yes

9.7%

1,221

9.8%

1,156

11.5%

95

18.4%

1,129

13.3%

1,281

15.2%

3,185

13.7%

3,012

(7)

SD of θp
As Percent of Mean

SD of θh
As Percent of Mean

Yes
Yes
Yes

9.1%

1,139

9.8%

1,156

12.0%

99

19.1%

1,173

13.5%

1,305

15.4%

3,222

13.8%

3,050

(8)

Notes: This table reports the dispersion measures for the fixed effects estimated in Equation 2.1. Columns (1) and (2) report the number of observations and
unconditional mean price for each sample. Columns (3)-(5) and (6)-(8) report the standard deviation of hospital and payer fixed effects respectively. Standard
deviations are calculated across all observations, effectively weighting each hospital or payer by its patient flows in the data. The standard deviation is reported
as a percentage of the mean price below each row. Patient controls include patient age, sex, insurance product type (HMO, PPO, POS, and other), and funding
type (ASO, fully insured, and other). In the all inpatient and composite samples, each regression also contains fixed effects for the primary diagnosis and are
weighted by the overall spending share that each diagnosis code or cohort represents. Regressions underlying estimates for columns (4), (5), (7), and (8) also
include a month-year fixed-effect. Data are limited to hospital-payer-cohort triads with at least 10 cases.

Patient Controls
θh
θp

74,446

13,142

Vaginal Delivery

Composite

10,810

Cesarean Section

36,525

8,205

Knee Replacement

Lower Limb MRI

5,764

(2)

(1)

Hip Replacement

Mean Price

Observations

Table 12: Quantifying Price Variation Within and Between Groups with Weighting By Patient Flows
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295,508

All Inpatient

12,734

9,212

795

6,194

9,787

21,677

22,625

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

2,594
20.4%

2,613
20.5%

1,376
14.9%

1,367
14.8%

258
32.4%

260
32.7%

1,081
17.4%

1,073
17.3%

1,738
17.8%

1,772
18.1%

3,322
15.3%

3,294
15.2%

3,421
15.1%

3,410

(4)

15.1%

(3)

Yes
Yes
Yes

20.4%

2,593

14.7%

1,351

32.3%

257

17.7%

1,099

17.8%

1,738

14.9%

3,238

14.0%

3,175

(5)

No
No
Yes

8.7%

1,112

16.9%

1,554

8.9%

70

16.5%

1,020

14.9%

1,463

25.0%

5,425

20.7%

4,684

(6)

Yes
No
Yes

8.7%

1,104

18.1%

1,667

9.3%

74

14.8%

918

14.4%

1,407

26.5%

5,738

21.8%

4,939

(7)

SD of θp
As Percent of Mean

SD of θh
As Percent of Mean

Yes
Yes
Yes

7.9%

1,003

17.4%

1,602

7.3%

58

15.8%

977

15.0%

1,472

25.9%

5,617

21.3%

4,808

(8)

Notes: This table reports the dispersion measures for the fixed effects estimated in Equation 2.1. Columns (1) and (2) report the number of observations and
unconditional mean price for each sample. Columns (3)-(5) and (6)-(8) report the standard deviation of hospital and payer fixed effects respectively. Standard
deviations are calculated across the unweighted set of hospitals or payers. The standard deviation is reported as a percentage of the mean price below each row.
Patient controls include patient age, sex, insurance product type (HMO, PPO, POS, and other), and funding type (ASO, fully insured, and other). In the all
inpatient and composite samples, each regression also contains fixed effects for the primary diagnosis and are weighted by the overall spending share that each
diagnosis code or cohort represents. Regressions underlying estimates for columns (4), (5), (7), and (8) also include a month-year fixed-effect. Data are limited
to hospital-payer-cohort triads with at least 10 cases.

Patient Controls
θh
θp

27,648

8,337

Vaginal Delivery

Composite

8,505

Cesarean Section

28,460

5,793

Knee Replacement

Lower Limb MRI

4,220

(2)

(1)

Hip Replacement

Mean Price

Observations

Table 13: Quantifying Price Variation Within and Between Groups with Balanced Panels

Table 14: Patient Characteristics and Hospital Choice Across Payers in Boston HRR, All
Inpatient, 2009-2011
BCBS

HarvardPilgrim

Tufts

National
Payers

Other

Age

44.11
(12.52)

44.50
(12.55)

45.08**
(12.55)

43.07
(12.59)

43.62
(13.26)

County Median
Income

68,730
(10,336)

68,128
(11,191)

68,983
(10,284)

68,742
(10,419)

65,911
(11,317)

Distance Traveled
(Miles)

10.66
(12.13)

10.14
(11.55)

10.01
(11.00)

10.09
(11.32)

9.04
(11.86)

Distance to Closest
(Miles)

3.24
(3.31)

3.20
(3.43)

3.18
(3.14)

3.18
(3.16)

2.81
(3.39)

Admitted to
Closest Hospital

0.35
(0.48)

0.35
(0.48)

0.36
(0.48)

0.38
(0.48)

0.45*
(0.50)

Distance to
MGH

30.18
(23.99)

27.60
(23.99)

28.43
(22.44)

29.78
(22.00)

29.03
(24.94)

Observations

133,660

66,687

47,075

29,848

47,829

Notes: This table presents each payers mean (first-row) and standard-deviation (second-row) for each characteristic,
estimated over the sample of inpatient admissions in the Boston HRR for 2009-2011. Stars indicate significance
levels from a t-test against the overall mean: ∗ (p<0.10), ∗∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗∗ (p<0.01), and standard errors are
clustered at the hospital-payer pair. County level median income data come from the Census Bureau’s Small Area
Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). Distances are measured from the centroid of each patient’s zip code to
the hospital’s longitude and latitude using a geodetic distance measure. “National Payers” represents the combined
average of UnitedHealth Group, Aetna, and Cigna. “Other” contains all other insurers in the data: Fallon, Health
New England, Boston Medical Center HealthNet, Celticare, ConnectiCare, Health Plans Inc., Neighborhood Health
Plan, NetworkHealth, and Wellpoint.

126

127

0.022∗
(0.010)
0.038
(0.103)
-0.402∗∗∗
(0.110)
-0.258∗∗
(0.079)

0.023∗∗
(0.007)
-0.067∗∗
(0.025)
-0.142∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.140∗∗
(0.045)

ASO

Tufts

Aetna/UHG/Cigna

Yes
Yes
Knee
Replacement
0.408
8,205

-0.255∗∗∗
(0.053)

-0.445∗∗∗
(0.108)

0.004
(0.011)
0.143
(0.077)

-0.058∗∗∗
(0.014)

(3)

Yes
Yes
Cesarean
Section
0.499
10,810

-0.253∗∗∗
(0.057)

-0.084∗
(0.035)

0.018∗
(0.008)
-0.298∗∗∗
(0.037)

-0.052∗∗∗
(0.009)

(4)
ln(Price)

Yes
Yes
Vaginal
Delivery
0.461
13,142

-0.159∗∗
(0.055)

0.083∗
(0.039)

0.010
(0.010)
-0.230∗∗∗
(0.036)

-0.059∗∗∗
(0.014)

(5)

Yes
Yes
Lower Limb
MRI
0.513
36,525

0.416∗∗∗
(0.077)

0.100∗∗
(0.036)

0.033∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.029
(0.041)

-0.021∗
(0.009)

(6)

0.464
419,139

All Inpatient

Yes
Yes

-0.201∗∗∗
(0.040)

-0.112∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.039∗∗∗
(0.006)
-0.094∗∗∗
(0.028)

-0.035∗∗∗
(0.008)

(7)

Notes: ∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗ (p<0.01), ∗∗∗ (p<0.001). Standard errors clustered at the hospital-insurer pair in parentheses. The dependent variable is the
log of individual-level transaction price. Insurer coefficients are estimated relative to BCBS. Funding type includes ASO, Fully Insured (the omitted
category), and other. Product type includes PPO (the omitted category), HMO, POS, and other. All regressions contain controls for patient patient sex
and five-year age band as well as monthly fixed-effects. We also estimate price-level coefficients for all other payers in the data, which include: Fallon,
Health New England, Boston Medical Center HealthNet, Celticare, ConnectiCare, Health Plans Inc., Neighborhood Health Plan, NetworkHealth, and
Wellpoint. However, we omit these estimates here for the sake of simplicity.

0.933
74,446

Composite

Clinical Cohort

R-Squared
Observations

Yes
Yes

Hospital FE
Other Payer FE

Yes
Yes
Hip
Replacement
0.384
5,764

-0.050∗∗
(0.018)

-0.056∗∗∗
(0.011)

HMO

Harvard Pilgrim

(2)

(1)

Table 15: All Inpatient Prices, All Payers

Table 16: Patient Characteristics and Hospital Choice Across Funding Type in Boston
HRR, All Inpatient, 2009-2011
(1)
ASO

(2)
Fully Insured

(3)
Other

Age

44.75***
(12.50)

43.68***
(12.61)

43.90
(13.27)

County Median
Income

68,809***
(10,564)

68,157
(10,564)

66,596**
(11,485)

Distance Traveled

10.20
(11.43)

10.39**
(12.06)

9.30*
(11.69)

Distance to Closest
(Miles)

3.15
(3.21)

3.25***
(3.41)

2.89**
(3.29)

Admitted to
Closest Hospital

0.35***
(0.48)

0.38
(0.48)

0.42
(0.49)

Distance to
MGH (Miles)

28.62
(23.21)

30.06***
(24.19)

28.10
(23.96)

Share PPO

0.35***
(0.48)

0.10***
(0.30)

0.14***
(0.35)

Share HMO

0.31***
(0.46)

0.81***
(0.40)

0.14***
(0.34)

Share Other

0.34***
(0.47)

0.10***
(0.30)

0.72***
(0.45)

Observations

137,907

144,767

42,425

Notes: This table presents each payers mean (first-row) and standard-deviation (second-row) for each characteristic,
estimated over the sample of inpatient admissions in the Boston HRR for 2009-2011. Stars indicate significance levels
from a t-test against the overall mean: ∗ (p<0.10), ∗∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗∗ (p<0.01), and standard errors are clustered at
the hospital-payer pair. County level median income data come from the Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and
Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). Distances are measured from the centroid of each patient’s zip code to the hospital’s
longitude and latitude using a geodetic distance measure. Shares of product characteristics do not always sum to 1
because of rounding.
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Table 17: ASO and HMO Effects Under Assumed DGP
(1)

(2)
ln(P riceif |jhp )
-0.068∗∗∗
-0.050∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.000)

Dependent Variable:
HM Oi

0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)

ASOi

ASOj
R-Squared
Observations

1.000
36,525

0.030∗∗∗
(0.000)
1.000
36,525

Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the hospital-payer
pair parentheses. Table presents the results of the simulation described in Appendix A.1.

Figure 12: Consequences of Price Variation for Enrollee Out-of-Pocket Spending and Plan
Actuarial Value

Notes: Results of simulations using MarketScan Data, as described in Section 2.4.
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A.3. Matching Merging and Non-Merging Hospitals
Table 18 compares the performance of alternative matching approaches. The metric of
interest is an index of the difference in hospital characteristics Xh,τh −1 between merging and
non-merging hospitals; for a given merging hospital h, candidate matched controls are those
with transactions in [τh − 1, τh + 1] and the matching procedure is applied to characteristics
data from the pre-merger year τh − 1. We summarize performance across characteristics K
by the average standardized difference
X 1 X̄ctrl,k − X̄treat,k
K
σk

k∈K

where X̄ctrl,k is the mean of characteristic k in the matched control group, X̄treat,k is the
mean of characteristic k in the treated (merging) group, and σk is the standard deviation of
characteristic k among treated hospitals. Each UMDNS-code-specific sample of treated and
control hospitals is weighted by that UMDNS code’s total expenditure share, to mimic the
stacked regression weighting. Column (1) summarizes each matching approach by summing
the difference index across the four target/acquirer-PPI/non combinations.
We followed Schmitt (2017) and Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) to select candidate matching
algorithms. Following Schmitt (2017), we used M -to-1 optimal Mahalanobis matching along
the eleven characteristics dimensions at the top of each panel in Table 6, for various values
of M . Following Dranove and Lindrooth (2003), we also use Probit regressions of the
probability of merging and match M control hospitals to treated hospitals using the resulting
predicted propensity scores; in some cases, we also limit candidate controls to those whose
characteristics are all within 20 percent (a 20 percent “caliper,” in matching terminology) of
the target’s characteristics.
The results are shown in Table 18, in descending order of summary match performance. The
10-to-1 optimal Mahalanobis algorithm had the best performance, but was comparable to
many Probit-based matches. The best matching algorithms improved upon the comparison
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without matching by a factor of nearly three standard deviations.
Table 18: Comparison of Matching Results
Sample
Mahalanobis 10
Probit 15, no cal.
Probit 30, 20 pct cal.
Probit 15, 20 pct cal.
Probit 25, 20 pct cal.
Probit 5, no cal.
Probit 5, 20 pct cal.
Probit 10, no cal.
Probit 20, 20 pct cal.
Probit 30, no cal.
Probit 10, 20 pct cal.
Mahalanobis 15
Mahalanobis 5
Probit 20, no cal.
Probit 25, no cal.
Mahalanobis 20
Probit 1, 20 pct cal.
Mahalanobis 25
Probit 1, no cal.
Mahalanobis 30
Mahalanobis 1
Non-matched

(1)
Composite
3.699
3.745
3.769
3.777
3.800
3.809
3.818
3.820
3.827
3.843
3.854
3.856
3.916
3.925
3.938
4.113
4.271
4.299
4.332
4.467
5.555
10.633

(2)

(3)
Non-PPIs
Targets
Acquirers
1.230
0.686
0.689
0.649
0.690
0.692
0.661
0.690
0.682
0.818
0.675
1.204
1.334
0.782
0.853
1.172
0.746
1.198
0.775
1.147
2.014
3.873

0.607
1.101
1.114
1.105
1.121
1.164
1.181
1.102
1.106
1.140
1.155
0.619
0.757
1.146
1.131
0.717
1.046
0.825
1.065
0.938
1.124
1.348

(4)
Targets
1.013
0.791
0.797
0.827
0.823
0.736
0.778
0.807
0.849
0.759
0.808
1.049
1.028
0.833
0.810
1.082
0.982
1.031
1.008
1.063
1.303
4.028

PPIs

(5)
Acquirers
0.849
1.168
1.170
1.196
1.165
1.217
1.197
1.222
1.189
1.127
1.216
0.984
0.797
1.164
1.145
1.141
1.497
1.244
1.484
1.319
1.113
1.384

Notes: Each cell presents the Euclidean distance of mean characteristics between the treatment and control
group (i.e., the sum of mean differences between the treated and relevant control group, divided by the standard
deviation in the treated group). Each row presents statistics for a given matching approach. Columns (2)-(5)
present distance values for each of the four treatment-class categories. Column (1) presents the sum across all
characteristics and treatment categories.

Table 19 shows the results of our baseline price regressions for alternative matching methods,
as well as the non-matched sample.
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Table 19: Merger Treatment Effects on Price – Alternative Matching
Targets
Panel A: Mahalanobis, 10 Neighbors
Non-PPIs
-0.006
(0.008)
PPIs
-0.034†
(0.010)
Panel B: Non-Matched
Non-PPIs
PPIs
Panel C: Probit, 10 Neighbors
Non-PPIs
PPIs
Panel D: Mahalanobis, 1 Neighbor
Non-PPIs
PPIs

Acquirers
-0.004
(0.004)
0.017†
(0.006)

0.006
(0.009)
-0.022**
(0.010)

-0.005
(0.005)
0.015†
(0.005)

-0.016*
(0.009)
-0.036†
(0.012)

-0.001
(0.005)
0.020†
(0.007)

0.013
(0.022)
-0.042
(0.029)

-0.009
(0.009)
0.021*
(0.011))

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors clustered at the hospital-brand level in parentheses. Coefficients estimated from pooled
specifications (3.1). The dependent variable ln(Price) is the logged transaction price measured
at the hospital-brand-month-year. Matched characteristics include number of beds, Medicare and
Medicaid share of discharges, teaching status, non-profit ownership, HMO penetration, and log inputs
(FTEs and technologies) and outputs (admissions) as in Dranove and Lindrooth (2003). All price
specifications include hospital-brand and brand-month-year fixed-effects.
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A.4. Generalizability
The matching exercises described in Appendix A.3 focus on selecting the best comparison
groups for our in-sample mergers to ensure internal validity. Here, we conduct multiple
exercises aimed at testing the generalizability of our findings. Table 20 shows estimates for
our main merger specification from equation (3.1), with sample treated hospitals re-weighted
to match the national distribution of treated hospitals on various observable characteristics.
Panel A presents our main estimates from Table 7 for reference.
Panel B of Table 20 displays the same results, where we have re-weighted the sample to
match the national distribution of merging hospital bed sizes. To put this in perspective,
Figure 13 displays the raw distribution of beds across targets and acquirers in our main
regression sample (column (4) of Table 4) and in the overall AHA survey during 2009-2015
(column (2) of Table 4). The raw distributions are somewhat different: PriceGuide hospitals
tend to be larger than average, but the mergers we observe in the PriceGuide data span the
support of those in the overall AHA. Panel C of Table 20 alternatively re-weights our sample
treated hospital to match the national distribution of targets and acquirers by teaching and
non-profit status; recall from Table 4 that the PriceGuide sample treated hospitals are more
likely than merging hospitals in the full AHA to be non-profit, and more likely to be teaching
hospitals.
Re-weighting our sample targets and acquirers as described above, we find that the average
merger, nationwide, may have a slightly smaller effect for targets’ PPI prices than the average
merger in the PriceGuide sample. However, no result is statistically different from our main
results in Panel A.
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Table 20: Merger Treatment Effects – Re-weighting for Generalizability

Panel A: Baseline Weighting
Non-PPIs
PPIs

Targets

Acquirers

-0.006
(0.008)
-0.034†
(0.010)

-0.004
(0.004)
0.017†
(0.006)

Panel B: Re-weighted by Bed Quintiles
Non-PPIs

-0.004
(0.008)
PPIs
-0.026**
(0.011)
Panel C: Re-weighted by Teaching X Non-Profit Ownership
Non-PPIs
0.002
(0.009)
PPIs
-0.029†
(0.011)

-0.000
(0.004)
0.017†
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.016†
(0.006)

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors clustered at the hospital-brand level in parentheses. Coefficients estimated from pooled
specifications (3.1). The dependent variable ln(P rice) is the logged transaction price measured
at the hospital-brand-month-year. All specifications include hospital-brand and brand-month-year
fixed-effects. Panel B: observations in each quintile of PriceGuide bed size distribution reweighted
by proportion of AHA hospitals in same quintile. Panel C: observations in each teachingXnon-profit
combination in PriceGuide data reweighted by proportion of AHA hospitals in same teachingXnonprofit combination.
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Figure 13: Distribution of Beds by Treatment Type

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data and AHA Annual Survey. Each panel displays a histogram
for the number of beds at each treated hospital.
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A.5. Quantity Effects – Details
In this Appendix, we broadly consider “quantity” effects that may have implications for
welfare or for the validity of our research design.
Composition of products purchased: First, an important issue for thinking about the
welfare effects of mergers is whether they impact the composition of products purchased.
Here, we estimate the following specification:
τ −1
Br
Br
Br
BrandShruh,τ
+1 = βu ∗ 1 {T reated}h + θug + uh

τ −1
where BrandShruh,τ
+1 is the market share one year post-merger (y = τh + 1) of brands

in UMDNS code u that were purchased by hospital h in the year before the merger (y =
τh − 1); 1 {T reated}h is a dummy for the hospital being involved in a merger, as opposed
Br are UMDNS-by-match group fixed effects. Intuitively,
to being a matched control; and θug

this specification asks whether and how merging hospitals changed the set of brands they
purchased around the time of acquisition, relative to a set of matched controls. It leverages
τ −1
similar identifying variation as in Section 3.4, but the fact that BrandShruh,τ
−1 = 1 (by

definition) implies that a differences-in-differences that replaces price on the left-hand side
τ −1
would essentially collapse to this cross-sectional
of specification (3.1) with BrandShruhmy

specification.
The results are shown in Appendix Table 21. Interestingly, we find that brand switching is
significantly less likely for merging hospitals than for matched controls, with similar results
for targets and acquirers. For context, in τ + 1, 51 percent of hospital purchases by matched
controls are accounted for by products each hospital purchased in τ − 1.
Purchase volume: Second, we examined the effect of mergers on purchase volume,
motivated by the logic that targets may have enjoyed price reductions due to increases in
their quantity purchased rather than changes in negotiated prices. In Appendix Figure 14
and Appendix Table 22, we report the results of differences-in-differences specifications with
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Table 21: τ + 1 Market Share of Products Purchased in τ − 1

shjt|t=τ +1,j∈Jτ −1

Dependent Variable:
Non-PPIs
Treated

PPIs
Treated
Fixed Effects
Treatment

0.250†
(0.022)

0.207†
(0.020)

0.242†
(0.020)

0.245†
(0.015)

θg
Targets

θg
Acquirers

Notes: Table displays point estimates and standard errors from estimation of specification
τ −1
BrandShruh,τ
+1 on a dummy for merging hospitals and UMDNS-by-match group fixed effects.
Pooled product class-level estimates shown here. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors, clustered at the match-group, in parentheses.

ln(Quhy ) as the dependent variable for each product category, and for all categories in each
product class, respectively. The results are quite noisy, with both large positive and large
negative point estimates (which are rarely statistically significant). The summary results
mostly suggest that there is no consistent effect of mergers on volume of supplies purchased.
One exception is a finding that acquirers purchase approximately 13 percent more nonPPI product post-merger, which is primarily driven by a large result for intraocular lenses.
Importantly, comparing Figure 14 to Figure 4, we do not find evidence that savings are
correlated with quantity effects.
Table 22: Merger Treatment Effects on Purchase Quantity

Dependent Variable: ln(Quhmy )
Non-PPIs
PPIs

Targets

Acquirers

0.030
(0.061)
0.044
(0.066)

0.130***
(0.035)
0.006
(0.036)

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. Regression coefficients from pooled version of
specification (3.1), replacing price as the dependent variable with ln(Q): the logged purchase quantity
measured at the hospital-category-month-year level. Point estimates shown are for post-merger year
τh +1. All specifications include category-hospital and category-month-year fixed-effects. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01 with standard errors clustered at hospital level.
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Figure 14: Merger Treatment Effects on Purchase Quantity

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. Regression coefficients from specification (3.1), replacing
price as the dependent variable with ln(Q): the logged purchase quantity measured at the hospital-categorymonth-year level. Point estimates shown are for post-merger year τh + 1. All specifications include categoryhospital and category-month-year fixed-effects. Bars indicate 95% confidence interval with standard errors
clustered at category-hospital level. Left panel: Targets. Right panel: Acquirers. Circular/green markers:
non-PPIs. Triangular/orange markers: PPIs.

Sample attrition: Lastly, we investigate whether there is nonrandom attrition in our
sample. For example, if merging hospitals are more likely to disappear from our sample after
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a merger takes place, then the price treatment effects we estimate may be systematically
biased upward or downward. Here, we estimate the following specification:
G
InP Gh,τ +1 = β InP G ∗ 1 {T reated}h + θgInP G + InP
h

where InP Gh,τ +1 is a dummy for hospital h appearing in the PriceGuide data one year
post-merger (y = τh + 1); 1 {T reated}h is a dummy for the hospital being involved in a
merger, as opposed to being a matched control; and θgInP G are match group fixed effects.
We also estimate a similar regression for InP Gh,τ to investigate attrition in the merger year.
In a manner similar to the brand switching regressions above, this specification asks whether
merging hospitals were more likely to disappear from the PriceGuide database post-merger,
relative to a set of matched controls.4
The top panel of Appendix Table 23 shows the results. To give a sense of magnitudes,
matched controls have an overall attrition rate of 16.5 percent across our target and acquirer
samples by τ + 1. We find that there is no differential attrition of target hospitals relative
to matched controls, and slightly less attrition of acquirers than of matched controls, in the
merger year τ . However, in the post-merger year τ + 1, there is a jump in differential target
attrition. The baseline attrition rate for target controls is 13.7 percent, indicating that
targets have a τ + 1 attrition rate of approximately 28 percent. Further investigation reveals
that this is primarily driven by differential post-merger attrition of targets in the last merger
year in our sample (i.e., we are missing more target data in 2015, meaning we are missing
more post-merger data for mergers taking place in 2014). The bottom panel of Appendix
Table 23 shows the same specification as in the top panel, but excluding 2014 mergers;
the target treatment effect is much smaller and no longer significant. Conversations with
our data provider indicate that data are generally submitted with a lag, so this differential
attrition may be driven by a longer delay in data submission for targets post-merger.
4

The estimation sample for these regressions are all treated and matched control hospitals appearing
in the PriceGuide data in τ − 1, so there are more hospitals in the regression samples than for the price
specifications.
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Table 23: Evidence on Differential Attrition of Merging Hospitals

Dependent Variable:
All Mergers in PriceGuide
τh

1{In PriceGuide Data at t = X }
-0.011
(0.036)

0.027*
(0.016)

-0.140**
(0.063)

0.042
(0.033)

50
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-0.016
(0.043)

-0.009
(0.024)

τh + 1

-0.064
(0.061)

0.022
(0.040)

Ntar /Nacq
Fixed Effects
Treatment

36
θgInP G
Targets

67
θgInP G
Acquirers

τh + 1

Ntar /Nacq
Excluding 2014 Mergers
τh

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors clustered at the match-group in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator for
whether or not the hospital remained in the PriceGuide data by t = {τ, τ + 1}. All specifications
include fixed-effects for the match-group.

Such delays are problematic for our price regressions if they are correlated with price trends;
e.g., if targets that obtain large discounts upon merging no longer prioritize access to
PriceGuide. To investigate this phenomenon, Appendix Table 24 below estimates the same
regressions as in Table 7, but excluding 2014 mergers. The results are very similar with and
without 2014 mergers, with the exception that excluding 2014 mergers causes the acquirer
PPI effect to be smaller and no longer significant.
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Table 24: Main Price Regressions Excluding 2014 Mergers
ln(P rice)uhjmy

Dependent Variable:
Non-PPIs
PPIs

Fixed Effects:
Treatment:

-0.004
(0.009)
-0.032†
(0.010)

0.010
(0.014)
-0.035†
(0.010)

θuhj + θjmy
θuh + θjmy
Targets

-0.008
(0.005)
0.004
(0.008)

-0.007
(0.007)
0.006
(0.007)

θuhj + θjmy
θuh + θjmy
Acquirers

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors clustered at the hospital-brand level in parentheses. Coefficients estimated from pooled
specifications (1) and (2). The dependent variable ln(Price) is the logged transaction price
measured at the hospital-brand-month-year. All price specifications include brand-month-year fixed
effects.
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A.6. Deriving Estimated Savings from Treatment Effects
A main object of interest for this study is the estimated yearly savings a hospital might
experience given the treatment effects we observe. In order to generate these numbers, we
calculate average yearly savings for class C as:

save
dC =

X

β̂u ∗ (spenduhy|y<τh ),

u∈C

where βu represents the target- or acquirer-specific treatment effect for UMDNS code u and
(spenduhy|y<τh ) is the target- or acquirer-specific pre-merger average yearly spending per
hospital. We aggregate these across categories within product class C to obtain estimates
of average yearly savings for target and acquirer hospitals. Table 25 shows the details for
these estimates.
Alternatively, we could calculate estimated savings by broad product class using total
average spending across UMDNS codes and the pooled estimates from our stacked regressions
presented in Table 7. Table 26 shows the details for these estimates.
To clarify the source of the difference between the two approaches, note that Table 7 presents
the treatment effect estimates from our stacked regressions, where β is estimated by pooling
all UMDNS codes in a given class and weighting observations by average annual spending on
each category.5 The covariance between spending and βu across product categories generates
the differences between our two methods of calculating total implied savings.

5

Results are similar if we instead simply average the category-specific coefficients in Table 25, weighting
each coefficient by average annual spending.
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Table 25: Estimated Savings Using Within-Brand Merger Effects
Targets
Acquirers
βu
save
du
βu
save
du
spendu
spendu
Nylon Sutures
8,999
0.038†
-341†
15,549
0.001
-14
Bone Wires
21,459
0.025
-537
18,124
0.002
-27
Surgical Drapes
34,507
0.011
-391
31,987
-0.026
847
Tracheal Tubes
26,843
-0.220*
5,894*
39,192
0.083
-3,266
Trocars
72,804
-0.039
2,863
80,086
-0.002
193
Suture Anchors
62,562
0.025
-1,580
98,318
-0.000
26
Drill Bits
65,296
-0.001
92
81,434
-0.027**
2,176**
Electrosurgical Forceps
100,609
-0.018
1,778
155,306
-0.032
5,024
Polymeric Mesh
89,673
-0.147†
13,216†
148,059
0.000
-38
Allografts
121,461
-0.087†
10,585†
170,192
0.015
-2,552
Bone Nails
149,845
-0.050*
7,537*
132,104
0.002
-291
Spinal Bone Plates
184,493
0.026
-4,822
153,061 -0.044**
6,670**
Trauma Bone Plates
135,915 -0.032**
4,387**
133,282
-0.026†
3,502†
Embolization Coil
126,795
0.133
-16,805
190,202
0.058** -11,070**
Surgical Staplers
161,796
-0.003
525
163,854
-0.005
785
Bone Implant Putty
207,381
0.030
-6,279
152,812 -0.020**
3,045**
Guiding Cath.
201,432
-0.023
4,664
186,996
0.026*
-4,795*
Ablation/Mapping Cath.
491,229
0.015
-7,346
398,176
-0.011
4,501
Guide Wires
225,899
-0.016
3,536
247,702
0.003
-787
Trauma Bone Screws
174,039
-0.011
1,928
231,470
-0.029†
6,816†
Bone Grafts
275,187
0.000
-99
352,701
-0.001
457
Spinal Bone Screws
783,374
0.026
-19,996
716,334
-0.020
14,034
Non-PPI Total
3,721,599
-1,193
3,896,942
25,235
Intraocular Lenses
0.046
85,130
-0.001
100
112,267
-0.003
291
Spinal Rod Implants
0.094
84,839
0.041
-3,520
78,096
0.011
-850
Mammary Prosth.
0.039
198,467
-0.062†
12,314†
266,688
0.004
-1,119
Spinal Stimulators
0.052
514,980
0.026
-13,133
379,773
0.017**
-6,368**
Acetabular Hip Prosth.
0.115
212,804
-0.058
12,372
191,340
0.054** -10,422**
Cardiac Valve Prosth.
0.071
419,883
-0.006
2,406
440,065
0.007
-3,068
Aortic Stents
0.029
370,289
-0.020
7,375
429,992
0.066
-28,520
Pacemakers
0.068
549,356
-0.093†
51,327†
481,747
0.009
-4,571
Tibial Knee Prosth.
0.080
416,882
-0.014
5,966
305,852
-0.006
1,864
Femoral Hip Prosth.
0.095
472,522
-0.074
34,824
351,485
-0.008
2,959
Cardioverter Defib.
0.046
816,792 -0.074** 60,589**
720,423
0.034** -24,265**
Resynchronization Defib.
0.052
852,969
-0.058
49,264
719,977
0.002
-1,625
Femoral Knee Prosth.
0.071
542,193
-0.053†
28,730†
415,035
0.014
-5,993
Spinal Spacers
0.057
596,326
0.028
-16,494
543,893
0.010
-5,456
Drug Eluting Stents
0.038
1,436,850
0.012
-16,526
1,140,904 0.025†
-28,336†
PPI Total
7,570,282
215,595†
6,577,537
-115,478†
Grand Total
11,291,881
214,402†
10,474,480
-90,243†
Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. Estimated savings numbers calculating by totaling
expected savings across product categories as described in Appendix A.6. Giniuh|jmy presents Gini coefficient
for the product category u, for prices calculated across hospitals within product-month and averaged across
product-months. spendu presents the average pre-merger spending for target and acquirer hospitals. βu
presents the merger treatment effect as estimated from equation (3.1) and SE presents the corresponding
standard error, clustered at the hospital-brand level. save
d u denotes the estimated savings per hospital year
based on βu and the pre-merger spending levels.
Giniuh|jmy
0.064
0.127
0.080
0.146
0.094
0.070
0.083
0.123
0.061
0.054
0.066
0.077
0.049
0.038
0.080
0.052
0.090
0.069
0.086
0.079
0.043
0.097
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Table 26: Estimated Savings Using Pooled Coefficients
Targets

Acquirers
GiniCh|jmy
Non-PPI Total
PPI Total
Grand Total

0.079
0.064

spendC

βC

3,721,599 -0.006
7,570,282 -0.034†
11,291,881

save
dC

spendC

βC

save
dC

23,600
260,895†
284,494†

3,896,942
6,577,537
10,474,480

-0.004
0.017†

16,541
-111,772†
-95,230**

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. Estimated savings numbers calculating by totaling
average yearly spending across product categories and applying treatment effect estimates from equation (3.1)
as described in Appendix A.6. GiniCh|jmy presents Gini coefficient for product class C, for prices calculated
across hospitals within product-month and averaged across product-months. spendC presents the average
pre-merger spending for target and acquirer hospitals. βC presents the merger treatment effect as estimated
from equation (3.1) and SE presents the corresponding standard error, clustered at the hospital-brand level.
save
d C denotes the estimated savings per hospital year based on βC and the pre-merger spending levels.
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A.7. Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 15: Merger Treatment Effects – Event Studies, Non-PPIs
Panel A: Targets
(a) Average Prices

(b) Estimated Treatment Effect

Panel B: Acquirers
(c) Average Prices

(d) Estimated Treatment Effect

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. The left panels present the raw average price for treated
hospitals and matched controls, adjusted for the composition of products using a product-category-brand
fixed-effect. The right panels present regression coefficients from pooled event study version of specifications
(3.1), each month within one year of merger year τh . Hold-out date is December of last pre-merger year; all
coefficients represented relative to pre-merger year mean. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval with
standard errors clustered by hospital-brand.
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Figure 16: Merger Treatment Effects for Targets – Event Studies using Alternative Timing
Supports
(a) Non-PPIs, τh − 2 to τh + 1

(b) Non-PPIs, τh − 1 to τh + 2

(c) PPIs, τh − 2 to τh + 1

(d) PPIs, τh − 1 to τh + 2

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. Regression coefficients from pooled event study
specifications, focusing on targets. Hold-out date is December of last pre-merger year; all coefficients
represented relative to pre-merger year mean. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval with standard errors
clustered by hospital-brand. Circles indicate results for non-PPIs; triangles indicate results for PPIs. Left
panels: the estimated series using data from two years prior to merger (τh − 2) through one year after (τh + 1).
Right panels: estimates using data from one year prior to the merger (τh − 1) through two years after (τh + 2).
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Figure 17: Merger Treatment Effects For Acquirers – Event Studies using Alternative Timing
Supports
(a) Non-PPIs, τh − 2 to τh + 1

(b) Non-PPIs, τh − 1 to τh + 2

(c) PPIs, τh − 2 to τh + 1

(d) PPIs, τh − 1 to τh + 2

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. Regression coefficients from pooled event study
specifications, focusing on acquirers. Hold-out date is December of last pre-merger year; all coefficients
represented relative to pre-merger year mean. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval with standard errors
clustered by hospital-brand. Circles indicate results for non-PPIs; triangles indicate results for PPIs. Left
panels: the estimated series using data from two years prior to merger (τh − 2) through one year after (τh + 1).
Right panels: estimates using data from one year prior to the merger (τh − 1) through two years after (τh + 2).
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Table 27: Merger Treatment Effects – Alternative Samples

Panel A: Baseline sample
Non-PPIs
(Ntar = 33, Nacq = 85)
PPIs
(Ntar = 29, Nacq = 74)
Panel B: Using only post-join data
Non-PPIs
(Ntar = 23, Nacq = 47)
PPIs
(Ntar = 26, Nacq = 54)
Panel C: No additional mergers from τ − 2
Non-PPIs
(Ntar = 28, Nacq = 69)
PPIs
(Ntar = 25, Nacq = 58)

Targets

Acquirers

-0.006
(0.008)
-0.034†
(0.010)

-0.004
(0.004)
0.017†
(0.006)

-0.019**
(0.008)
-0.039†
(0.012)
to τ + 1
-0.006
(0.009)
-0.025**
(0.013)

0.006
(0.005)
0.022†
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.021†
(0.006)

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors clustered at the hospital-brand level in parentheses. Coefficients estimated from pooled
specifications (3.1). The dependent variable ln(P rice) is the logged transaction price measured at
the hospital-brand-month-year. All specifications include hospital-brand and brand-month-year
fixed-effects. Panel B restricts the sample to only data after which hospitals obtained access to the
database. Panel C restricts the sample to include only hospitals which did not experience a prior
merger for at least 2 years before the current merger (τ − 2), and which did not experience a
subsequent merger in τ + 1.
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Table 28: Merger Treatment Effects on Price – Alternative Timing
Targets

Acquirers

Using years τ − 1 to τ + 1, β only
Non-PPIs
(Ntar = 33, Nacq = 85)
PPIs
(Ntar = 29, Nacq = 74)

-0.006
(0.008)
-0.034†
(0.010)

-0.004
(0.004)
0.017†
(0.006)

Using years τ − 1 to τ + 1, α = β
Non-PPIs
(Ntar = 33, Nacq = 85)
PPIs
(Ntar = 29, Nacq = 74)

-0.003
(0.006)
-0.032†
(0.009)

0.003
(0.003)
0.007*
(0.004)

Using years τ − 2 to τ + 1, β only
Non-PPIs
(Ntar = 16, Nacq = 43)
PPIs
(Ntar = 18, Nacq = 50)

-0.027**
(0.011)
-0.055†
(0.014)

-0.011**
(0.006)
0.003
(0.007)

Using years τ − 1 to τ + 2, β only
Non-PPIs
(Ntar = 21, Nacq = 39)
PPIs
(Ntar = 25, Nacq = 41)

-0.006
(0.009)
-0.039†
(0.011)

-0.012*
(0.007)
0.007
(0.008)

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard
errors clustered at the hospital-brand in parentheses. Coefficients estimated from pooled
specifications (3.1). The dependent variable ln(Price) is the logged transaction price measured at
the hospital-brand-month-year. All specifications include hospital-brand and brand-month-year
fixed-effects.
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Table 29: Merger Treatment Effects on Price – Alternate Standard Errors
Targets

Acquirers

Panel A: Clustered at the Hospital X Product
Non-PPIs
-0.006
(0.008)
PPIs
-0.034†
(0.010)

-0.004
(0.004)
0.017†
(0.006)

Panel B: Clustered at System X UMDNS Code
Non-PPIs
-0.006
(0.009)
PPIs
-0.034†
(0.013)

-0.004
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.008)

Panel C: Clustered at Hospital X Vendor
Non-PPIs
PPIs

-0.006
(0.010)
-0.034**
(0.015)

Panel D: Clustered by Hospital X Product (Wild Bootstrap)
Non-PPIs
-0.006
(-0.018, 0.005)
PPIs
-0.034†
(-0.051, -0.020)

-0.004
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.007)

-0.004
(-0.010, 0.003)
0.017†
(0.008, 0.026)

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Panels
A-C report clustered standard errors in parentheses. Panel D reports 95% confidence intervals
generated from wild bootstrap clustered at the hospital-brand level (n = 1, 000) in parentheses.
Coefficients estimated from pooled specifications (3.1). The dependent variable ln(Price) is the
logged transaction price measured at the hospital-brand-month-year. All specifications include
hospital-brand and brand-month-year fixed-effects.
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434
0.945

-0.011
(0.013)

θh + θt
Targets

109
0.921

0.018
(0.024)

PriceGuide
Full Sample,
Hospitals,
2009-2015
2009-2015

33
0.953

-0.011
(0.046)

PriceGuide
Hospitals,
Full
Support,
2009-2015

964
0.944

0.011
(0.007)

θh + θt
Acquirers

225
0.935

0.008
(0.011)

PriceGuide
Full Sample,
Hospitals,
2009-2015
2009-2015

ln(HCRIS Cost)

86
0.936

-0.002
(0.021)

PriceGuide
Hospitals,
Full
Support,
2009-2015

Notes: Authors’ calculations from HCRIS data. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, † p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the
hospital level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the CMI adjusted operating cost per patient, calculated from the
HCRIS as described in Schmitt (2017). Following the regressions in the main text, we match each merging hospital to its
10 nearest non-merging neighbors using Mahalanobis distance. All specifications include hospital and year fixed effects.

Fixed Effects
Treatment

Ntar/acq
R-Squared

Sample

Dependent Variable:

Table 30: Cost Regressions Using the HCRIS Measure

Figure 18: Relationship Between Vendor HHI and Treatment Effect
(b) Acquirers

(a) Targets

Notes: Authors’ calculations from PriceGuide data. Each point represents the estimated within-brand
treatment effect from equation (3.1).
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A.8. Example “Request for Proposals” (RFP)
This section contains excerpts from an example RFP from a large group employer. Figure
19 shows the list of plan requirements. Notably, requirement 5 requires the bidding insurer
to replicate the benefits of existing plans exactly.
Figure 20 shows the level of claims data insurers receive when submitting bids to contract
with employers. In this case, the insurer received data for six years of claims history. For
the most recent years, they also received a listing of the most expensive conditions and
procedures. Finally, Figure 21 further shows the level of detail that insurers receive on
enrollment and characteristics of employees for setting premiums.
Figure 19: Plan Requirements
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Figure 20: Claims History

154

Figure 21: Enrollment Census
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A.9. The Form 5500
A.9.1. Identifying Insurer Groups
While the Form 5500 contains information about insurers, that information contains
measurement error. Primarily this comes from two sources. First, insurer IDs are recorded
using the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ company codes. However, these
codes have a many-to-one mapping to insurance carriers. Second, forms submitted prior to
2009 were not submitted electronically. Available data from this time period was digitized,
resulting in transcription errors. The data also include a text field containing the name
of the carrier. This field is also subject to transcription errors, but provides an additional
source of information to verify insurer identifiers. In order to properly group codes into
insurance carriers, I implement the following procedure:
1. Match insurers to NAIC group codes using their NAIC company code and directories
published by NAIC for 2004-2018
2. Based on insurer names of successful matches, perform string matching
3. Reconcile conflicts from steps (1) and (2)
4. I perform a small number of manual assignments based on obvious mappings missed by
string matching (e.g. “Connecticut General” and “Cigna” do not pass string matching,
but are in fact the same company).
A.9.2. Measuring Employer Size
In order to construct a standardized measure of premiums, I must construct a measure of
employer size that will allow me to express premiums in terms of dollars per covered life year.
Firms can fluctuate substantially in size from 2001-2018. While the cleanest approach would
be to focus on firms that remain a consistent size over the study period, such a restriction
would severely limit the size and generalizability of the sample.
The combined 5500 base form and Schedule A contain three separate variables that serve
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to measure the number of plan participants. These variables are the most consistently
reported, and most closely capture the relevant employer size for the purpose of standardizing
premiums. I denote them here as:
• N boy : Line 6a(1) of the Base Form 5500 reports the total number of active participants
at the beginning of the plan year.

This number reflects the number of enrolled

employees across all schedule A filings attached to a given base form.
• N eoy : Line 6a(2) of the Base Form 5500 reports the total number of active participants
at the end of the plan year. This number reflects the number of enrolled employees
across all schedule A filings attached to a given base form.
• N cov : Line 1e of the Schedule A reports the “approximate number of persons covered
at end of policy or contract year.”
N cov is the measure that closely captures the relevant employer size for computing average
per-member premiums. However, it is clear from the data and documentation that reporting
is inconsistent. In a preparer’s manual for the 5500, Fisher and Anderson note that “The
DOL says dependents should be included in the count reported on line 1e (name of N cov
variable), although whether dependents are include or excluded in the data provided by an
insurance company varies depending on the carrier’s own internal procedures. Generally,
preparers simply use the information provided by the insurance company without further
analysis. Dependents are not counted for any other purposes on the Form 5500 or its
schedules” (parentheses mine). Patterns in the data indicate that not only does reporting
vary across insurers, but also within insurer-employer dyads over time.
A straightforward solution would be to simply rely on the N boy and N eoy variables. There
are two issues with this approach. First, employers often report several policies as part of
a “wrap plan,” including separate contracts for life insurance, stand-alone dental plans, and
other benefits. In these cases, the correspondence of N boy and N eoy will depend greatly
on the existence and relative size of other plans offered by the employer. Second, even
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restricting to health plans where N cov and N eoy align closely will generally bias premium
measures upward across all plans.
To solve this issue, I implement the following approach.
1. Identify observations of N cov that definitely represent enrollment because N cov >>
N act . In this step, I also manually reviewed cases representing outliers or marginal
cases. I exclude 86 employers for whom enrollment was not sufficiently clear in all
years of their panel.
2. For observations where N cov >> N act , I calculate the ratio of N cov /N act and apply
the nearest ratio (in time) to adjust each non-enrollment observation.
Additional detail regarding premium measurement are included in the following section.
A.9.3. Measuring Premiums
Figure 22 shows the measure of average premiums from the Form 5500 from 2011-2018.
Comparable measures from CMS are available through MLR filings for 2011-2017. Data
from the KFF-EHBS represent the national average and show that in early years, the Form
5500 produces premiums that are within a reasonable range for each year.
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Figure 22: Average Premiums Benchmarked to Published Data

Notes Figure shows adjusted premiums from the final series, along with data from the
CMS MLR filings for Massachusetts, and national average premiums for the KFF-EHBS.
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A.10. Generalizability
In this section, I present a number of exercises designed to assess the generalizability of the
sample used for analysis.
A.10.1. Self-Insurance and Firm Size
As discussed in Section 4.2, the employer panel I use does not contain self-insured employers.
Self-insured employers are required to submit a Form 5500 filing, though they do so via
financial information about the trust through which benefits or third-party administrators
are paid.

This typically makes it difficult to identify the insurer who provides their

administrative services, as the administrative fees are sometimes paid out of the general
assets of the employer rather than the trust.

Self-insured employers also tend to be

disproportionately large firms with many locations, all of whom may file the 5500 under
a common tax identifier. These filings make it difficult or impossible to determine which
of the insurance contracts correspond with different local markets. Although this feature of
the data potentially limits my ability to speak to the full landscape of employer-sponsored
insurance, there are several reasons to expect that my findings will generalize to larger
self-insured firms.
Both the unavailability of data on self-insured employers and the restrictions on multistate employers have the potential to bias the results of the counterfactuals.

If large

and/or self-insured employers have drastically different underlying costs and preferences, the
counterfactuals will less accurately reflect the true equilibrium premium the public option
would offer.
Prior work has found that levels and trends in premiums match closely between the fully and
self-insured markets, and self-insured employers typically contract with the same insurers
to provide administrative services only (ASO) contracts (Altman 2020). In Panel (a) of
figure 23, I reproduce analysis from Altman (2020), using data from the KFF-EHBS to plot
average premiums between self and fully insured employers. Levels and trends of premiums
in the self-insured market are broadly similar and have followed similar trends over the past
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Figure 23: Premiums and Market Shares in the Self-Insured Market
(a) Average Premiums

(b) Market Shares

Notes: Panel A shows average premiums for self-insured and fully-insured plans. Data come from the KFF
Employer Health Benefits Survey. All estimates calculated using the provided employer weights. Panel B shows
the market shares of insurers in the fully insured market and the market for self-insured (ASO), using data from
HealthLeaders Interstudy.

two decades.
Self-insured employers bear the risk of underlying claims, however, they contract with health
insurers to provide networks, utilization management, and claims processing. Panel (b) of
figure 23 shows the market shares of health insurers in the Massachusetts fully insured and
ASO markets using data from HealthLeaders Interstudy. National insurers tend to play a
larger role in the ASO market in Massachusetts. However, in at least some cases national
insurers who wish to operate in the state do so by renting their network from local players
(Wojcik 2004). Since the network is a, – if not the – primary source of product differentiation
across insurers, I interpret this as evidence that employers in the self-insured market face
the same market for differentiated services as those in the large group market.
The primary concern for the counterfactuals is whether between-insurer variation in costs
is substantially different across these groups. While cost is not readily observable, the
KFF-EHBS contains measures of premiums, firm size, and insurance type for a nationally
representative sample of firms.

Table 31 displays the mean, standard deviation, and

coefficient of variation in premiums for fully and self-insured firms across the distribution of
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Table 31: Between Employer Premium Variation by Employer Size
Number of Employees
50-199
200-999

3-49

1,000-4,999

Panel A: All Employers
Mean Premiums
SD
SD/Mean
N

7,390
(2,560)
0.346
270

7,085
(2,241)
0.316
265

7,346
(2,111)
0.287
442

7,392
(1,788)
0.242
688

Panel B: Fully Insured
Mean Premiums
SD
SD/Mean
N

7,560
(2,552)
0.337
231

7,008
(2,257)
0.322
201

6,982
(1,987)
0.285
207

7,404
(1,876)
0.253
104

Panel C: Self Insured
Mean Premiums
SD
SD/Mean
N

5,901
(2,140)
0.363
39

7,450
(2,146)
0.288
64

7,712
(2,173)
0.282
235

7,389
(1,768)
0.239
584

Notes: Calculations based on the 2019 KFF-EHBS. All calculations made using the provided survey weights.

firm size. Nearly all subgroups appear to have similar patterns in terms of premium levels
of variation across firms. Small (3-49 employee) self-insured firms appear to be an outlier.
Because these firms operate in the small group market, where premiums are community
rated, this could be the result of selection into self-insurance by firms with below average
costs. However, I also note that the number of firms in this cell is small and has the potential
to be less representative.
A.10.2. Restriction on Estimation Sample
In addition to the cleaning rules discussed in Section 4.2 and Appendix A.9, I apply two
restrictions to the estimation sample, which are required for identification of the demand
model. First, I restricted to employers who have a minimum panel length of three years.
Second, I condition on employers who switch at least once. These restrictions reduce the
sample substantially. Employer panels may be incomplete due to entry, attrition, or a variety
of data quality issues. In this section, I perform a number of exercises aimed at assessing
the generalizability concerns associated with these restrictions.
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First, Table 32 shows the count of employers remaining after each of the restrictions. The
data contain limited direct information on characteristics of the employers. However, the
these restrictions do not substantially alter the distribution of employer size. The final
sample is more likely to choose HPHC and less likely to choose BCBS than the baseline
sample. Since BCBS is the most preferred insurer, there will be more choice sequences of
three consecutive years with BCBS than the other insurers. Therefore, conditioning on a
switch fundamentally lowers the probability the expected market share for BCBS.
Table 32: Estimation Restrictions and Sample Size

Baseline Sample
Has 3+ Years
Ever Switches
Both

N

Average of
Covered
Lives

Share
BCBS

Share
HPHC

Share
Tufts

1,051
744
605
384

468
479
474
475

0.680
0.583
0.590
0.488

0.112
0.156
0.152
0.198

0.119
0.154
0.150
0.195

Second, to analyze the role of entry in determining panel length, I compare trends in the
number of firms who file a 5500 to the the subset of firms who are likely to fully insure through
the large group market and meet the filing threshold of 100 employees. I benchmark these
numbers using the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS) data focusing on
the number of firms in Massachusetts with 100-999 employees – the category most of firms
that are are likely to participate in the large group market. In both datasets, the number
of firms the number of firms who are likely to purchase fully insured products, and who
meet the filing thresholds for the 5500 follow similar trends. The 5500 consistently contains
approximately one third the number of firms in this category.
Third, because switches occur infrequently, there is a strong relationship between the
probability that a firm switches and the length of time they are observed in the data. Figure
25 shows the relationship between the probability of observing a switch for an employer and
the length of their panel in the data. Longer panels provide more opportunity to observe
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Figure 24: Count of firms in the 5500 data

Notes Figures show number of firms in the 5500 and the number of firms in Massachusetts
with 100-1,000 employees based on the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamic Statistics
(BDS).

a switch. Therefore, employers who are not ever observed making a switch, may simple
be in the data for shorter amounts of time, rather than this condition reflecting differences
in the employers’ underling preferences. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, I estimate
a regression to predict attrition as a function of whether or not a switch is ever observed
in the data. Because observing a switch is more likely the longer an employer remains in
the data, I include fixed effects for the year in which the employer entered the data and
the year of the data. Column (1) presents the baseline relationship between whether an
employer has previously switched insurers by time t, and an indicator for whether the has
exited the data by year t. Column (2) includes fixed effects for the year and cohort-year
of the employer. Column (3), which includes an interaction between year and cohort-year
most flexibly controls for the increased likelihood of observing a switch in longer panels. In
both Columns (2) and (3), I find no evidence that switchers are more likely to attrit from
the data.
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Figure 25: Probability of observing a switch and panel length

Table 33: Switching Behavior and Attrition
Dependent Variable:

Out of the Data in Year t

Has Switched
Before t

0.167∗∗∗
(0.025)

0.008
(0.029)

-0.004
(0.029)

Fixed Effects
N
Ni

None
21,220
1,051

Cohort + Year
21,220
1,051

Cohort X Year
21,220
1,051
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A.11. Testing for State-Dependence
A.11.1. Properties of Choice Sequences
I explore the panel structure of the data to provide evidence of switching costs using a
semi-parametric approach. Consider an employer i with random utility over j ∈ J insurers.
Any sequence of three choices can be partitioned into five mutually exclusive, collectively
exhaustive categories:
• A1: Stay, Stay
• A2: Stay, Switch
• A3: Switch, Stay
• A4: Switch, Return
• A5: Switch, Switch
These categories provide a way to assess the degree of state-dependence in the data, by
comparing the prevalence of sequences containing the exact same set of choices, but different
numbers of switches.
To illustrate the logic, consider an employer who enters the market and chooses between two
insurers. Using superscript ĥ = {h, −h} to denote whether insurer j is the “home” insurer
(the one i chose in the prior period).
shij > s−h
ij , when there are switching costs and
shij = s−h
ij , when there are no switching costs.
Each probability Pi (A2) and Pi (A4) can be written as the sum of sequence probabilities
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that would result in each type of sequence.
ρi = Pi (A4)/Pi (A2)
=

−h
−h −h −h
shi1 s−h
i2 si1 + si2 si1 si2

(A.1)

!

−h h −h
shi1 shi1 s−h
i2 + si2 si2 si1

,

As long as an employer’s preferences for insurers are constant over time, ρi will be exactly
one in the absence of switching costs, and strictly less than one when there are switching
costs. This result is not sensitive to initial conditions, and can be performed using the the
full set of consecutive choices in the data, regardless of choices preceding each sequence. The
sequence probabilities for a consumer who chose insurer j prior to the sequence are:
−h h −h
Pi (A2) = shij shij s−h
ik + sik sik sij
−h
−h −h −h
Pi (A4) = shij s−h
ik sij + sik sij sik .

The sequence probabilities for a consumer who chose insurer 2 prior to the sequence can be
written symmetrically. The key insight is that each of these sequences contains the same set
of products, but the sequences that contribute to A4 always involve an additional switch
relative to their brand-matched counterparts in A2. In the absence of switching costs, the
sequence probabilities will be the same, and switching costs will always tend to drive ρ
below 1. This property also holds for any pair of two insurers, and therefore accommodates
a choice set of any size because a ρi with a larger choice set simply involves summing all of
the equivalent terms for each pairwise combination of jk. In the case of three insurers:

ρi =

−h −h
−h
−h −h −h
−h
−h −h −h
−h
s−h
ij sik (sij + sik ) + sij sil (sij + sil ) + sik sil (sik + sil )
−h h
−h −h h
−h −h h
h
h
h
s−h
ij sik (sij + sik ) + sij sil (sij + sil ) + sik sil (sik + sil )

In the population, the estimated ratio will be the average of ρi over the distribution of
(θ, η). With no state-dependence, ρi = 1 for all individuals, and therefore the population
average of ρ will be 1, regardless of the underlying distribution of time invariant brand
preferences. On the other hand, the presence of positive switching costs in at least some
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part of the population implies that ρi ≤ 1, for all consumers. Since the switching costs drive
ρi below 1 for any individual, the population average of ρ, forms a test that is sufficient
to demonstrate the presence of switching costs. The intuition is the same as adding more
products. The population average ρ is simply involves adding more terms of equation (A.1)
to the numerator and denominator.

ρ = P(A4)/P(A2)
P P
P

i
j∈J
Pk∈J
=P P
i

j∈J

k∈J

sij sij sik
sij sik sij

,

which makes it easy to discern that integrating over the population does not reduce the
strength of the test. Without switching costs, these terms all contribute the same quantity
to the numerator and denominator. The presence of switching costs will add smaller terms
to the numerator than the denominator.
A.11.2. Results
In this section, I provide estimates of ρ using the Form 5500 employer data. I focus on
sequences of three consecutive choices in the data. With this restriction, assuming stable
preferences at the individual level implies that the underlying distribution of preferences in
the population is also fixed.
The main result is an estimated ρ using the full set of three-year sequences, and is reported
in the first two rows of Table 34. The ratio of sequence probabilities imply that employers
are over 18 times more likely to choose a sequence containing one fewer switch, holding the
set of chosen products fixed. Standard errors are generated using bootstrapping over 1, 000
re-samples.
I repeat this exercise on subsets of the data, based on the maturity of the employers’ health
plan. “New Plans” are three-period sequences where the first period is the first observation
for a given employer, and the “plan effective date” reveals that it was the first year that
the employer offered a health plan. The results using “Mature Plans” relies only on the
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Table 34: Semi-parametric Tests of State Dependence in the Employer Panel



P(A4)
P(A2)



ρ
Full Sample

0.053
(0.034, 0.075)

New Plans

0.200
(0.048, 0.404)

Mature Plans

0.042
(0.024, 0.063)

Early Years:
2001-2003
Late Years:
2014-2016
First
Observed Sequence
Randomly
Chosen Sequence

0.097
(0.000, 0.211)
0.051
(0.014, 0.102)
0.108
(0.046, 0.193)
0.048
(0.000, 0.102)

P(A1)

P(A2)

P(A3)

P(A4)

P(A5)

Stay,
Stay

Stay,
Switch

Switch,
Stay

Switch,
Return

Switch,
Switch

0.837
(0.828,
0.846)

0.075
(0.068,
0.082)

0.079
(0.073,
0.086)

0.004
(0.002,
0.006)

0.004
(0.003,
0.006)

0.803
(0.766,
0.845)

0.086
(0.059,
0.114)

0.083
(0.059,
0.110)

0.017
(0.003,
0.031)

0.010
(0.003,
0.021)

0.840
(0.831,
0.850)

0.074
(0.067,
0.081)

0.079
(0.071,
0.086)

0.003
(0.002,
0.005)

0.004
(0.002,
0.005)

0.826
(0.795,
0.857)

0.079
(0.059,
0.102)

0.082
(0.059,
0.105)

0.008
(0.000,
0.015)

0.005
(0.000,
0.010)

0.851
(0.833,
0.867)

0.068
(0.055,
0.081)

0.072
(0.059,
0.084)

0.003
(0.001,
0.007)

0.006
(0.003,
0.009)

0.808
(0.786,
0.831)

0.080
(0.066,
0.098)

0.096
(0.080,
0.112)

0.009
(0.004,
0.015)

0.006
(0.002,
0.011)

0.843
(0.822,
0.865)

0.077
(0.062,
0.093)

0.073
(0.058,
0.088)

0.004
(0.000,
0.007)

0.004
(0.000,
0.007)

complement of these observations. The estimated ρ for new plans is 0.2, which is still
below 1 but substantially higher than estimates generated from other samples.6 While it is
tempting to conclude that new plans are more likely to reverse a switch (choose A4) than
mature plans, none of these estimates are significantly different from each other.
I also produce estimates over different time periods to determine whether the results are
driven by something that is time varying. Because the distribution of preferences is fixed
in all exercises, this result is mainly informative regarding the degree to which the evidence
of switching costs is disproportionately driven by something that is changing over time.
I estimate ρ using a sample of sequences from 2001-2003 and 2014-2016, which provide
6
Switching costs could be lower for new employers if, for example, new plans receive a value from
searching. Such a pattern would suggest that ρ > 1 in the absence of switching costs.
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estimates that are similar to both each other and the main estimates.
Finally, using the full sample of possible sequences produces observations relying on
overlapping observations. A reasonable concern is the degree to which this impacts the
expectation of observed sequences, since these are not independent observations. While I
have not fully explored the analytic properties of this issue, I implement two tests specifically
designed to address it. I measure ρ over the first three observations for each employer. For
employers who offer a health plan for the first time during the sample period, this observation
will be the same one underlying the estimate for new plans. For other employers, this will
be the sequence beginning in the first three-year sequence I observe for each employer. I
also produce an estimate using one sequence per employer, chosen at random. Both of these
exercises produce measures that are qualitatively similar and statistically indistinguishable
from the main results.
Finally, this exercise relies only on the observed choice probabilities and ignores the
contribution of prices. In general, both the empirical exercises in Section 4.2 and the model
in Section 4.3 indicate that prices are weakly lower for choices that result in a switch because
of the dynamics of the invest-harvest motives. Lower prices from switching imply that there
h
may be situations where s−h
ij > sij . In this case, the results provide a lower bound on the

degree to which state dependence drives the observed choices.
A.11.3. Numerical Illustrations
This section provides numerical simulations to illustrate the behavior of ρ, and the
interaction between switching costs and stable brand-preference. I simulate choice scenarios
with varying degrees of heterogeneity in preferences over products and switching costs.
Utilities are given by
uhij = θij + ηi + ij

(A.2)

u−h
ij = θij + ij ,

(A.3)
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θij is a persistent taste shock for consumer i and product j. ηi is a persistent switching
cost for consumer i, which experienced only if the consumer stays with a previously chosen
product, and ij is an iid logit shock.
I first, consider a set of homogeneous set of consumers with identical brand preferences:
θHOM = (2, 2, 4)
Next, I consider a distribution of brand preferences, which are distributed normally around
the same means in θ1 , this time each having a standard deviation of 1.


θN ORM 1




 1 0 0





∼N
 2 2 4 , 0 1 0



0 0 1

Finally, I allow for a mixture of normals, where 50 percent of the sample is drawn from
θN ORM 1 , and 50 percent is drawn from


3
0
0


 






∼ N  1 4 2 , 0 2 0
 .



0 0 1


θN ORM 2

The baseline analysis demonstrates the properties of ρ, across each distribution of consumer
preferences, allowing for various values of a fixed switching cost. For each set of simulations,
I estimate the expectation of ρ by averaging the choices of N = 1, 000 randomly drawn
consumers over R = 500 identically simulated markets.
In a second set of analysis, I allow for heterogeneity in switching costs by drawing consumers
from a log-normal distribution with a standard deviation, ση = 0.5. I choose a log-normal
for this parameter because I am specifically interested in testing the behavior or ρ where
switching costs are weakly positive, as assumed in the set-up of the problem. In unreported
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Figure 26: Simulated ρ = P(A4)/P(A2)
(a) η, Naive Plans

(b) ηi , Naive Plans

(c) η, Mature Plans

(d) ηi , Mature Plans

analysis, I find that the results are qualitatively similar with the unrestricted range of
a normal distribution, provided that the standard deviation is not too large. However,
for sufficiently small means of switching costs, large negative draws from the left tail can
produce some estimates of ρ > 1.
Figure 26 shows the results from these exercises. The left column – panels (a) and (c)
– of the table presents results for simulations using homogeneous switching costs. The
right column – panels (b) and (d) – presents results from simulations using the log-normal
distribution of switching costs. The top two panels – (a) and (b) – show these results for
“naive plans,” where the the first choice cannot involve a switching cost by construction. In
the bottom two panels, I simulate the results using steady state sequences calculated after
a 20-period burn in.
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All of these exercises provide intuition that confirms the results above: ρ is close to 1 (up to
a small amount of simulation error) when there are no switching costs, and deviates from one
as switching costs become larger. Adding heterogeneous brand preferences generates lower
ρ for a given value of switching costs. However, the incremental effect from the the normally
distributed preferences to the mixture model is undetectable in every exercise. Mature plans
look qualitatively similar to naive plans. Adding a distribution of switching costs mutes the
effect of η on ρ. This is likely driven by the assumed log-normal distribution of ηi , which
has a large density below the mean.
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A.12. Estimating Unobserved Premiums
A.12.1. Estimation
The goal of this estimation exercise is to impute counterfactual premiums for demand
and cost estimation. In general, the premiums will reflect the cost at which insurers can
provide a given bundle of health care consumption to consumers. Because premiums are set
individually, they will reflect the underlying costs associated with insuring each employer,
as well as the switching costs and preferences of the employer. Moreover, there may be
important match value between an employer’s preference for certain providers and the prices
a particular insurer has negotiated with those providers.
In order to impute a set of flexibly estimated premiums for unobserved insurers and states,
I implement a Lasso regression predicting logged premiums using as much information as
possible about each employer: their premiums in observed states, and characteristics of their
choice sequences that would imply the strength of their preferences or the magnitude of their
switching costs. Maintaining the employer-specific components of costs is important because
the dispersion of costs across employers is a key driver of selection in the counterfactuals.
Using employer i’s observed premiums as a basis for anchoring their premium levels, the
Lasso specification is designed to impute premium offers using other employers with similar
choice patterns who do purchase from insurer j at some point.

log(pijt ) = f (Xijh , j, h, β̃) + ε̃ijt

(A.4)

where Xij is a vector of measures summarizing observed prices and choices for employer i. β̃
is the set of coefficients on the relevant features. Specifically, Xij contains employer-specific
measures of
• Indicators for each insurer j and state h
• Average observed premiums across all insurers (j) and states (h)
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• Average observed premiums for employer i at each insurer separately
• An indicator variable for whether employer i has an observed premium for insurer j
• Raw choice probabilities for each insurer
• Fraction of years in which an employer switches between insurers
• An indicator for whether or not a choice represents a switch in a given year for that
employer
Average observed premiums for employer i for other insurers and states are included to
capture the employer-specific components of cost. The indicators for employer j are intended
to capture insurer-specific costs. State indicators and the switching rate are included to
capture information about each employers’ switching costs, and the invest-harvest pricing
they face. I also include a third-order polynomial on each pairwise combination of the items
listed above. The intuition behind this is to allow for relative shifts in premiums, which
may be informed by aspects of the choice sequence, using observed premiums for employer
i as a base. These features may have important, and possibly non-linear interactions. For
example, one would expect that a lower switching rate provides some information about the
switching cost. This may impact prices, but should likely be interacted with whether or not
that insurer represents a switch for the employer in that year.
A.12.2. Fit
The root mean squared error of the model is $196.44. To put that number in context, the
root mean squared error for a naive model with only a constant term is $853.60. This results
in an R2 of 0.947 (= 1 − (196.442 /853.602 )), indicating that the model explains nearly 95
percent of the premium variation in the data. Estimates are slightly less dispersed, which
is consistent with premium observations in the tails of the observed premium distribution
containing more measurement error.
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Figure 27: Fit of Estimated Premiums

Notes: Figure displays a binscatter showing estimated premiums over the distribution of
observed premiums. Data are split into 50 percentile bins of observed premiums. Each point
displays the mean predicted value for the bin. Horizontal bars display the standard deviation
of predicted values within a bin.
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A.13. Testing for Measurement Error in Premiums
This Appendix provides additional detail regarding the scale and source of measurement
error in premiums. Because premiums are standardized as a per-person-per-year measure,
fluctuations in firm size can influence the measure of premiums. Premiums are typically paid
on a per-member-per-month basis, whereas I only observe the number of covered lives on a
yearly basis. To illustrate the relationship between measured enrollment and premiums, I
calculate the coefficient of variation of each variable within employer-insurer pairs. Figure
28 presents a binned scatterplot showing the strong, positive relationship between the two.
The orange series recalculates the same measures, conditioning on years in which the number
of covered lives changed by less than 10 percent. This restriction results in lower measured
variation in premiums. The average coefficient of variation in premiums is 0.12, indicating
that the within ij standard deviation of premiums is just over $700 on average.
Figure 28: Within-Employer Variation in Premiums and Enrollment

Although employer size is not an important determinant of premium setting in my model,
Figure 28 could also be consistent with a model of employer-insurer bargaining in which
larger employers receive lower premiums. Under such a model, fluctuations in firm size
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would result in changes to premiums due to real economic forces rather than measurement
error. To directly test this, I estimate two regressions that capture the relationship between
firm size and premiums within an employer-insurer dyad.

pijt = βN Nit + γij + 1it
pijt − pijt−1 = βδ (Nit − Nit−1 ) + 2it

(A.5)
(A.6)
(A.7)

I use the first equation to estimate βN , restricting to years in which the year-to-year change
in premiums is small. This specification is intended to capture any “true” price effects, while
omitting years in which large transitions take place. Intuitively, βN captures the premium
difference for the same employer-insurer pair between years in which the employer is large
or small, but not transitioning in size. By contrast βδ in the second equation is designed to
capture the fluctuations in premiums that occur purely due to the year-to-year change in
observed firm size.
I compare estimates of βN when the percent change in N is small, to estimates of βδ in
years where the percent change in N is large. The difference between these two estimates
estimates is informative about the degree to which the correlation between premiums and
covered lives is driven by measurement error rather than an employer size discount. If
|βδ − βN | is small then premium fluctuations are likely driven entirely by economic forces,
whereas a large difference implies observed “size” discounts that are driven by measurement
error in enrollment.
Figure 29 presents the estimates of this exercise, where the x-axis varies the threshold by
which I consider a percent change in N to be large or small. Focusing on the non-differences
fixed-effect specification, βN , the gradient between firm size and premiums is small, and
consistent across thresholds. On the other hand, estimates of βδ , focusing on large year-to178

year changes in premiums, show a much stronger relationship between the two measures.
As the treshold approaches 50 percent, the estimating samples become more similar and the
estimates for both coefficients converge. I view this as strong evidence that a large amount
of within employer-insurer premium variation is driven by measurement error in firm size
fluctuations.
Figure 29: Testing for Impact of Fluctuations in Coverage Count
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